



lituanus

LITHUANIAN QUARTERLY • 1960 • VOLUME VI • NO. 2

l i t u a n u s

lithuanian quarterly

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Published in March, June, September
and December by the Lithuanian
Student Association, Inc.

Editorial and Subscription Office
916 WILLOUGHBY AVE.
BROOKLYN 21, N. Y.

Subscription price \$2.00 per year.

Second class postage paid at Brooklyn
Post Office.


VOLUME VI. NO. 2
SEPTEMBER 1960

SOVIET RULE IN LITHUANIA

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The illustrations appearing in this issue are the work of artists
in occupied Lithuania • Lithograph on the cover — LITHU-
ANIAN FREEDOM FIGHTER by V. K. Jonynas, U.S.A.





dance, puppets, dance . . .

Festivals are an indispensable feature of the summer season in Europe. From Scotland to Italy, nations try to outdo each other in color, spectacle, pageantry. Yet one of the strangest festivals, although unlisted in the tourist manuals took place on July 21st in Soviet-occupied Lithuania.

Over 32,000 folk-dancers and singers were transported to Vilnius, capital of the country. They were made to sing and dance, to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the annexation of their country by Soviet Russia. The main honor guest at the festivities was none other than M. Suslov, the alleged head of the Stalinist faction in the Kremlin, and the main architect of genocide against Lithuania in 1944-46. The highlights of his speech were an attack against the Captive Nations Week (whose main slogan is self-determination for all nations) and a scolding for the shortcomings in Lithuania's industry, resulting in a lesser intake for the "motherland of socialism". Meanwhile in Moscow, Khrushchev was eloquently upholding the rights of the Congo and of Cuba to national sovereignty.

In the United States, an American Baltic Commemorative Committee was established, with former U.S. president Herbert Hoover as its chairman. In a Manifesto issued in June, 1960, Balts in the free world appealed "to the conscience of all mankind to perceive the magnitude of the injustice perpetrated upon the Baltic countries and to support their efforts toward the restoration of the liberty of these countries." Lithuanians abroad tried to counter the mock-festival with a campaign of truth, the best weapon against Soviet interpretation of history. This issue of *Lituanus* represents a contribution to this effort, especially on the part of the younger generation of Lithuanians. Within its covers, the editors and collaborators of this magazine have attempted to illuminate the basic components of the Lithuanian situation.

Civilization has progressed in our century insofar that international crimes, although committed with unabated vigor, are no more publicly admitted. (Granting a sceptic's right to argue that classic imperialism was more honest.) Hence the need for contemporary imperialist states to devise intricate legalistic justifications for their actions. The first article in this issue describes Soviet efforts to justify the annexation. The main five Soviet arguments on the legality of the annexation are analyzed, their inherent distortions and self-contradictions are pointed out. An important companion piece to this article is a review of two recent books dealing with the annexation of the Baltic States, to be found at the end of this issue.

Soviet assertions that Lithuania's annexation by the U.S.S.R. expressed the will of the Lithuanian people, is further repudiated by the scope and intensity of the resistance movement in Lithuania. This movement is the subject of an article, which is illustrated by excerpts from a book by one of the leaders of the guerilla war in Lithuania.

Colonization, deportations, religious persecution — these are the subjects of the following articles. They throw a light on the wounds from which Lithuania has not yet recovered, and explain the popular non-acceptance of the Communist rule.

The flash of lightning on the true face of Hungary's youth in 1956 was a revelation for the West. The article on present-day youth of Lithuania attempts to define the distribution of young Lithuanians between the two poles of "acquiescence" and "resistance". The article is illustrated by excerpts from the controversial novel *Studentai* (The Students).

The situation of Lithuanian artists and intellectuals is described in the following articles: *The Work of Lithuanian Historians, the Official Line and Creative Ideas, Art in Occupied Lithuania, New Developments in Architecture*. The main theme of these articles is the great conflict between totalitarian dogma and the creative spirit of man.

We believe that this issue has an important message not only to those who have special interest in Lithuania, or East-Central Europe in general; what these articles describe is, in the final analysis, man's—in this case the Lithuanian's—undying hope and ability to endure and to maintain his dignity in face of overwhelming odds. With the totalitarian tide on the rise in this summer of 1960 and with its threat to the very survival of liberty, the situation of Lithuania as described herein acquires a special meaning and urgency.

20th MOCK

A N N I V E R S A R Y

Soviet aggression against the Baltic States was such an obvious international criminal act that the Kremlin had a most difficult time in devising justifying explanations and then changing them again. The author points out how different versions of the Soviet story contradict each other.

SOVIET EFFORTS TO JUSTIFY BALTIC ANNEXATION

By DOMAS KRIVICKAS

Since 1940, when the Baltic states were incorporated into the Soviet Union, Soviet authorities and writers had advanced several theories to justify that event. The theories have varied with the general political situation.

The first official Soviet explanation was that the Baltic peoples voluntarily decided to join the Soviet Union through their representatives elected to the People's Diets. During World War II another thesis was advanced, to the effect that the Baltic states had not observed the conditions of peaceful coexistence and that the Soviet Union had therefore been compelled to demand a change of their governments. Still another explanation was offered at the same time — that a social revolution had taken place in the Baltic states, and that the governments of independent Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia had been overthrown before, or immediately after, the entry of Soviet troops. After the war the Soviet union tried to justify its action in the Baltic states in 1939-1940 on the grounds of the necessity for creating an Eastern front in order to defeat Nazi Germany. Finally, some writers undertook to prove that the introduction of the Soviet regime in 1940 was nothing but the reinstatement of the Communist regime that had been in power in Lithuania in 1918-1919.

Before we enter into an analysis of these theories, we will restate in brief the most important events leading up to the incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union.

The Soviets and Nazis Divide up the Baltic

On August 23, 1939, the Soviet Union, in direct violation of its obligations under Article 10 of the League of Nations Covenant, entered into a nonaggression pact with Nazi Germany. This pact provided for the partitioning of six neighboring states.

In a secret agreement attached to this pact, and in the supplementary protocol of September 28, 1939, the Soviet Union and Germany agreed that Lithuania would be incorporated into the Soviet Union, with the exception of a small section of southern Lithuania, which was to become a part of Germany. In the supplementary protocol it was stated that "As soon as the government of the U.S.S.R. shall take special measures on Lithuanian territory to protect its interests, the present

German-Lithuanian border, for the purpose of a natural and simple boundary delineation, shall be rectified in such a way that the Lithuanian territory situated to the southwest of the line marked on the attached map should fall to Germany."¹

Thus even before the outbreak of World War II, the Soviet Union and Germany had disposed of Lithuania's territory as if it were their own property. However, everyone wanted to save face. When, on October 3, 1939, Molotov proposed that simultaneous action be undertaken to delimit the respective zones of interest in Lithuania, the German Ambassador, Count von der Schulenburg, reacted vigorously:

"Molotov's suggestion seems to me harmful, since in the eyes of the world it would make us appear as 'robbers' of Lithuanian territory, while the Soviet government figures as the donor. As I see it, only my suggestion enters into consideration at all. However, I would ask you to consider whether it might not be advisable for us, by a separate secret German-Soviet protocol, to forge the cession of the strip of Lithuanian territory until the Soviet Union actually incorporates Lithuania, an idea on which, I believe, the arrangement concerning Lithuania was originally based!"²

On October 8, 1939, such an agreement was reached. Molotov, in a letter to the German Ambassador in Moscow, stated that the following understanding existed between the Soviet Union and Germany:

"1. The Lithuanian territory mentioned in the protocol and marked on the map attached to the protocol shall not be occupied in case forces of the Red Army should be stationed (in Lithuania);

"2. It shall be left to Germany to determine the date for implementing the agreement concerning the cession to Germany of the above-mentioned Lithuanian territory."³

By an agreement of January 10, 1941, Germany agreed that, in return for \$7, 500,000 compensation the aforementioned part of southern Lithuania, which had already been occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940, should remain under the Soviet Union.⁴

The Soviet Union, acting upon these agreements, imposed upon the Baltic states the mutual assistance pacts providing for the establishment of Soviet military bases in those countries. When in 1940, the German troops entered Paris, the

Secret Supplementary Protocol

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries declare the agreement of the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the U.S.S.R. upon the following:

The Secret Supplementary Protocol signed on August 23, 1939, shall be amended in item 1 to the effect that the territory of the Lithuanian state falls to the sphere of influence of the U.S.S.R., while, on the other hand, the province of Lublin and parts of the province of Warsaw fall to the sphere of influence of Germany (cf. the map attached to the Boundary and Friendship Treaty signed today). As soon as the Government of the U.S.S.R. shall take special measures on Lithuanian territory to protect its interest, the present German-Lithuanian border, for the purpose of a natural and simple boundary delineation, shall be rectified in such a way that the Lithuanian territory situated to the southwest of the line marked on the attached map should fall to Germany.

Further it is declared that the economic agreements now in force between Germany and Lithuania shall not be affected by the measures of the Soviet Union referred to above.

Moscow, September 28, 1939.

For the Government
of the German Reich:
J. Ribbentrop

By authority of the
Government of the U.S.S.R.:
W. Molotov

Soviet Union presented ultimatums to the Baltic states demanding the free entry of an unlimited number of Soviet troops into the Baltic countries and a change of their governments. On June 15, 1940, Soviet troops occupied Lithuania.

This action was undertaken in spite of the Soviet Union's solemn promises to respect Lithuania's independence and territorial integrity contained in Article 1 of the peace treaty of July 12, 1920, and Articles 2 and 3 of the nonaggression treaty of September 25, 1926. Moreover, by the July 5, 1933, Convention for the Definition of Aggression, the Soviet Union had agreed to recognize as the aggressor in a conflict the state that was first either to declare war or to invade with its military forces. And it was added that no considerations of a political, military, economic or any other nature were to serve as excuse for the aggression.

"People's Diet Asked for Incorporation" Theory

The Soviet Union, to save face, attempted to cover its annexation of the Baltics with a cloak of legality. It was important for the Soviet Union that annexation of the Baltic states appear to be carried out through the action of the peoples of those states. Therefore Moscow ordered elections to the People's Diets, with single lists of candidates. The Diets were assigned the mission of introducing a Soviet regime in each of the Baltic countries and of filing requests for the admission of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union. They carried out this assignment.

Professor Lapradelle, an authority on international law, has said:

"Never before had an occupying power arranged general elections in an occupied country

in order to create an elective parliament charged with the prescribed task of voting for the incorporation of its country in the occupying one. In order not to shock world opinion, the Russian stage managers desired that the Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians should themselves go on record as petitioners for their admission into the Soviet Union.

"But if the elections, held under the conditions of military occupation, were to have any validity from the internal political point of view ... the question of the surrender of sovereignty and the proposal for incorporation in the Soviet Union should have been explicitly announced to the electorate before the elections. The platform of the government-sponsored party, however, did not suggest this eventuality by a single word."⁵

Professor Savory, of Queen's University, Belfast, speaking in the House of Commons on May 23, 1943, said:

"The elections in all three countries took place on July 14th and 15th, but the counting of votes did not take place until July 17th; however, on July 15th the British press reported that of 79 deputies elected to the Lithuanian Parliament, 80% belonged to the Communist Party... In fact, the results were published in the London press before the counting took place."⁶

A committee of the U.S. Congress, after investigating the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union, concluded:

"The evidence is overwhelming and conclusive that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were forcibly occupied and illegally annexed by the U.S.S.R. Any claims by the U.S.S.R. that the elections conducted in July, 1940, were free and voluntary or that the resolutions adopted by the resulting

June 15, 1940

After signing Treaties of Non-Aggression, Amity and Mutual Assistance (1920, 1926 and 1939) which were to remain in force until 1945, the Soviet Union on that day broke them all and occupied Lithuania by force. Although the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, M. Molotov, gave new promises of non-interference in Lithuanian internal affairs, in fact he sent his assistant, M. Dekanozov, to Lithuania for the express purpose of ordering Lithuanian internal affairs and incorporating Lithuania into the Soviet Union. M. Dekanozov, together with the Soviet Union's envoy to Lithuania, M. Pozdniakov, dictated the new government, the so-called "People's Government". This was only a puppet-show, manipulated by those who had dictated its formation: M. M. Dekanozov and Pozdniakov.

The suppression of all the political parties, the economic, cultural and religious organizations, followed swiftly. Only one party was allowed: the Communist. During the night of July 11-12, 1940, the leading personalities of the press, of public organizations and of public life in general, were arrested and incarcerated. After six months in prison they were charged as "counter-revolutionaries" and sentenced to long terms with hard labor and deported to the prisons and labor camps of Siberia. Those members of the former governments who had not fled from Lithuania were also deported to Russia.

On July 14 and 15, "elections" to a "People's Parliament" were staged. Only the Communist Party, which at that time had about 700 members, that is about 0.002 % of the total population, and mainly non-Lithuanians at that, could present candidates. The candidates presented on the single list made up exactly the number of representatives to be elected. Therefore the polling was meaningless. Whether there were more votes or less, or none at all, all the candidates nominated would be elected. Naturally the people did not want to take part in elections of that sort. According to a declaration of the "President" of the "People's Government", only about 15 or 16% of the population actually voted. In order to raise the percentage, the committees which were to count the votes were told to "supplement" the ballot. It thus came about that in certain districts 110 to 120 percent of those having the right to vote, "voted."

The attempt to camouflage the actual boycott of the elections was rather clumsy. Moscow had decided beforehand that the percentage of the voters was to be 99% and, strange to say, the results of the "elections" were officially announced by the Soviet news agency in a London newspaper twenty four hours before the closing of the "polls".

When the "Peoples Parliament" was convened on July 21, it was ordered to beg the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union to incorporate Lithuania into the Soviet Union. The appropriate resolution was prepared at the Soviet Legation and translated from Russian into Lithuanian. The whole procedure was also decided upon at the Legation; the members of the "People's Parliament" who were to speak were designated and each was told what to say and when to say it. The speakers had to hand in their speeches in writing beforehand and the necessary corrections were made so that everything should be strictly "in line". The National Theatre, where the one and only session of "Parliament" took place was filled, besides the members, with representatives of the N.K.V.D. (Secret Police) and members of the Communist Party. These took full part in the proceedings, raised their hands together with the members. But since nobody counted the votes, this did not greatly matter: everything was "unanimous" anyway.

That was how the "People's Parliament" on July 21, 1940 begged that Lithuania be permitted to join the Soviet Union.

In the resolution itself of the "People's Parliament" it is stated that "the people, helped by the mighty Red Army overthrew the yoke of the Smetona (i. e. the last President of the free Lithuanian Republic) oppressors"—that means, with the help of a foreign armed force. On June 30, 1940, M. Molotov told Prof. Krėvė-Mickevičius, acting prime-minister of the "People's Government", that "the Government of the Soviet Union had determined to incorporate the Baltic States into the family of Soviet Republics" (Lithuanian Archives III, p. 11). Thus there can be no talk of the free adherence of Lithuania to the Soviet Union. Despite these facts, Soviet propaganda has been continually proclaiming that the Lithuanian people joined the Soviet Union at their own free will, having expressed wishes in this matter in a truly democratic fashion!

parliaments petitioning for recognition as Soviet republics were legal are false and without foundation in fact."

When during the Nuernberg Trials some of the German defendants tried to justify the annexation of Austria as an expression of the will of the Austrian people, the Tribunal turned down the excuse:

"It was contended before the Tribunal that the annexation of Austria was justified by the strong desire expressed in many quarters for the

union of Austria and Germany; that there were many matters in common between the two peoples that made this union desirable; and that in the result this objective was achieved without bloodshed.

"These claims, even if true, are really immaterial, for the facts plainly show that the methods employed to reach the objective were those of an aggressor. The ultimate factor was the armed might of Germany ready to be used if any resistance was encountered."

"Nonobservation of Peaceful Coexistence" Theory

In 1941 the Soviet War News, on behalf of the Soviet Information Bureau, published the pamphlet *The Soviet Union, Finland and the Baltic States*, in which the thesis was advanced that the Soviet government had been compelled to demand a change in the governments of the Baltic states because these countries had failed to observe the conditions of peaceful coexistence. The point was presented as follows:

"The Soviet government considered that the Baltic states were in duty bound to fulfill only condition for peaceful coexistence. This condition was loyalty and readiness (and this not only in words but in deeds) on the part of the Baltic states not to violate the security of the Soviet Union, not to transform their territory into places d'armes for possible attacks on the Soviet Union, not to permit any country to establish a protectorate over themselves, not to give their territory 'on lease' for its possible use by any aggressor or would-be aggressor against the Soviet Union."⁹

According to the pamphlet, the Baltic countries did not meet these conditions.

"But both the foreign and the home policies pursued by the governments of the Baltic states during the whole period under review not only demonstrated their hostility to the Soviet Union but systematically violated precisely the one essential condition for peaceful, good-neighborly coexistence — the condition which, had it been respected, would have formed a real basis for their independence and self-determination and the maintenance of peace."¹⁰

The pamphlet concluded:

"The Soviet Union could not but draw the only possible deduction from all these facts, and in 1940 it was constrained to demand that there should be a change in the governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania— since their hostility toward the U.S.S.R. threatened the complete subordination of the Baltic states to German fascism.

"Only politically blind people or hopelessly stupid ones did not understand that had Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia not entered the Soviet Union in 1940, they would have shared the fate of Czechoslovakia, Norway, Denmark and other countries that have been enslaved by Hitler."¹¹

In fact, at the time when the Soviet Union presented its ultimatums to the Baltic states (June 1940), their situation was as follows: By the so-called mutual assistance treaties imposed upon them by the Soviet Union in 1939, the Baltic states were constrained to turn over military bases "on lease" to the Soviet Union and to admit on their territories at least 50,000 to 60,000 Soviet troops. Thus the Soviet Union itself was guilty of transforming the Baltic states into "places d'armes" and of establishing a protectorate over them.

The Soviet Information Bureau also tried to present the Soviet Union as a "savior" by stating that had the Baltic states not entered the Soviet Union, "they would have shared the fate of Cze-

choslovakia, Norway, Denmark and other countries that have been enslaved by Hitler." But the Red Terror was not only equal to, but worse than the Brown Terror for the Baltics, and the losses of Lithuania's population alone under the Red Terror amount to several hundred thousands.

"Formation of the Eastern Front" Theory

In 1948 the U.S. State Department published a collection of documents under the title *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941*. This book provided crystal-clear evidence of Soviet conspiracy and aggression against neighboring states. The Soviet Information Bureau immediately responded with another pamphlet, *Falsifiers of History*, in which it tries to justify the Soviet action on strategic grounds. The principal arguments were as follows:

"On March 12, 1940, the Soviet-Finnish treaty was signed. Thus the defense of the U.S.S.R. against Hitlerite aggression was strengthened in the North, in the Leningrad area ... But this did not mean that the formation of an Eastern front from the Baltic to the Black Sea had been completed. Pacts had been concluded, but there were as yet no Soviet troops capable of holding the defenses. Moldavia and Bukovina had been formally reunited with the U.S.S.R., but there, too, there were still no Soviet troops capable of holding the defenses. In the middle of June, 1940, Soviet troops entered Bukovina and Moldavia. The latter had been severed by Rumania from the U.S.S.R. after the October Revolution.

"Thus the formation of an Eastern front against Hitlerite aggression from the Baltic to the Black Sea was completed.

"The British and French ruling circles, which went on abusing the U.S.S.R. and calling it an aggressor for creating an Eastern front, evidently did not realize that the appearance of an Eastern front signified a radical turn in the development of the war — a turn against Hitler's tyranny, a turn in favor of a victory for democracy.

"They did not realize that it was not a question of infringing or not infringing upon the national rights of Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, but the point was to organize victory over the Nazis in order to prevent the conversion of those countries into disfranchised colonies of Hitler Germany."¹²

Thus the Soviet Union, as Hitler had done in the case of Austria, finally stressed strategic advantages and emphatically denied the national rights of the other nations. Yet the Soviet Union was not at war with Nazi Germany when the Soviet troops overran the Baltic states. On the contrary, this was a period of fraternization between the two countries. Soviet military action against Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia was carried out in agreement with Germany on delimitation of their respective zones of influence.

As for the claim that the Soviet Union intended "to prevent the conversion of those coun-

tries into disfranchised colonies of Hitler Germany," it is rather ridiculous if one considers that in 1948, when this pamphlet was published, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, had been converted into "disfranchised colonies" of the Soviet Union.

The "Social Revolution" Theory

In another effort to absolve the Soviet Union of guilt in the annexation, efforts were made to show that the establishment of the Soviet regime in the Baltic countries was the result of social revolutions in all three countries and that the governments of independent Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia had been overthrown by local revolutionary forces.

"As a preliminary to armed intervention, the democratic-socialist opposition, cooperating with the local Communist Parties, staged coups d'etats. In all three capitals people's governments were set up. These governments gave power to local political forces grouped in the Left bloc; formal in Latvia and Estonia, informal in Lithuania"¹³ — such is the presentation of events by G. Melksins in a Soviet propaganda booklet published in New York in 1943.

The same point was presented by V. Niunka, a Secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party, as follows:

"In 1940 the antifascist movement of working people became a great force. Taking advantage of the situation, the working people of Lithuania, under the leadership of the Communist Party, overthrew the bourgeois dictatorship and took power into their hands."¹⁴

Thus an inexperienced reader might easily be led to believe that the Soviet Union had nothing to do with the establishment of the Soviet regime in the Baltic countries. But the truth is completely different from what Melksins and Niunka say. First, there were no changes in the governments of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia before the Soviet troops occupied those countries. Second, the formation of the new governments was directed by special Soviet Emissaries. On June 17, 1940, Molotov wrote to the German Ambassador in Moscow:

"For the negotiations concerning the formation of the new governments the Soviet government had sent the following special emissaries, in addition to the Soviet envoys accredited there: to Lithuania, Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs Dekanozov; to Latvia, Vishinsky, the representative of the Council of People's Commissars; to Estonia, Leningrad Region Party Secretary Zhdanov."¹⁵

The composition of the new puppet governments was directed by these men. In Lithuania, A. Merkys, Acting President of the Republic, under duress appointed J. Paleckis, Dekanozov's nominee, as Prime Minister.

The elections to the People's Diet cannot be considered a revolutionary act, for they were engineered by Moscow. In this connection it is worthwhile to note the words of K. Marek:

"It must further be borne in mind that a

revolution is a spontaneous phenomenon; in the case of the Baltics, however, it took place with an uncanny identity of timing and procedure in what were, after all, three entirely separate states. Yet the dates of the consecutive stages of that allegedly revolutionary development were almost as identical as were the resolutions produced by the allegedly revolutionary bodies...

"The identical resolutions of the three Parliaments providing for the alienation of Baltic independence fell like a blow on an electorate which throughout all preceding stages, had been given assurances that this independence would be safeguarded... The elections fully deserved the following comment by Justice Atkinson: 'I think one might say it was a glorious triumph for those who engineered the elections.'"¹⁶

The thesis of social revolution was discounted even by the Lithuanian People's Diet itself. In its July 22, 1940, Declaration on the Entrance of Lithuania into the Soviet Union, it dispelled any doubt about the real masters who had arranged the entire performance:

"Now the people, helped by the mighty Red Army... had established in their country the Soviet Government... If the people have been able to establish in their country the only just order — the Soviet order — it is all due to the Soviet Union!"¹⁷

Molotov told Foreign Minister Kreve-Mickevičius about Moscow's intentions during the latter's visit to Moscow on July 2, 1940, even before the elections had taken place.

"You will see that before four months have passed the people of all the Baltic states will vote for incorporation, which will take place without any disturbances, even though you try to intimidate me... You would be doing the most intelligent thing if you would accept without any hesitations the leadership of the Communist Party, which is determined to effect the unification of all Europe and the application of the new order."¹⁸

The "Reinstatement" Theory

The idea that a nation would voluntarily renounce its independence and agree to its inclusion in another state is so implausible that when Hitler made the suggestion in the case of Czechoslovakia, Soviet Foreign Commissar Litvinov refused to accept it:

"It is difficult to admit that any people would voluntarily agree to the destruction of its independence and its inclusion in another state, still less a people that for hundreds of years fought for independence and for twenty years maintained its independence."¹⁹

Therefore Soviet writers sought again and again for new explanations of the Baltic incorporation. Several authors, in particular A. M. Andreev, attempted to prove that establishment of the Soviet regime in 1940 had been nothing but the reinstatement of the same regime that was

first established in Lithuania in 1918-1919. The only thing they succeeded in proving, however, was that the establishment of the 1918-1919 Soviet regime had been an act of Moscow, just as the establishment of the 1940 regime was.

According to Andreev, on October 23, 1917, Lithuanian sections were organized in the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party (Bolsheviks) in Russia (Lithuania was under German occupation at the time). On May 26-27, 1918, they transmitted orders to Lithuanian Communists "to form a uniform Communist organization that would work on the basis of the program and tactics of the Russian Communist Party (b)."²⁰ In July, 1918, in pursuance of these orders, the Social Democratic Workers' Party of Lithuania and Byelorussia was formed. On August 14, 1918, on orders from Moscow, the name was changed to the Communist Party of Lithuania and Byelorussia.

The formation of this party was necessary in order to justify military intervention and to present this military action as assistance to the local population.

"The R.S.F.S.R. sent its troops to help the workers of Byelorussia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia," according to Andreev. At the end of 1918, Red Army troops penetrated deeply into Lithuania.

On December 8, 1918, on Stalin's orders, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania and Byelorussia formed the Provisional Revolutionary Workers' Government of Lithuania, headed by V. Kapsukas-Mickevičius chief of the Lithuanian Bureau of the Communist Party in Moscow, and on December 22 of that year the government of Soviet Russia recognized the authority of Kapsukas' government and "instruct-

ed all civil and military authorities to give all necessary assistance."²¹

Because the people did not support this government its life was a short one, and toward the end of February, 1919, it was transformed into the Lithuanian-Byelorussian Soviet Republic. But the Lithuanian National Army drove back the Russian invaders, and the peace treaty between the government of the Russian republic and the Lithuanian National Government was signed in Moscow on July 12, 1920. Thus ended Soviet Russia's first attempt to subjugate Lithuania.

Conclusions

The Soviet efforts to justify the annexation of Lithuania are contradictory. On the one hand, efforts have been made to explain the action by trying to show it to be the result of the free determination of the Lithuanian people (elections, social revolution), and on the other hand, reasons of security and strategy have been advanced. These explanations cancel each other out. If Lithuania was incorporated in the Soviet Union for security and strategic reasons, the decisive factor was the will of the Soviet Union and not the will of the Lithuanian nation. According to Professor Savory, there are no better words to characterize the Soviet action in the Baltic states in 1940 than these words of Lenin himself:

"If a small or weak nation is not accorded the right of deciding the form of its political existence by a free vote — implying the complete withdrawal of troops of an incorporating or merely strong nation — then the incorporation is an annexation, an arbitrary appropriation of a foreign country, an act of violence."²²

NOTES:

1. U.S. Department of State, *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941*, edited by Raymond James Sontag and Francis James Beddie. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948, p. 107.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 112.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 118.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 267-268.

5. "La Jeune Suisse," February, 1944. Quoted from "Lithuanian Bulletin," New York, Vol. V, No. 5-6, 1947, p. 3.

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The year 1940 marked the beginning of the first Soviet occupation of Lithuania. Since then Lithuanians have continuously resisted their oppressors. The author, a former participant in the Lithuanian resistance movement, describes its historical development.

TWENTY YEARS OF RESISTANCE

By STASYS ZYMANTAS

is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to
be purchased at the price of chains and
slavery?

Forbid, it, Almighty God! I know not
what course others may take, but as for
me, give me liberty, or death.

Patrick Henry

The Lithuanian nation's resistance against its Soviet Occupiers has not yet ended, but it already has its history, which is an inseparable part of European history — part of the vast resistance movement that was born in Europe during World War II and that is still alive today in some East European countries.

The word "resistance" was first used in its present meaning by General de Gaulle in a talk on the British radio on June 22, 1940, and it took immediate root in Lithuania.

"Resistance," wrote Georges Bidault, head of the French underground National Council, "is first of all a state of mind, reinforced by an act of faith. A spirit of refusal—refusal to become dishonorable, to collaborate, to despair in the face of the misfortunes befalling the country. An act of faith—faith in a few virtues perilously preserved: honor, courage, the spirit of sacrifice, love of freedom."¹

To the Lithuanians, just as to the Frenchmen, resistance meant a national decision, the categorical NO of a whole nation. It meant more than simply armed action against the aggressor — it was a viewpoint which made the struggle of every individual meaningful and inspired the nation to an active part in history."²

Resistance to Soviet Oppression

The loss of independence in 1940 was a harsh experience. Suddenly Lithuania lost its freedom, and the national culture and economic progress achieved during the years of that freedom. The people were stunned by this blow, but they were not knocked out.

The Soviet occupation turned out to be more than merely a military occupation; through the use of force and terrorism drastic social and economical changes were made, a totalitarian dictatorship was introduced and the country was annexed to the Soviet Union. Under these conditions the usual methods of resistance against wartime military occupation were impossible. No help was forthcoming from the Western countries. However, resistance to Soviet oppression manifested itself during the very first days of the occupation, and before long it took on a strong and definite organizational form.

On November 17, 1940, at the initiative of Col. K. Škirpa, Lithuania's Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary, the Lithuanian Activist Front (Lietuvių Aktyvistų Frontas, or L.A.F.) was launched in Berlin by the unanimous action of political leaders who had managed to escape from occupied Lithuania. It solved the problem of unifying the resistance movement at home and provided it with a clearcut organizational framework.

Efforts were made to safeguard the moral strength of the nation. The underground struggle against the Russification and Sovietization activities of the occupier was very difficult. Great determination and great sacrifices were demanded of those who joined the active resistance, for its work was carried out under terribly difficult conditions.

Only one underground paper, "Laisvoji Lietuva" ("Free Lithuania"), was published as compared with the large number of underground publications during the German occupation a year later. The editors and publishers of this underground paper were arrested in January 1941 and were tortured and sentenced to death. But the underground fight went on. Its scope and strength were manifest in the revolt of June 22, 1941.

The Revolt

War was imminent between Germany and the Soviet Union. The leaders of the Lithuanian resistance movement had no illusions as far as Nazi plans were concerned, but they were preparing for the fateful moment of war to give the signal for a sudden revolt. They hoped to get rid of the occupier, take power into their hands and proclaim a provisional government. Thus the Germans would be confronted with a fait accompli.

The Germans had a number of plans regarding the future of the Soviet-occupied countries: those of Ribbentrop, Rosenberg and Himmler. Hitler decided the course of action only a few weeks before the war; as expected, it was not favorable to Lithuanian aspirations. A few days before the war, representatives of the Gestapo asked Lithuania's envoy K. Škirpa, who was still in Berlin, that the Lithuanians abstain from any revolt and from the formation of a government.

In spite of this, on the very first day of the German-Soviet war, June 22, 1941, a sudden revolt was launched in Kaunas against the Soviet occupation. On June 23 the Kaunas radio announced the restoration of Lithuanian independence and the formation of a Lithuanian Provisional Government. On June 24 Kaunas was free from the Russians; not until the next day, June 25, did the Germans reach the city. The city of Vilnius was also liberated by Lithuanian rebels before the Germans marched in on the early morning of June 24.

After the restoration of Lithuania's independence was announced the revolt against the Soviet occupation spread throughout the whole country. The retreating Russians killed 412 prisoners at the concentration camp of Pravieniškiai — only 50 prisoners managed to escape the massacre; they also killed 73 prisoners in the Rālniai woods near Telšiai. This wave of terrorism would have spread had it not been halted by the swiftness of the rebellion. It is estimated that the number of rebels came to about 100,000. In some respects the uprising in Kaunas and Vilnius reminds one of the later fighting in the streets of Budapest. For the most part those who took part in the Lithuanian revolt were youths—students and young workers—and they were largely unarmed. Like Budapest's Freedom Fighters, the Lithuanian rebels attacked Soviet tanks with nothing but revolvers in their hands, or with no weapons at all, and they provided themselves with arms by attacking and disarming Soviet soldiers.³ Soviet tanks were forced to abandon the cities.

The revolution helped to safeguard Vilnius and Kaunas from the destruction of war, saved many lives from Soviet genocide, freed political prisoners, permitted the Lithuanians to take over the national administration and demonstrated to the whole world the nation's determination to be free and independent.

A New Phase

The Germans did not recognize the Provisional Government of Lithuania and interfered with its activities. They demanded that the government dissolve and cease its activities within twelve hours, but they did not employ repressive measures, as they did when confronted with a similar situation in the Ukraine; rather, they were inclined to ignore the fact that there had been a revolt and that the restoration of Lithuania's independence had been proclaimed. On June 25, the German Telegraph Agency announced in very vague terms that "the aspirations of certain individuals in the Baltic States did not coincide with the opinion of the Reich's Ministry of Foreign Affairs."⁴

The establishment of a German Civilian Government and the formation of "Ostland" were not announced until July 25. On August 5 all activities of the Lithuanian Provisional Government were formally halted.

The attitude of the Lithuanian people toward the German occupation was clear and unanimous. There was not a single political group willing to cooperate with the Nazis. Even the number of individual quislings was comparatively low.⁵ We have to keep in mind the fact that at this point the threat of Soviet imperialism had not diminished or been forgotten, and that the attitude of the West toward the Baltic states was exceedingly vague and far from encouraging.

Underground activities continued during the German occupation under practically the same leadership as before but with even larger popular participation.

Several underground organizations, such as the Lithuanian Front (Lietuvių Frontas, or L.F.), the Lithuanian Freedom Fighters' Association (Lietuvių Laisvės Kovotojų Sąjunga, or L.L.K.S.) and others, were formed. Political parties also took an active part in the underground. In 1943 all the political parties and resistance organization formed a central body, the Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania (Vyriausiasis Lietuvos Išlaisvinimo Komitetas, or V.L.I.K.).

The Underground Press

The resistance movement published and circulated an extensive underground press, which kept the people well informed, disclosed Nazi atrocities — their extermination of the Jews, etc. — and gave people advice on how to meet the demands of the Nazis. The press had a great deal of influence on the attitude of the people toward the occupying power.

The L.L.K.S. issued its first proclamation in September, 1941. In the fall of the same year the first printed underground newspaper, "Nepriklausoma Lietuva" ("Independent Lithuania"), was published by the Peasant Union in Vilnius; it appeared regularly for three years. Other noteworthy underground publications were "Laisvės

Kovotojas" ("The Freedom Fighter"), published by L.L.K.S., and "Į Laisvę" ("To Freedom), published by the L.F. The circulation of these underground papers came to between 5,000 and 10,000 copies and sometimes even reached 20,000 copies. Proportionally, this underground press did not lag behind the underground press of other countries, for instance France. There were 28 underground periodical publications during the Nazi occupation; this number exceeded the number of officially published periodicals during that time, which was 18.⁶

The underground fight against the Nazi plans for Lithuania was carried out on a very large scale. It was a fight against German efforts to close down the colleges and universities and to halt the development of national culture, as well as a fight against German plans for colonization, extermination of the Jews, economic exploitations and mobilization.

The best example of the Lithuanian reaction against Nazi designs can be found in a proclamation published by the Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania when the Germans, on February 18, 1944, requested 100,000 men (between 15 and 55) and women (between 16 and 45), at the rate of 5,000 a week, for labor service in Germany: "The Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania advised all those called upon not to surrender to the pressure of terrorism. We must bravely and unanimously say No to this as we have to other previous threats."

The German efforts to organize a Lithuanian SS legion were even less successful. Only 2% of those called responded to the orders for mobilization, and most of these were people who were crippled or otherwise unfit for military duty. This was considered an insult to the German Reich, and drastic repressions took place as a consequence. On March 16 and 17, 1944 forty-six hostages were taken prisoner from among the Lithuanian intelligentsia — among them professors, clergymen, men of politics and administrators — and sent to the concentration camp at Stutthof, where many of them soon perished. In addition, all institutions of higher learning were closed. There were also arrests among the families of those who avoided mobilization.⁷ Commissar General von Renteln declared that all those who out of patriotic motives disobeyed German orders would be treated as prisoners of war and as enemies.⁸

Solidarity with the Western Democracies

On April 30, 1944, and the days following, a series of arrests was carried out among leading members of the underground organizations and the top leadership of the resistance movement. Six of the nine members of the Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania were arrested. All of them were charged with the crime of communicating with the Western Allies, or treason to the Reich (Hochverrat), and were sent to German prisons.

The Lithuanian underground, along with the whole nation, was waiting and hoping for the victory of the Western democracies and was ready to assist in achieving it. The underground had secret communications with the West and was keeping it informed about the situation in the country.

The Lithuanian nation sincerely believed in the democratic ideals of the West. "Democracy means a reaction against dictatorship; it will restore the rights and freedom of the individual, of which Europe has been robbed by totalitarianism. Man, degraded and silenced by totalitarian rule, will have a voice again and will become a creative person" — so wrote "Į Laisvę," one of the underground papers, on March 25, 1943.

Many people worked in secret and died in silence for these ideals — workers, students, farmers, soldiers, intellectuals. There are no exact data on the number of those who gave their lives.⁹ A brief notice in the 23rd issue of "Laisvės Kovotojas" in 1944 bespeaks their silent sacrifice: "In March, 1944, the SS court handed down the death penalty on Krėve County Sheriff Kaunas, Gražiškiai County Sheriff Ūsas and Officer Ūsorius for refusing to obey the orders of the German Police."

The Lithuanians also endured such Nazi brutality as the burning alive of 120 residents of the village of Pirčiupis — men, women and children — a crime that the underground paper "Į Laisvę" said called to heaven for revenge.

The German Nazis perpetrated many crimes, massacres and mass exterminations in Lithuania, as was their general policy in occupied lands. The underground, however, by interfering with their plans for mobilization and other designs, helped to save many lives that the nation would otherwise have lost.

For 100,000,000 Europeans — No Liberation

To many European nations the year 1944 brought liberation and the beginning of a new life. To Lithuania it brought the beginning of another occupation, another enslavement—and also another struggle for freedom. And not only to Lithuania but to other East European countries as well, with a total population of 100,000,000.

The Lithuanians, having already experienced one year of Soviet occupation, knew very well that any compromise with the Soviet regime would be impossible. When the Red Army invaded Lithuania many Lithuanians escaped to the West. Many others hid in the woods, intending to fight the Russians. The resistance leadership advised them to wait. But spontaneous, armed combat was prompted by a wave of terrorism, arrests, massacres and deportations, and finally by the illegal attempt to draft into the Red Army all men born between 1909 and 1926 and the subsequent round-up of these men. Thus an undeclared, spontaneous war started in occupied Lithuania.

Lithuania — a Battlefield

To someone from the outside world the country at that time would have given the impression of a field of real, intensive war. The following few examples from an authentic underground report of June 7, 1946, will suffice to illustrate the cruel intensity of those fights.

"1945, May 15, Alytus District. The Forest of Kalniškiai was a scene of battle for 84 Lithuanians and 2000 Russian N.K.V.D. The Russian dead numbered 380, the Lithuanian 43, among them three women, one of whom, a schoolteacher, fought with both legs blown off till she ran out of ammunition.

"1945, April 10, Marijampolė District at Būdininkai — a battle between 116 Lithuanians and 700 N.K.V.D. Russian dead — 94, Lithuanians — 3 dead and 6 wounded.

"1945, September, Raseiniai District encounter between 138 Lithuanians and 900 Russians. The struggle lasted 20 hrs. 73 Lithuanian partisans, among them their leader, fell dead. The Russian killed numbered 430.

"1945, July, Panevėžys District at Zaliosios Giria, 150 partisans against 2000 N.K.V.D. 35 partisans and 240 Russians were killed.

"1946, April, Kėdainiai District. 3000 N.K.V.D. attacked 70 partisans. The fatalities were 12 partisans and 108 N.K.V.D.

"1946, June 1-2, Marijampolė District. 2000 N.K.V.D. sought out 23 partisans. One Lithuanian killed and one taken prisoner. The Russian dead — 12."¹⁰

These are but isolated examples of the hundreds of battles and smaller engagements that were taking place day and night over the country. The ratio of Russian fatalities to Lithuanian ones was almost 10:1. In every battle the Russians used artillery, tanks, tankettes and howitzers. The approximate number of Lithuanians killed in battle between 1944 and 1946 is 8,000, but the number of those killed does not indicate all the hardship and cruelty of this undeclared war. Those captured, even the wounded, were interrogated by methods horrible beyond imagining.

Knowing this, the freedom fighters fought to death and were very seldom taken alive. They would often shoot themselves in order to escape capture, or use grenades so their bodies could not be identified and their families would thus be spared persecution. The bodies of the dead partisans would be brought to the nearest market place, where, they would rot for days. "This is how the sadistic horror of degenerate Stalinistic Communism manifested itself," says the above mentioned report.

Moscow used every known method of total terror to combat Lithuanian resistance. In the fall of 1944 Kruglov, U.S.S.R. Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, was sent to Lithuania, and he ordered that the penal methods employed against those who aided the resistance be no less cruel

than those applied to the partisans themselves. Relatives and helpers of the partisans were either killed or deported to Siberia and their farms were burned. It is estimated that by 1946 approximately 20 farms in each of the 309 Lithuanian counties had been burned down. According to the above-mentioned report, 24,000 people were killed in Lithuanian villages between 1944 and 1946 in the execution of repressive measures against those who helped the partisans.

It is no wonder that on September 30, 1944, the political leaders of the resistance turned to the Western democracies in a plea for international help to terminate the genocide of the Lithuanian nation. A memorandum sent to London before the end of the war pointed out that the Soviet Army was bound by obligations under international law, and that Lithuania should not be treated worse than enemy territory. The authorities of the U.S. and Great Britain were asked to dispatch military missions to protect the rights and vital interests of the Lithuanian nation and safeguard it from its impending destruction. Sad to say, this plea received no response.

No Hope ...

Lithuanian partisans, and the whole nation with them, were convinced that this new Soviet occupation would last no longer than a few months. This conviction had very tragic consequences. There was a great, unfounded hope, which turned into disappointment and despair.

"In trying to grasp the development of future international events, we could never let ourselves believe for a moment that the West would permit the Red terror to destroy the countries of eastern and mid-eastern Europe that—after the German occupation—found themselves or were soon to find themselves under the terrible paw of communist slavery," one of the partisans wrote. "We solemnly believed freedom and the rights of individuals and nations to be indivisible, as the Atlantic Charter declared and as many important conferences later reiterated. We could not believe that the principles and the human rights for which the blood of many noble Westerners had flowed would be renounced."¹¹

The members of the resistance firmly believed that in opposing the Soviets they were fighting not only for their own freedom but also for the freedom of all nations, for they well knew the Communist aim to rule the world.

The same belief was expressed during the Hungarian Revolution over Free Radio Rakoczi: "We are fighting for freedom ... We are also fighting for you."¹²

Organizational Efforts and Difficulties

When the Soviets occupied Lithuania in 1944, the resistance leadership had already been considerably weakened by the German arrests and deportations.

In the fall of that year the remaining leaders formed the Council for Liberation of Lithuania (Lietuvos Išlaisvinimo Taryba), but within a short time it was broken up by arrests. A Unity Committee (Vienybės Komitetas) was formed, but it met with the same fate.

The underground methods employed during the German occupation proved unsuitable under the conditions of Soviet occupation. For this reason the next central body, the Supreme Committee for the Restoration of Lithuania, (Vyriausias Lietuvos Atstatymo Komitetas), was also unable to function efficiently. Centralization of the spontaneous armed resistance had to begin at the bottom, and it developed very slowly.

During the first year of Soviet occupation there were conferences of partisan unit leaders of different localities; this resulted in a merger into larger units — districts. For instance, by August 25, 1945, the "Tauras" district encompassed all the freedom fighters of the Suvalkija province. The first conference of all partisan leaders was held on April 23, 1946 — that is, almost two years after the beginning of the Soviet occupation. It was followed by talks with underground representatives from abroad and the remaining members of the Unity Committee.

As a result of these talks one strong resistance organization was finally formed on June 6, 1946 — the General Democratic Resistance Movement (Bendras Demokratinio Pasipriešinimo Sąjūdis, or B.D.P.S.). It provided leadership for both the active, armed resistance and the passive resistance, with all its separate underground organizations (the same ones that had been active against the Nazi occupation).

But on February 16, 1949, the partisans broke with the passive resistance and formed a separate resistance movement, Lithuania's Freedom Fight Movement (Lietuvos Laisvės Kovų Sąjūdis — LLKS).

The partisans, who had adopted the name "freedom fighters," functioned in nine separate districts, later fused into "regions." In 1951 there were still three regions, with two or three districts each: the region of Northern and North-eastern Lithuania, with the "Vytis" and "Vytautas" districts; the region of Western and Northwestern Lithuania, with the "Žemaičiai," "Kęstutis" and "Prisikėlimas" districts; and the "Nemunas" region, with the "Tauras" and "Dainava" districts. All of them were under a Chief Armed Partisan Headquarters (Vyriausias Ginkluotų Partizanų Štabas).

Activities

The activities of the Lithuanian resistance movement were quite extensive. Between 1944 and 1946, considerable areas of the country outside the major cities were under control of resistance groups.

Every possible means was used to prevent the occupation administration from exploiting the people. The partisans obstructed the enforcement

of compulsory grain deliveries and the collecting of excessive taxes from the farmers. They interfered with Soviet "elections" and with the methods employed by the Communists to force the people to vote. Thus in 1947 the vote was only 27%-28% despite Soviet pressure.

The partisans also struggled violently against Soviet efforts to enforce the collectivization of the farms. Therefore, the Soviets were not able to establish collectivization fully until about 1949 or 1950.

An extensive underground press was published, as under the Nazi occupation. Most of these publications, with the exception of "Kovas", which was published by the General Democratic Resistance Movement, were issued, quite regularly, by partisan units or their districts. For instance, "Laisvės Varpas" ("Bell of Freedom"), which was printed by regular press, published 127 issues by 1947. It still continued to appear in 1951. Like every other underground press, this partisan press scrutinized daily events, information warned, advised and encouraged the people. It was the voice of a fighting nation, manifesting its true will and its true hopes.¹³

Tragic Failure

This period of armed resistance is undoubtedly the most heroic in Lithuania's history. But its heroism is deeply tragic. The tragedy lies in the fact that, based as it was on unfounded hopes, it was doomed to failure from the very beginning.

Responsible Lithuanian political leaders and diplomats abroad sent secret warnings on several occasions to the effect that armed resistance could have no influence on diplomatic developments regarding the Lithuanian question, and that the death of the best Lithuanian men could not bring about a change in international events; therefore, they insisted, strength should be preserved and armed combat avoided. These warnings only succeeded in arousing bitter feelings toward the Western democracies.

"They surrendered us to death at Yalta, Potsdam Now they are repeating the same mistakes, not daring to raise their voices in protest against the destruction of our nation, not even wanting to know that we are still not totally disappointed in them but will continue fighting as their "ally," not recognizing defeat The road ahead is terribly long and bloody."¹⁵

Despite the hopelessness of the situation, the freedom fighters had no other course than to continue fighting, since Soviet policy itself and its methods left no other alternative. Armed opposition continued until the end of 1952. By then it was too severely crippled by terrorist methods, and it never revived in its old organizational form. Nor did the post-Stalin coexistence policies of the West encourage its revival.

Of course, the long years of armed resistance brought many and severe losses. According to

available data, in 1944-1945 the number of active armed partisans reached 30,000. Yet by 1949-1950 this number had dwindled to 5,000, and by 1951-1952 to 700. Since it is known that very few partisans gave themselves up alive, we may conclude that the total number killed during the second Soviet occupation comes to between 25,000 and 30,000.

This number does not include the tens of thousands Lithuanians who fell victim to Soviet terror for aiding the resistance indirectly. The Soviets census of 1959 reveals how great have been the losses of the Lithuanian population.

Only History can evaluate the significance of this struggle against oppression and its meaning for the future of the nation. But there can be no doubt that this struggle has been largely responsible for the present patriotic behavior of the Lithuanian people and their constant manifestations of nationalist feelings, as attested to by the Communist press. And we can surely say that their attitude toward the Soviets will be important for future developments in their country, as well as in the whole of Eastern Europe.

The French writer Romain Gary in his book "A European Education" points out that idealists will always continue their fight for freedom "through some inner human compulsion" and that the last twenty years of European history plainly show that "we Europeans still are and will be for a long time condemned to heroism."

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4. Z. Ivinskis, "Šešios savaitės" (Six Weeks), *Laisvė*, No. 6, 1955, p. 36.
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6. See Les Idées Politiques...
7. E. J. Harrison, "Lithuanian's Fight for Freedom", London, 1944, p. 36.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 40, 41.
9. K. Pelėkis, *Genocide, Lithuania's Threefold Tragedy*. Published by "Venta", Western Germany, 1949.
10. "Nepaskelbtas karas Lietuvoje" (Undeclared War in Lithuania), June 7, 1946. Report from Lithuania by the Supreme Committee for the Restoration of Lithuania.
11. J. Daumantas, "Partizanai už Geležinės Uždangos", (Partisans behind the Iron Curtain), Chicago, 1950, p. 46-47.
12. A White Book, *The Hungarian Revolution*, published for the Congress for Cultural Freedom by Martin Secker and Warburg LTD, London, 1957.
13. S. Žymantas, "Laisvosios spaudos nelaisvėje puslapis atskleidus", *Santarvė*, No. 10, 1954, p. 363. See also the same author's "Lithuania Militans" in *Lituanus* No. 2, 1956.
14. J. Daumantas, *Partizanai*... p. 305, 306.

The armed resistance of Lithuanian freedom fighters against Soviet oppression (1944-1952) is virtually unknown in the Western world, despite ample material to document it. Here are a few excerpts from a book written in Lithuanian by a guerilla leader, who has since lost his life in this heroic struggle.

THE FIGHT OF KALNIŠKIAI

The heroic actions of "freedom-fighters" are deeply engraved in the memory of the people, as attested by many new folk-songs. Several of them tell of the Kalniškiai encounter in which, on a May day in 1945, eighty partisans, led by Lakūnas and entrenched on a hillock, destroyed some four hundred NKVD men in several hours.

The women were as brave as the men. The wife of Lakūnas, a former teacher, took the place of fallen machinegunners and held on to her gun even after bullets hit both her legs. Beside her fought the young woman Pušėlė.

After several hours of fighting, ammunition ran low. With their last handfuls of cartridges they broke through the NKVD circle to freedom.

On the woody hillock remained resting forever Lakūnas, his wife, Pušėlė, and the greater part of the group.

The people of Kalniškiai now sing:

Sister, weave a wreath of green,
In secret bring it here.
Brother, build a cross of wood,
Place it here by night.

AND THE DEAD COULD NOT REST

Heretofore the bodies of slain partisans had been left where they fell by the NKGB, for they collected only their own dead. However, beginning with February 15, the bodies of partisans were removed by the Bolsheviks and brought to the nearest village square to be desecrated. Doubtless, they hoped to terrorize the inhabitants so that they would not dare to join the thinning ranks of the armed resistance movement.

Toward the end of February some dozens of NKGB men attacked a group composed of about a dozen partisans of Viesulas' company. Twenty Russians and seven of our men perished. The Bolsheviks collected the partisan bodies and brought them to the square of Garliava. Here, the body of the group's leader was placed against a wall, propped up with poles, and a water tap was thrust into his mouth. The other bodies were so placed that they resembled a meeting. The Bolshevik activists then filed past these bodies, beating them with sticks, kicking them and cursing.

The bodies were so placed that from the NKGB headquarters it was possible to observe the people passing through the square. If the NKGB happened to observe tears or other indications of grief in the demeanor of passers-by, they would immediately de-

tain such persons and order them to reveal the true names of the dead men and the names of their relatives. Most of the people, however, did not recognize the corpses, but were only lamenting the death and desecration of unknown compatriots.

At the same time, the Bolsheviks began to desecrate the graves of fallen partisans wherever they were found: by the roadsides, in the depths of the forests or in the fields. The Bolsheviks did not like the fact that such graves were kept in perfect order and were constantly decorated by the people and by the partisans. In the spring, countless blossoms were laid by Lithuanian girls upon these graves. Against such manifestations of love for fallen countrymen, the Bolshevik occupants now resolved to take ruthless action. They began to smash fences erected around such graves, overthrow the crosses and deface the tombstones.

On the outskirts of the Klebiškis forest, shaded by pines on S. road, rested the bodies of seven partisans slain in various engagements. Their fellow-countrymen had enclosed these graves with a fence and had placed uniform crosses on all the graves. The graves were decorated by shields with the Vytis coat-

of-arms and other national ornaments of green moss and flowers. This was an eyesore to the Bolsheviks and the Prienai NKGB men proceeded to destroy the graves.

The leader of the local partisan detachment noted the events and with his men and some passive resisters, put the desecrated graves in order. The emblems were restored, the crosses re-erected and the graves enclosed with a new fence. To prevent the Bolsheviks from desecrating them again, the leader mined the graves and warned the local inhabitants to stay away. He then attached a notice to the fence, in Lithuanian and Russian, to the effect that it was forbidden to touch the graves. A few weeks later, a group of Russians arrived and finding the restored graves, began to desecrate them once more. While they were tearing down the fence, a mine exploded wounding three of them, whereupon the entire gang retreated to a ditch and did their best to complete their work by tossing grenades from a respectful distance.

At the same time, similar acts of desecration were committed throughout Lithuania. While the Communists did not allow even the dead to sleep in peace, new recruits replenished the ranks of the living.

EIGHT AGAINST THOUSANDS

In early July the leaders of the partisans in Dzukija gathered in the Punia forest, at the district commander's headquarters, for a conference. Several combatants had accompanied the leaders and the ensuing stir was observed by the Bolsheviks. Moreover, the partisans had lacked caution. The forest had sheltered the commander and some staff sections for a full year, yet the underground hideout was hard to find only in winter. The brook which helped to hide footprints when frozen only emphasized tracks in soft mud. Though the two entrances were carefully hidden, it was not safe to keep a shelter in one place for so long. The pressure of work had prevented the district commander from moving.

The Russians detected the shelter and, during the night of July 10, about 300 American-made trucks packed with MVD troops converged on the Punia forest. Local Bolshevik detachments joined them. Some circled the forest in two rings, others began a thorough search. Local folk thought the war had begun, for why else so many Russian troops when only eight partisans were known to be hid in the woods? But it made sense to the Russians: they had been trying to wipe out armed resistance for a long time, and knew that this was the backbone of all resistance in the country.

Machine-guns were posted, the bunker surrounded with three tight rings of men. Some trenches were dug. Then, one MGB colonel tried to persuade the partisans to leave the shelter, "personally guaranteeing" them immunity. The conference had already dispersed. The commander and seven men were inside. While the MGB colonel still spoke, the smoke of burning documents rose from a ventilation channel.

After the files in the bunker had been destroyed, differences of opinion arose among the partisans. Some, including the district commander, Ažuolis, thought that efforts to break out were pointless because the enemy's strength was too great. But the

majority, favored attempting a break-through. To them, death in battle was preferable, for then they could inflict losses on the enemy. After the headquarters' documents and other more important articles had been destroyed, Ažuolis took leave of his comrades-in-arms and shot himself. The other men began to leave through the emergency channel. The unexpected appearance of our men so surprised the Bolsheviks, that for a moment they were at a loss where to shoot. Meanwhile, Aras first opened fire against them. As the other partisans were emerging through the opening, the Bolsheviks began to hurl grenades. Three of our men were stunned, even before they could get into action. Those who succeeded in leaving the aperture alive tried to break the encircling rings, but our fire was a drop in the ocean compared to that of the Bolsheviks, which poured in from behind every tree. Only Senis managed to break out and hide in the nearest thickets. Finally, after a long wait, the enemy ventured to enter the bunker where they found nothing useful.

After this unfortunate event in the Punia forest, the Soviet Lithuanian press dared publicly admit that there was an organized resistance movement, although it had heretofore announced that only isolated "bandit gangs" were disturbing the tranquility of Soviet life. This time, the newspapers announced that the Dainava's district staff had been liquidated. But their joy was premature. In a month, the supposedly liquidated staff was engaged in activities even more troublesome to the Bolsheviks. However, the Bolsheviks were in luck since two of the men stunned by grenades recovered. In their name, the Bolsheviks wrote an appeal to the armed resistance movement. This appeal was circulated in thousands of copies and urged the partisans to see reason and abandon their erroneous path.

J. Daumantas, "Partisanai už geležinės uždangos" (Partisans Behind the Iron Curtain), Chicago, 1950.

An analysis of circumstances under which deportations of various national groups were prepared and carried out by the Soviets.

DEPORTATIONS

Concentration camps and the persecution of political deviates, or enemies of the Soviet society, are important features of the history of Soviet Russia. With the acquisition of new territories, such as the Baltic States in 1940, Russia began to expand toward the West. Forced labor and large-scale deportations were applied by the Russians in the newly annexed lands in their endeavors to preclude overt opposition to the Communist system.

Large-scale deportations were first carried out in Russia itself in connection with the First Five-Year Plan of 1928. The collectivization of agriculture provided for in the plan was staunchly opposed by many peasants. Soviet authorities attempted to solve the problem by imposing high taxes on individual landholders and by demanding the delivery of grain to the state under extremely high quotas. The peasants' opposition brought about a decrease in production, which endangered the fulfillment of the Five-Year Plan. The authorities retaliated with great harshness. Many peasants were arrested and deported from their native lands into remote areas of the Soviet Union. The Ukrainians in particular, among whom the "kulaks" were strongly represented, suffered greatly at that time. Entire villages were wiped out. Although the immediate economic effects were disastrous, the Soviet authorities nevertheless succeeded in accomplishing their end. Opposition to government policies on the part of the rural population was greatly reduced. Many deportees were used in development of the Soviet frontier. For example, with the development of the timber industry in the Archangel area during the First Five-Year Plan, Soviet authorities were apparently confronted with an acute labor shortage. A report compiled by the British Anti-Slavery Society and based on the eye-witness accounts of individuals who had managed to escape from Russia, showed that a great many prisoners were being used in the production of timber. It was disclosed that many victims of collectivization in the Ukraine had been moved to Archangel.¹

The publication of this report and of additional accounts by the ex-prisoners Arthur Kopman, George Kitchin and others had unpleasant results for the Soviet Union. Prominent spokesmen in Western countries demanded that trade relations with Russia be severed, and in particular that Soviet export timber be boycotted because the country's timber production was based on slave labor. As a result of this reaction, Prime Minister Vlachislav Molotov gave a speech at the Sixth

By JULIUS SLAVENAS

Congress of Soviets, in 1931, stating that no export goods were produced by prison labor. He admitted that prisoners were being put to work in Russia, but he denied the accusations that the conditions in the various camps were unbearable. Moreover, Molotov invited delegations of workers, trade union officials and correspondents from Western countries to come to Russia and see for themselves how well off the Russian prisoners were.²

Early in 1931 it was announced to the directors of the labor camps in the Archangel area that a foreign delegation would visit the region. Instructions were transmitted from Moscow that the forced-labor camps be camouflaged within three days and the prisoners removed from sight. Kitchin described how this was accomplished:

The evacuation of the thirty thousand prisoners working there required eight hundred railway cars. No passenger cars were available, and the prisoners were loaded on old discarded freight and flat cars. Trains picked up groups of prisoners at the stations, to which they had been forced to march from their remote outposts. While waiting for the trains they spent several nights in the forest, hungry and freezing. No exception was made in the case of suffering from fever, scurvy, or tuberculosis; they endured the same privations. Many men died during the mad rush of the evacuation.³

When the representatives from abroad finally arrived, the majority of the prisoners was gone. The guards had also been sent away and barbed-wire fences removed. The Soviet authorities thus succeeded in disguising the nature of the camps. Many other first-hand accounts could be cited to show that similar procedures were applied with regard to camps in other areas.⁴ This clearly indicates that the Soviet rulers were determined to cover up the crueler aspects of the regime.

Authority for Deportations

The question arises as to the authority under which arrests and deportations were carried out. In 1934, an ordinance enacted by the U.S.S.R. Central Executive Committee and the U.S.S.R. Council of People's Commissars gave special powers of punishment to the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, or NKVD. Article 3 of this ordinance read as follows:

1. The U. S. S. R. People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs shall be empowered to subject persons who are recognized as constituting a danger to society to:

a. exile under public supervision for a period not exceeding five years to localities a list of which shall be established by the U. S. S. R. People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs;

b. expulsion under public supervision for a period not exceeding five years, with a ban on residence in the capital cities, large towns and industrial centers of the U. S. S. R.;

c. detention in corrective labor camps for a period not exceeding five years;

d. expulsion from the confines of the U. S. S. R. in the case of foreign subjects who constitute a danger to society.⁵

A "Special Council" was created within the NKVD to apply the above provisions. Thus after 1934 the secret police were in a position to maintain exclusive control over arrests and deportations. No changes in this ordinance are on record up to 1953.⁶ Therefore the post-1934 deportations discussed in this article were carried out essentially in the light of its provisions. Yet the wording of the ordinance is too general to permit a clear view of the scope of the deportations.

Baltic Deportations

When the Russian troops retreated from the Baltic States in 1941, secret NKVD files were discovered specifying the groups of the population that were to be deported. It might be pointed out here that up to 1939 the relations between the Baltic States and the Soviet Union were based on the provisions of the various nonaggression pacts that were initiated in 1920. In 1939, the Soviet Union compelled Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to sign so-called Mutual Assistance Pacts, which provided for the establishment of Russian military bases in the three countries. Molotov, speaking to the Supreme Council of the U. S. S. R. on Oct. 31, 1939, stated:

The pacts with the Baltic States in no way imply the intrusion of the Soviet Union in the internal affairs of Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania, as some foreign interests are trying to have it believed. These pacts are inspired by mutual respect for the governmental, social and economic systems of each of the contrac-

ting parties. We stand for an exact and honest fulfillment of agreements signed by us on a basis of mutuality and declare that foolish prattle of Sovietization of the Baltic States is of use merely to our common enemies and to all kinds of anti-Soviet provocateurs.⁷

Promises of noninterference in internal Baltic affairs were also made to the delegates of the Baltic governments who discussed the pacts with Stalin, Molotov and other Soviet officials.⁸ At the same time, however, preparations were being made in Russia for the destruction of the Baltic republics. The Kremlin instructed its agents in Lithuania to begin screening the population and to prepare a list of politically and socially dangerous elements.⁹ The path was thus prepared for the events that followed in 1940: Soviet troops occupied the Baltic States, and in August of that year the three nations were deprived of their independence by being incorporated into the Soviet Union on the basis of fraudulent elections staged by the Russian overlords. In 1941 Jurgis Glušauskas, formerly a People's Commissar of the Lithuanian Soviet Republic, revealed that the Kremlin had ordered the Council of People's Commissars of Lithuania to approve a resolution for the deportation of 700,000 persons from Lithuania.¹⁰

The "Operative Register" for 1939-41 — a secret manual published by the NKVD — established 29 classifications of groups that were to be removed from the Baltic States. Among the victims were prominent members of all parties except the Communist Party, commissioned and noncommissioned officers of the former Baltic armies, industrialists, wholesale merchants, owners of large houses and farms, persons of aristocratic descent, persons whose relatives had engaged in anti-Soviet propaganda abroad, close relatives of persons who had been convicted under the Soviet regime, members of mystic societies such as the Free Masons, and registered prostitutes.¹¹ These groups, except for the final category, comprised large segments of the total population of the Baltic area. Actually, many workers, peasants, teachers, doctors and members of various other professions were also deported on the simple grounds that they were unreliable. A top-secret order issued at Kaunas on April 25, 1941, by the Lithuanian S. S. R. People's Commissar of State Security and signed by Senior Major of Security Forces Gladkov provided for the completion of the lists of persons to be moved out of Lithuania. Instructions from the office of the U. S. S. R. Deputy People's Commissar of Public Security, signed by Serov, specified the steps to be taken in carrying out the deportations:

The deportation of anti-Soviet elements from the Baltic republics is a task of great political importance. Its successful execution depends upon the extent to which the district operative "Troikas" and operative headquarters are capable of carefully working out a plan for executing the operations and for anticipating everything indispensable.

Moreover, care must be taken that the operations are carried out without disturbances and panic, so as not to permit any demonstrations and other troubles not only on the part of those to be deported, but also on the part of a certain section of the surrounding population hostile to the Soviet administration.¹²

The "Troikas" were three-member commissions operating for the secret police. In this instance they were in charge of the deportation procedures within the various districts. They were aided in carrying out their objectives by local party members and functionaries. The instructions referred to above provided that the assembling of families doomed to deportation be completed within two hours of the time the agents entered the victims' homes. In many cases the NKVD agents managed to complete the preliminary steps in a much shorter time. They would enter a home, check the deportees' belongings for weapons and counter-revolutionary literature, tell everyone to pack the most essential articles, load the deportees on trucks and take them to the nearest railroad station, where they were put on freight cars. Serov's instructions permitted the deportees to take with them personal belongings not to exceed 100 kilograms in weight.¹³ Actually, very few persons were able to take along that much of their property.

The deportations from the Baltic States were begun on June 14, 1941. Since Germany launched its attack on Russia approximately a week later, they could not be carried out to the full planned scope; thus the German occupation of the Baltics in 1941-1944 temporarily halted the Soviet plans for depopulating those countries. Nevertheless, when in 1941 statistics on missing people were compiled, it was revealed that Estonia had lost approximately 20,000 people, Latvia and Lithuania, about 34,000. No secret NKVD documents described the hardships and misery attendant upon the deportations, nor the subsequent fate of the individuals involved. Liudas Dovydėnas, a former Lithuanian Supreme Soviet deputy, described the deportations as follows:

In the late afternoon of June 15, 1941, I was at the Kaunas Railroad Station. Thousands of deportees to Siberia were still being loaded into trains. An NKVD guard explained to me, a Deputy to the Supreme Soviet, that these were "enemies of the people" — Fascists, bourgeois dogs. It was the line voiced by "Tiesa", the Party organ, and by the radio.

I saw Jonas Bružas, a proofreader at the Spindulys Printing Plant. I saw his two daughters, three and six years old, and his pregnant wife — a quiet and thoughtful woman — being driven into the car... A small, broad-faced NKVDist pushed Mrs. Bružas with a rifle butt when she was unable to climb unassisted into the freight car... I felt a revulsion... I saw three pinched children's faces peering through the barred window of

"Voluntary" Deported Youths Ask to be Sent Home

The press in Soviet-occupied Lithuania has been painting the life of the "voluntary" deported youth in the virgin lands of Kazakhstan in cheerful and heroic colors. But it took a newspaper in Russia to point out the discontent. In one of the October issues, *Sovetskaya Rossiya* disclosed that many of the youths that were brought to the "virgin lands" of Siberia are dissatisfied with the working conditions there and are asking to be returned to the Western Republics of the Soviet Union. According to the newspaper, the young workers complain that in the "virgin lands" no attention is paid to their special training; they are employed in the lowest jobs as "unskilled workers."

*

Komsomols to work on farms

At the 12th Conference of the Lithuanian CP last March, the Secretary of the Komsomol asserted that "this year the Komsomol will send 4000 young people to work on farms". The role of the Komsomol will be a supervising one. Communist youth themselves shun the hard work on collective farms.

*

Young Lithuanians—20th Century Slaves

On September 22, 1959, Radio Vilnius broadcast the letter of a girl who had started studying architecture this year in the Polytechnical Institute at Kaunas. The letter was addressed to her girl friend.

"Dear friend: If you think that I don't write because of laziness, you are very wrong. I have been working all week on a construction site. It is very difficult. For several days I cleaned the floors. Don't think that this is just a pleasant wiping up of the floor with a damp rag. Just imagine: A new, still unfinished house. A thick layer of crushed brick, lime and cement is covering the floors. Teenage boys scrape the floors and remove the refuse in sacks to the backyard. They are exhausted, covered with dust, and don't look human. We sweep and scrub. It is difficult to carry water in pails from the cellar to the fourth floor. The norm for us is two rooms and a corridor per person. We work from 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. The lectures begin at 6:15 p.m. and no lateness is allowed since the lecturer refuses to admit late-comers."

The broadcast then proceeded to relate that, according to the new education laws, beginning students will have to work by day in various industries and study at night, for the period of two years.

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Youths Sent to Kazakhstan

Intimations of labor shortage on Lithuania's collective farms regularly seep through in the local press. Yet, on April 26, *Tiesa* (Truth) glowingly described the "voluntary" departure of 300 young Lithuanian tractor drivers and mechanics to Kazakhstan.

the freight car. They cried "Water, water — just a little water!" ... Workers, farmers, civil servants, teachers, physicians ... Men armed with bayoneted rifles pushed and kicked them into freight cars, 35 to 45 persons per car. NKVD men mercilessly showered rifle butts on the people for the slightest unauthorized movement, for a word of complaint.¹⁴

Dovydenas' account would hold true for events that occurred simultaneously in other parts of the Baltics. Many people succeeded in escaping arrest by fleeing from their homes.

When Russian troops retook the Baltic countries in 1944 the second phase of Soviet domination began. Until the end of the war, no large-scale deportations occurred; apparently the authorities lacked the necessary transportation facilities. Guerrilla forces that operated in the forests up to about 1948 presented another obstacle to carrying out deportations in the rural areas. However, it is estimated that six large-scale deportations were carried out in Lithuania alone between 1945 and 1949. Exact statistical data are not available, of course, but Lithuanian sources in the West estimate that 83,000 individuals were deported in 1945 and that the number of deportees in May, 1949, exceeded 100,000.¹⁵ Subsequent deportations were carried out on a similar scale, bringing up the total number of deportees to approximately 300,000.

As the collectivization of agriculture was pushed in the Baltic States at a rapid pace after 1945, many peasants in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania suffered the same fate as the "kulaks" in Russia. There are no indications of large-scale deportations in the Baltics after 1953. Yet about 60,000 people who had been deported previously can still be found in concentration camps all over the Soviet Union. Officially, of course, concentration camps do not exist in Russia — they are called corrective labor camps.

The systematic removal of large segments of the populations of the Baltic States seems to have a twofold purpose. On the one hand, through deportations the resistance to the Soviet occupation on the part of the natives was considerably weakened; on the other hand, by filling the gaps that occurred through the loss of population with settlers from Russia, the Kremlin made a great contribution to the Russification of the Baltic States. The latter aspect reflects an idea that had been conceived prior to the Bolshevik revolution. Russia, particularly since the days of Peter the Great, had been determined to subjugate the entire Baltic area by incorporating it into the Russian Empire and by eradicating the non-Slavic national characteristics of the Baltic peoples. This imperialistic spirit did not fade after the revolution; on the contrary, it was reinforced during the Stalin era and has prevailed since. Although the Soviet constitution stipulates the economic, governmental, cultural, political and social equality of all the national groups within the Union, there

is ample evidence that in reality the non-Russian nations have been discriminated against in various ways.

During World War II several national groups within the Soviet Union were transplanted in a body from their native lands. In this connection reference may be made to a decree of the U. S. S. R. Supreme Soviet dated Aug. 28, 1941. This decree provided for the resettlement of the Germans in the Volga area.¹⁶ The Volga Germans comprised one of the national groups that were granted autonomous status within the Soviet system shortly after the Bolshevik revolution. In 1937, at the time of elections to the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet, Soviet sources claimed that the Volga German republic was one of the most progressive and cooperative parts of the Union. But the situation changed drastically in 1941. The Volga Germans, who had been acclaimed as having shown complete devotion to Communism, were now termed unreliable. The decree mentioned above was titled "On the Resettlement of the Germans in the Volga Area", and it stated that according to reliable information tens of thousands of spies and deviators were awaiting signals from Germany to begin sabotage activities in the Volga area. Since none of the Volga Germans had reported to the Soviet authorities the existence of so large a number of agents within their territory, the conclusion could be drawn that the Germans of the Volga area were hiding these elements. To avoid bloodshed in case sabotage and deviationist activities were begun, the Soviet authorities decided to resettle the entire Volga population in other areas. Land was allotted for this purpose in the vicinity of Novosibirsk and Omsk and in the Altai and Kazakhstan. This is the official Soviet version; the exact fate of the Volga Germans is not known. They were dispersed over Asiatic Russia. In 1939 the population of the Volga republic had been more than 500,000.

Collective punishment was also applied to the Chechen-Ingush and Crimean Autonomous Republics; these two republics were abolished and their inhabitants removed on the pretext that the majority of their people had assisted the Germans during the war.

Forced Repatriation of Soviet Citizens

At the end of World War II there were large numbers of Soviet citizens in Germany and in territories formerly occupied by Germany. In addition to the thousands of civilians who had been brought into Germany to do forced labor, there was a large contingent of Russian prisoners of war. In 1944 the Soviet government began diplomatic negotiations with her allies to bring about the repatriation of all Soviet citizens in the Western zones, whether or not they wanted to return. Among the former prisoners of war were many individuals who had joined General Vlasov's movement and had fought the Soviet Union on the German side. These people in particular had

no desire to return home, where they would have been treated as traitors under any circumstances. But the Soviet Union anticipated that even among the civilians there would be a substantial number who would refuse to return. Many displaced persons from Russia and the Ukraine were hesitant to go home because rumors had circulated among them to the effect that the Soviet authorities were going to place them in concentration camps, regardless of whether they had or had not collaborated with the Germans. The refugees from the Baltic States who were claimed by the Soviet Union as its citizens were not affected by any extradition agreements, since the Western countries did not recognize the annexation and incorporation into the Soviet Union of the Baltic countries. Thus the Balts were spared the fate of many individuals from Russia and the Ukraine. Beginning in 1945 the allied military authorities, in accord with the provisions of the Yalta agreement, initiated the forced repatriation of Soviet citizens.

Soviet Colonel Vassili Ershov, who defected to the West after the war and testified before the International Commission against Concentration Camp Practices in 1951, presented an interesting account of the way Soviet authorities disposed of the returned elements. In 1945 Ershov, then stationed in Eastern Germany, was ordered by his commanding general to establish a camp that would accommodate 2,000 to 3,000 persons a day, for the purpose of screening Soviet citizens arriving from the West. The camp was situated five miles from the allied boundary. One hundred and twenty trucks, decorated with red flags and pictures of Stalin, were detailed for the transport of these people. The slogans were "Our country has forgiven!", "Stalin has forgiven!". Such slogans gave many of these returning uneasy feeling, since it was by no means clear to them what was to be forgiven. When the convoys entered the camp they were met with music. Then NKVD officials appeared and urged the new arrivals to expose any traitors to the Soviet Union in their midst. From Ershov's account it would appear that everyone was presumed guilty unless he could prove otherwise. Thus all arrivals were treated with great suspicion. Of the individuals processed by Ershov's camp, only 25 % were repatriated to Russia as free people; these were mostly women, and men who were able to bear arms and who were subsequently drafted into the Russian Army. Approximately 80,000 to 90,000 people were sent to concentration camps at Syzran, Tyumen and elsewhere. Even before these individuals arrived from the West, it had apparently been determined which categories of those returning would be permitted to go home. In screening, the emphasis lay not on determining the guilt or innocence of an individual or on punishment of those who might have collaborated with Germany but on the economic needs of the system. Many of those permitted to go home were subsequently arrested. In 1947 Ershov was on leave of absence in Russia;

at that time he visited a plant that, he said, was operated exclusively on the forced labor of women who had been repatriated. The plant director was unable to meet his production quota, since the workers, deprived of their freedom, had no incentive to produce.¹⁷

Deportations from the Satellites

After Soviet occupation of the countries now known as the satellites, at the close of and shortly after the war, many were deported to the Soviet Union from these countries. Statistics compiled by the Hungarian National Council and presented to the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labor indicate that in all, 620,000 Hungarians were deported to the U. S. S. R. by the Red Army. More than 200,000 of these were civilians. Although the Soviet Union later returned a large part of the deportees, the process was a slow one; 369,000 Hungarians were still missing in 1951.¹⁸ An account by Msgr. Bela Varga, President of the Hungarian National Council, relates that when the Russian troops occupied Hungary during the war they picked up men and women from the streets for deportation, along with prisoners of war, to the Soviet Union. The same source also states that many Hungarians who had returned from German concentration camps were included among those deported.

Soviet deportations also were carried out in Rumania. In 1940 the two provinces of Bessarabia and Bukovina, which up to that time had been held by Rumania, were annexed by the Soviet Union. In 1941, when war broke out between Russia and Germany, Rumania, as an ally of Germany, regained these provinces. It was discovered at that time that about 300,000 people from that area were missing after the Red Army's retreat. The Soviet authorities had begun to transplant the loyal Rumanian population into the center of the Soviet Union. When hostilities between Rumania and Russia ended in August, 1944, and the two provinces were reannexed and deportations were resumed after a three-year halt. It is estimated that between 1944 and 1948 about 800,000 people, out of a total population of 2,000,000, were shipped to the Urals.

In Rumania proper, large-scale deportation of residents of German extraction was carried out in connection with a provision, imposed by the Soviet High Command in the country, under which men between the ages of 18 and 45 and women between 17 and 35 were to do forced labor in the Soviet Union. General Nicolai Radescu, then Prime Minister of Rumania, revealed that this deportation took place in January, 1945. Although Radescu had repeatedly submitted protests to the Russian military authorities, they were the Germans by secretly notifying the leaders of West, stated that he was able to save some of completely ignored. Radescu, who defected to the the German minority group. Thus of the 95,000

persons originally listed for deportations, only 69,332 were seized.¹⁹

This was only the beginning of deportation of those of German origin. The Soviet authorities later caught up with many who had managed to hide during January, 1945. Thus 107,000 persons of German origin were displaced from Rumania. The deportees were taken, under very harsh conditions, to the Stalino region in the Urals, where the women were forced to work in mines and draw ox carts. It appears from eye-witness accounts that the chief reason for this removal of Germans was economic. Individuals who broke down under the pressures of hard labor were in many cases sent to Germany.²⁰

Since Hungary and Rumania fought the Soviet Union on the German side, it might appear that the deportations discussed were a form of penalty imposed by Russia upon its enemies. Yet even in "liberated" Czechoslovakia, the population was not spared Russian cruelty. Statistics compiled by the Council of Free Czechoslovakia indicate that about 20,000 Czech citizens were deported to the Soviet Union in 1945 on the basis of denunciations by local Communists. A report drawn up by the International League for the Rights of Man asserted that deportations in Czechoslovakia were carried out directly by the NKVD.²¹ This report was compiled on the basis of eye-witness accounts. Czech deportees were taken to the Donets Coal Basin in the Ukraine, Camp Morkhansk in Siberia and elsewhere. Five thousand of them had been returned to their homeland by 1947; the rest disappeared.²²

A totalitarian instrument

In appraising the history of Soviet Russia in the Stalinist era, the role of deportations and concentration camps should not be underestimated. In consolidating his power as sole dictator, Stalin sanctioned the imprisonment, execution or deportation not only of opponents of the Soviet regime but also of those who deviated from the party line as he established it. Large segments of the GPU, the NKVD and the MVD were subjected to purges, and secret service agents were devoured by the system they themselves had helped to expand.

Many first-hand accounts give evidence that secret service investigators were responsible for the conviction of the arrested victims. Thus trumped-up charges with no foundation whatsoever were pressed against many individuals, accusing them of wholly imaginary crimes.

The deportations discussed here form only a part of the over-all deportations carried out by the Soviet authorities. It is as yet impossible to know their full scope, for in many cases precise data are lacking. The Soviet authorities have at all times tried to camouflage their misdeeds in connection with the deportations. The Soviet rulers, in building their empire, did not hesitate to apply ruthless means in carrying out their political and economic objectives. Large-scale deporta-

tions ceased with the end of Stalin's reign, but there is no guarantee that they may not be resumed in the future. For despite the relaxation of the reign of terror, the curtailment of the secret police, etc., Soviet Russia has remained a totalitarian dictatorship without provisions for the safeguarding of individual liberty and dignity. Several national groups in the Soviet Union were expelled from their native lands, and no traces of their former ethnic characteristics remain. So far the Baltic States have been spared this fate; even though the native populations of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia suffered a heavy toll from deportations, the three nations still exist. Yet their existence, and the preservation of their national culture, is faced today by a great obstacle — an obstacle imposed by Russian imperialism. Western nations have granted independence to former colonies in Africa and Asia, but there is no indication whatever that Soviet Russia will relinquish her rule over the countries she subjugated.

NOTES

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2 David J. Dallin and Eoris J. Nicolaevski, *Forced Labor in Soviet Russia* (New Haven, 1947), p. 224.

3 George Kitchin, *Prisoner of the OGPU* (New York 1935), p. 268.

4 Allan Pim and Edward Bateson, *Report on Russian Timber Camps* (London, 1931).

5 United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labor, *Report* (Geneva, 1953), p. 491.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 493.

7 E. J. Harrison, *Lithuania's Fight for Freedom* (New York, 1952), p. 26.

8 Cf. eye-witness accounts in U. S. Congress, House Select Committee to Investigate the Incorporation of the Baltic States into the USSR, *Baltic States Investigation*, House Resolution 346, Part I, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, 1953.

9 Dallin and Nicolaevski, *op. cit.*, p. 267.

10 K. Pelekis, *Genocide* (West Germany, 1949), p. 74.

11 Herling, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

12 Harrison, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

13 *Baltic States Investigation*, p. 673.

14 Quoted by Pelekis, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

15 Harrison, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

16 Reinhart Maurach, *Handbuch der Sowjetverfassung* (Munich, 1955), p. 348.

17 International Commission against Concentration Camp Practices, *The Regime of the Concentration Camp in the Post-War World 1945-53* (Paris, 1953), p. 65.

18 United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labor, *Report*, p. 239.

19 Herling, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

20 *Ibid.*, p. 109.

21 United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labor, *Report*, p. 221.

22 *Ibid.*, p. 221.

In his article "Religion under Soviet rule," which appeared in the last issue of LITUANUS, the author describes religious persecution in Lithuania during the brief but tragic period of the first Soviet occupation (1940-1941). He now explores the methods used by the Soviets since the beginning of the present occupation in 1944 and the resistance with which they have met.

"FREEDOM OF RELIGION" — SOVIET STYLE

By T. PAUKŠTELIS

1. The "New Order" Is Enforced Again

As World War II was drawing to a close the Lithuanians awaited an Allied victory, hoping for a restoration of independence. But they were bitterly disappointed; by October, 1944, the red Army was once more occupying the whole country. All the repressive measures of the first occupation (1940-1941) were reintroduced, except that they were now enforced by the NKGB, which had replaced the old NKVD.

Since the Church, according to Soviet theory, is one of the chief agents working against the "new order" and spreading "superstitions" among the people, the NKGB immediately concentrated its efforts on fighting the Church's influence.

2. Efforts to Establish a National Church

It was obvious that at least a part of the strength of the Catholic Church lay in its obedience to the Pope. During the first occupation the Soviets had tried to break this bond by denouncing the Concordat and expelling the Papal Nuncio. These efforts failed, and the Lithuanian Catholics remained faithful to the Church.

In 1944 the Soviets tried a new approach — the organization of a "national church," thus freeing the faithful from the "slavery" of the Vatican.¹ The Church hierarchy was ordered to sever all its relations with the Vatican; when it refused, the occupiers endeavored to organize the younger priests. Their efforts brought no significant results — neither promises nor threats availed. The Lithuanian bishops were repeatedly summoned to various government offices and informed that the Party would tolerate only a national church, not an international one. Smirnov, the chief of the MGB was given the task of organizing such a church, while A. Sniečkus, the First Secretary of the Communist Party in Lithuania, and B. Pušinas, the Director for Religious Affairs, applied additional pressure.

At the same time an intense propaganda campaign was launched against the Holy See. Forged documents, purporting to prove that the

Lithuanian hierarchy had condemned the Vatican as an enemy of the peace and of the people and ostensibly signed by a number of bishops already under arrest, were published. The pages of the Party press were filled with abuse. So-called seminars were organized throughout the country to propagate antireligious ideas. The topics of these seminars are very revealing — among them, for example, we find "Pope Pius II, supporter of Hitler, Lithuania's greatest enemy, in World War II" and "The Pope: slave of the American imperialists."

The Party also began to interfere in the internal affairs of Catholic parishes, by appointing special committees without whose approval the pastors even today are powerless to act. In some churches that had lost their priests, imposters masquerading as priests appeared, but they were quickly identified by the faithful and were killed by the partisans.²

3. Repressive Measures Against the Bishops

The Party, failing to establish a national church, resorted to another tactic — the use of the bishops' authority for its own political ends, thus compromising the bishops in the eyes of the faithful. Thus the Minister for Internal Affairs demanded that in their pastoral letters the bishops advise the partisans to end their resistance, since in "liberated" Lithuania the Church, like the whole country, enjoyed the greatest possible freedom.³ The bishops, however, refused to do this. A circular letter was published in the name of M. Reins, Archbishop of Vilnius, without his knowledge, exhorting the partisans to leave their hideouts and return to their homes assuring them full freedom and safety. When the archbishop learned of this, he declared from the pulpit that he had signed no such proclamation.⁴

On February 19, 1946, V. Borisevičius, Bishop of Telšiai, was arrested, and he was held in prison for three years. On January 3, 1949, he was sentenced to death in Vilnius; no certain information is available as to his fate, though the Italian

Communist newspaper "Unita" announced that the bishop died in Russia on August 28, 1956. The arrests continued: In the summer of 1946, P. Ramanauskas, Auxiliary Bishop of Telšiai, was arrested and deported. He was permitted to return to Lithuania ten years later, but was not allowed to return to his duties.

Shortly thereafter T. Matulionis suffered the same fate. Bishop Matulionis had been in Soviet prison several times previously. As a priest in St. Petersburg, he had been arrested during the Bolshevik revolution and had spent two years in the concentration camps on the Solovk Islands. He had then returned to St. Petersburg, now Leningrad, and was secretly consecrated a bishop there in 1926. For this he was again deported to the same islands, and he remained there until 1933, at which time the Lithuanian government agreed on an exchange of prisoners with the Soviet Union; Matulionis was among those exchanged. Now in 1946 he was arrested once more by the Soviets and deported. He did not return to Lithuania until 1956, and was forbidden to resume his pastoral duties.

Archbishop Reinyš was arrested in 1947, and after spending some time in prison in Vilnius was deported to Russia. The extreme hardships he underwent broke his health, and he died on November 3, 1953, in the prison at Wladimir.⁵

After the arrest of Reinyš, the only bishop left in Lithuania was the aging K. Paltarokas. Three bishops — J. Skvireckas, V. Brizgys and V. Padolskis — had escaped to the West; a fourth — A. Karosas, Bishop of Vilkauskis — had died. To remedy this situation, Canon J. Stankevičius and Canon P. Maželis were appointed administrators for the dioceses.

The reasons why the Soviets spared Bishop Paltarokas are unknown; whatever they were, his position was very difficult. He was free, but he could never be sure what might happen to him, that at any moment he might not be arrested, interrogated and tortured. An attempt was made to use him as a propaganda instrument: He was forced to participate in various conventions and in a conference of religious leaders held in Moscow. But in spite of this pressure, and at the risk of an arrest that would deprive Lithuania of her one remaining bishop, Paltarokas never denounced the Pope or the Church and never praised the existing regime. On the contrary, he would sometime use such occasions to reveal indirectly significant facts concerning the difficult situation of the Catholic Church.

Where compromise was impossible, the bishop acted forcefully and bluntly. For example, when at the Moscow convention one of the delegates made certain disparaging remarks about the Pope, Bishop Paltarokas rose and left the hall. When the Party attempted to institute lectures on Communist ideology in the sole remaining seminary, he asserted: "The seminary will remain as it is; otherwise we have no use for it at all." A final

example: When it was suggested in 1955 that a religious journal be published, the bishop refused, realizing that it would only be used to serve Communist propaganda.

K. Paltarokas was the only bishop in the country for nine years, until September 11, 1955, when, in accord with a decree of the Holy See, he himself consecrated two new bishops, P. Maželis and J. Steponavičius, at the cathedral in Panevėžys. The Communist government permitted the new bishops to assume their duties. The press and radio in occupied Lithuania ignored the event, while TASS used it as evidence of the country's religious freedom. This release appeared in the Western press, and some people conjectured from it that the Vatican intended to establish relations with the Soviet Union, a rumor the Vatican denied.⁷ As was mentioned earlier, in the summer of 1956 Bishop T. Matulionis and P. Ramanauskas returned from exile but were not permitted to resume their duties in their dioceses or to live in their residences; both were forced to settle in remote places. We might note that their return was also used for foreign propaganda purposes. T. Matulionis was interviewed over the Vilnius radio, and the interview was rebroadcast from Moscow on August 22, 1957. Very little of significance was said in the interview, but the announcer took the opportunity to deliver an extensive introduction dealing with "religious freedom" in Lithuania.

The Russians used Bishop Matulionis' age — he was 85 at the time — as an excuse for forbidding him to govern the diocese of Kaišėdoriai. Therefore the Holy See authorized the consecration of the Rev. V. Slatkevičius as auxiliary bishop. Bishop Matulionis performed the consecration ceremony privately at Birštonas so that it would not be used for propaganda purposes. The government responded by punishing the pastor at Birštonas for permitting the ceremony without Communist permission. Both bishops were exiled from the boundaries of the diocese of Kaišėdoriai, and the diocese was thus still without a head, although something was gained — an administrator, J. Meidus, was appointed for it.

Bishop Paltarokas died in Vilnius on January 3, 1958, and was buried in the crypt of the cathedral at Panevėžys. Huge crowds came from all over the country to mourn him; the cathedral was too small to contain them.⁸ On October 17, 1959, Bishop Ramanauskas also died, broken by his long years of exile. Thus there are now only four bishops, and two of them have not been permitted to resume their duties.

Thus the Lithuanian bishops remained faithful to the Holy See, the Church and their country in spite of intense pressure.

4. Persecution of the Priests and Seminaries.

The Party considers that the members of the clergy have taken up the profession for the sake of profit. It assumed that once Church property

was nationalized, the clergymen's salaries discontinued and the clergy burdened with heavy taxes, the clergymen would abandon their calling as no longer lucrative.

Furthermore, an intense propaganda campaign was launched to destroy the respect and authority the clergy enjoyed in the country. Priests were depicted as reactionaries, exploiters, loafers and enemies of the working class, and every other epithet in the extensive Party arsenal was hurled at them. In many cases sermons and conversations were deliberately distorted.

The life and work of the priests were greatly restricted. The priest's every step was followed by Party agents, who established themselves in neighboring houses and noted each visitor he received. To speak with a priest or actually visit one was sufficient evidence that a person or family was unreliable. The clergy were even forbidden to visit the sick in the hospitals unless a patient signed a written request. They could not enter the premises of a school even during vacations. Party agents would record their sermons and even pretend to go to confession in order to provoke statements that might later be used against the priests.⁹ All these restrictions are still in force.

Furthermore, a priest cannot exercise his functions without government permission, since hierarchy's right to appoint or transfer priests is not recognized. According to the present regulations, the community — that is, the parish, with its government-appointed committee — suggests a candidate to the Director for Religious Affairs, and he can appoint or reject the candidate. There have been cases when such appointments have been refused. It may also be noted that although there is a great shortage of priests in the country, those returning from exile elsewhere in the Soviet Union receive appointments as pastors or rectors only with the greatest difficulty.

Additional pressure is exerted upon the younger priests. Since the bishops refused to form a national church, it was hoped that the younger clergy could be persuaded to do so.¹⁰ When this failed, the Soviets decided to deport the more active priests. The press was first filled with the usual slanders, and these were followed by arrests and deportations.¹¹ The arrests and the deportations of priests is still being carried out on a smaller scale. In the autumn of 1959 the Rev. N. Gilis was sentenced to nine months' hard labor because he had been giving 30 children lessons in the catechism twice a week.¹²

As a result of the arrests and deportations there were too few priests to serve the people's religious needs. In January, 1954, TASS reported a statement by Bishop Paltarokas that there were 741 priests in occupied Lithuania. This is fewer than half the 1646 there were at the time of the invasion. If a number of private estimates are correct, the number later decreased to about 400

but has now risen again because of the return of some 150 priests from exile in recent years. New consecrations are insufficient to replace those who die: It is estimated that from five to eight priests are consecrated annually, while from 30 to 35 die.¹³

The monasteries suffered even more. They had begun to rebuild after the first occupation, but all the repressions against them were reintroduced with the return of the Bolsheviks. Many monks were arrested and deported. Many of these died, but some managed to survive ten years in Soviet prisons and have returned to the country. Several others have remained in Russia and are working among the Lithuanian exiles there. Those who returned have been forced to sign statements promising not to undertake to reorganize the monasteries. Out of the prewar 1586 monks, only a small handful have survived. There are also several nuns who now work in a lay capacity in hospitals and shelters.¹⁴

The seminaries were treated similarly. The seminaries at Kaunas, Telšiai, Vilnius and Vilka viškis had been reopened during the German occupation; in the fall of 1944 those at Vilnius and Vilkaviskis were again closed, and the Telšiai seminary was closed the following year. Some 300 students attended the sole remaining seminary, at Kaunas; the Party decided this was too many, and in 1945 it restricted the number to 190 and in 1946 to 150. Later restrictions reduced the number to 75 and then to 69, and last year the seminary was permitted only 60 students.

The seminary functions under extremely difficult conditions. There is a great shortage of suitable literature for the professors and textbooks for the students. Also, the Department for Religions frequently interferes in its internal affairs. It has tried on several occasions to initiate lectures on Marxism and Communist theory. In 1946 the police demanded that all the seminarians sign a statement promising to inform on the activities of the seminary, but in spite of great pressure not one seminarian signed. In retaliation the NKGB arrested and deported Msgr. Rauda, the rector of the seminary. His successor, Rev. Kuzmickis, met the same fate. In all, four rectors of the seminary have been deported since 1944; one vice-rector and two prefects were also arrested.¹⁵ In the spring of 1959 still another rector, Rev. K. Zitkus, was dismissed from his position along with three professors. They were replaced by younger priests without academic degrees, graduates of the seminary during the occupation. Possibly the intention of this move was to lower the clergy's standards of education.

The lack of religious literature has made the work of the priests more difficult. Up to 1956 there was no liturgical calendar listing the feasts of the Catholic Church and the proper ceremonies. Calendars mailed from abroad were never received; there were cases when calendars sent by registered mail were returned to the sender labeled "anti-

Soviet literature." The same is true of prayer books and breviaries, needed by the priests for saying mass and for their daily prayers. The censors have even thrown out clippings included in letters. However, a liturgical calendar has been published since 1956, and a prayer book was also printed in the same year.

5. The Desecration of Churches and Cemeteries

A dozen or so churches were destroyed during the war, and many others were seriously damaged. At first the occupation government not only refused to allow the damaged churches to be repaired but even closed down many undamaged ones by a special decree, which specified that no two churches could be closer to each other than seven kilometers. This seriously affected the urban churches. In Vilnius, only eight of the former 38 Catholic churches (excluding chapels) remain, and in Kaunas only four out of 17. As Bishop Paltarokas said, in January, 1954, there were 688 churches open in the country, as compared to 1202 before the war. Several churches have been repaired since then, and one new one has been built in Klaipėda. It might be noted that the entertainment tax is applied to churches, and those that cannot pay are shut down.

The closed churches are used for various purposes. The relics and statues in the historic cathedral in Vilnius have been removed and it has been turned into an art gallery. The monumental Church of the Resurrection in Kaunas is being used for storing fuel. Two other Churches in Kaunas are used to store grain and the furniture of deported families. The Church of St. Michael in Vilnius now serves as a building materials warehouse and a church in Marijampolė for book storage. The famed monastery at Pažaislis is now a hospital for the insane, and its old and beautiful church has been left uncared for. Other churches have been converted into sports arenas, theaters, etc.

The occupation government has recently begun to destroy the cemeteries in the larger cities, such as Kaunas and Kretinga. Many of these are of historical interest because of the distinguished persons buried in them. The explicit excuses advanced for their destruction are that urban cemeteries are unhygienic or that they interfere with construction plans.

Public religious monuments have also suffered damage, particularly the highway and homestead crosses that were so characteristic of the prewar Lithuanian landscape. Many of these have been torn down; the metal ones have been sold as scrap iron, which according to the Soviet press has been used to manufacture central heating systems and radiators. The three crosses that stood on a hill in Vilnius as a memorial to legendary Franciscan martyrs, an important national shrine, have been removed.

6. Communist Indoctrination of the Young

Even after 15 years of occupation, the Communist Party in Lithuania is not very large. It was reported at the 12th Congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania that on March 1, 1960 the Party had 46,381 members and 7,943 candidate members.¹⁶ Many of these members are not convinced Communists, of course, but joined merely in hope of better living conditions. Even now some of them are in secret practicing Catholics, for which they are frequently attacked in the Party press. The Party places all its hopes on the young, who are subject to Soviet education from the cradle up. Since the Church and the family are among the chief barriers to the spread of the Communist ideology, the Party in its educational programs has tried to minimize their influence. To this end all religious instruction has been abolished and every effort has been exerted to separate the young from the clergy and from their parents. This is done through the system of nurseries and kindergartens, which — purportedly to make things easier for the parents — take care of the children's early education. Many parents are forced by economic hardship to entrust their children to such institutions during working hours, and as a result the Communists could boast as far as 1954 that "even preschool children know that priests are exploiters." The Communist training initiated in this preschool period is continued in school. According to the decision of a teachers' conference of March 25, 1953, atheist indoctrination must be universal — that is, it must form a part of every subject taught. Special lectures were given to show how this should be done. Among the lecture topics we find "Atheistic training in the teaching of history," "Atheistic training in the teaching of physical geography."¹⁷

Another agency of atheistic education is the Pioneer organization for grammar-school children. It has been supplied with its own buildings, toys, sports equipment, playgrounds and summer camps. It enjoys full government support. It publishes the periodicals "Lietuvos Pionierius" ("The Lithuanian Pioneer") and "Žvaigždutė" ("The Little Star"). The leaders of the organization constantly tell children that only the Communist government takes care of them, and that in capitalist countries children are enslaved by religious superstitions, live in holes and eat from garbage heaps.

The children are also taught "scientific" laws that purportedly disprove religious dogmas. They are used to further antireligious propaganda: At Pioneer meetings they collect press clippings and make topical "atheistic albums" filled with illustrations "unmasking" the Vatican and the clergy in various historical epochs. In several places the Pioneers have organized "atheistic evenings."¹⁸

The Pioneers supply most of the membership of the Young Communist League which is made up of high-school, university and special-school

In Lithuania, the Church has become closely identified with national resistance. One reason for this is that the Church is the only remaining non-Communist organization and a living symbol of a different world view. Here are a few frank statements from the Communist press and radio.

The Struggle Against Religion Difficult

"A particularly important task is the struggle for a materialistic education of the working people. Religious superstition is most widespread and the fight against it is especially difficult. . . An intelligent anti-religious propaganda is a goal that demands our most serious attention."

(From an address by G. Zimanas, editor in chief of the Lithuanian CP organ *Tiesa* (Truth) at the 3rd Conference of the Workers and village Newspaper Reporters of Soviet Lithuania, on May 5-6.)

Even Non-Believers Go to Church

"...It is very strange that sometimes even non-believers permit their children to be baptized in the church. They pander to the opinions of old women, truckle to superstition. Such fawning is a shameful thing and it permits the survival of superstitions, because people usually conclude that non-believers only pretend to be such." (Radio Vilnius, May 29, 1960)

Tiesa (Truth) in its issue of June 5, 1959, tells the story of Mr. Barzda, employee of the bank in Pabradė and member of the Communist Youth Organization, who committed the supreme "sin" of getting married in church. The Communist Youth Organization discussed the event and appropriately punished the young man "for improper activity". *Tiesa* is particularly indignant about the fact that another Communist, Juška, and the manager of the local collective farm, Afoninas, were guests at the wedding ceremony and thus, "indirectly supported" the young man's behaviour.

Church and Red School Vie for the Young

"The bells of the Išlaužas church echo everyday in the fields of the Žemaitė collective farm, inviting the faithful to religious services. In the eight-grade school of Išlaužas close-by, a bell also rings everyday, calling the students to school. Yet, on Sundays the church bell is boastfully ringing alone, as if happy that on that day there is no sound of the annoying competitor—the school bell. And among those who are hurrying to Sunday Mass, there are students, who, with their grandmothers, head to the 'house of God'. . . Students are being constrained by their environment in which the influence of religious traditions and superstitions is still alive."

"Tarybinis Mokytojas" (Soviet Teacher)
March 20, 1960.

students and younger factory and collective - farm workers. This organization completes the work of preparing candidates for the Party. Its members participate in Party and government agencies. Suggestions arising within this organization, especially in matters of religion and education, are heeded by the government. Yet in spite of the efforts of the government and the

Party to eradicate religion, Lithuanian young people do not seem to have abandoned their "superstitions." Many observe religious practices clandestinely, and some members of the Young Communist League have even been known to serve at Mass. One Pioneer girl gave this advice to a friend in Vilnius: "Wear the red tie around your neck and carry God in your heart."¹⁹

Students have also been known to protest the closing of churches. When the Church of St. Gertrude in Kaunas was closed, students tore down the notice of its closing and crowded to Mass. This was repeated several times; finally several women students were arrested on suspicion and six were sentenced to six years at hard labor in Russia.²⁰ The Christmas and Easter holidays have been abolished, and a repatriated French teacher reports that on those days the students are restless and uncontrollable.

The Party places the primary blame for the persistence of religious beliefs among students on the parents, and the Party press often attacks the parents for displaying religious symbols in the home, observing religious holidays, taking their children to church, and permitting the children's participation in religious observances. One argument that is advanced is that by teaching the catechism to their children, parents are making it very difficult for the children to "adjust." Thus in 1958 a writer in "Tiesa" advised parents: "It would be best if parents would not, during their children's school years, try through their unsupported religious dogmas to destroy the scientific seeds sown by the teachers, which would yield such a rich harvest."

Most teachers are not particularly zealous in spreading atheism in the schools. This is shown by the fact that the Ministry of Education has had to dismiss, punish or even deport many teachers for teaching religious "superstitions."²¹ Yet many teachers' college graduates even now practice their religion in secret, as the Communist press indicates. A. Balsys, reporting a 1958 regional teachers' conference in "Tiesa," writes that complaints were made at the conference that "the instructors in the higher educational institutions in Vilnius give their students inadequate ideological training; because of religious superstitions, those harmful vestiges of the past, they cast doubts on the Soviet system." It was also charged that the instructors "have not repudiated dogmatism and give lectures that are divorced from life and are on a low theoretical and ideological plane."²²

It seems that the present efforts at Communist indoctrination are not yielding the desired results, and new methods are constantly being sought. At the 21st Communist Party Congress in Moscow, in February, 1959, Khrushchev stated that the possibility of educating all children in boarding schools at government expense was being studied. If this plan is put into effect, it will constitute a very serious threat to the efforts to preserve religion in Lithuania. The so-called Communist morality, totally opposed to Christian morality, is especially harmful for the young. Communist authorities have repeated time and time again that anything that contributes either to the overthrow of the old system or to the preservation of the new is permissible.

7. The Persecution of the Faithful and Atheistic Propaganda

The adults have not been forgotten in the process of indoctrination. Various excuses have been and are still being used to hamper the fulfilling of religious obligations. Today, as during Stalin's lifetime, teachers and civil servants are forbidden to attend church or practice their religion. Those who are detected are dismissed and punished.²³ Appeals to Article 24 of the U.S.S.R. Constitution, which ostensibly guarantees freedom of worship and which is repeated in the Constitution of the Lithuanian S.S.R. as Article 96, are of no avail.

After Stalin's death the Party changed somewhat the tactics of its antireligious campaign. On November 10, 1954, Khrushchev published a decree condemning the persecution of the clergy and laity and calling on the Communist Party to develop a program of "scientific" atheistic propaganda.²⁴ In occupied Lithuania this work was entrusted to the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences, which ordered the preparation of a program of scientific propaganda by its institutes. Members of the Academy were charged with preparing lectures and popular articles on atheism. A special committee was appointed to coordinate this effort.²⁵

In 1949 the Lithuanian Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Information was established for the development of "scientific" propaganda. After 1954 its activities were greatly intensified. Intellectuals of all professions must belong to it, and it has some 10,000 members. It publishes a journal called "Mokslas ir gyvenimas" ("Science and Life"). In the words of its chairman, J. Matulis, the society has grown into a serious center of "scientific" atheistic propaganda which organizes more than 20,000 lectures annually.²⁶ Besides publishing the journal, it contributes to many other periodicals. It might be noted that the materials it prepares often contain very little science.

To further this type of propaganda, many self-study circles, culture clubs, reading rooms, libraries, sports societies, women's councils and the like have been set up. Those propagandize atheism along with their other activities. So-called "houses of atheism" have begun to function recently here and there. These are divided into sections, each with a specific purpose. There are sections that organize lectures, for example, and history sections which falsify Church history; "unmiraculous miracles" sections attempt to explain away miracles on "scientific" grounds, while the political ceremonies sections devise secular rites, which frequently resemble closely the religious festivals, sacraments and rites they are intended to replace.²⁷

Atheism is also propagated in literature and art, in the theater and motion pictures. This is in keeping with the Communist principle that all forms of art must serve the re-education of

society and the strengthening of the state. Artists who try to escape this responsibility are subject to violent abuse.

Another innovation is the atheist exhibitions that have been held in the larger cities since 1954. In that year a huge display of atheistic literature was organized in Vilnius under the slogan "Religion — poisoner of the people's consciousness". Here are examples of the "scientific" books that were exhibited: *Christian Morality — Exploiter of the Working People and How the Priests Deceive the People*, both by J. Ragauskas; *Church and Clergy in the Service of the Exploiters*, by J. Mickevičius; and *The Vatican Unmasked*, by J. Galanas. According to the Vilnius radio, more than 3000 atheistic books and pictures were exhibited. A similar exhibition was held in Kaunas in the same year, and others followed later in the smaller cities.

The State Publishing House for Political and Scientific Literature is another propaganda agency, along with its other functions. It has, of course, translated and published the Communist classics in overwhelming numbers; by 1955 it had printed a total of 5,471,000 copies of the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. It has printed works by local Communists, a great deal of which is pure antireligious propaganda. Among these latter works are *The Vatican*, by J. Lavreckis (published in 1957), *The Economic and Juridical Position of the Catholic Church in Lithuania (15th through 19th Centuries)*, by P. Parkarklis (1956), and *Kazimieras Lyščynskis — Pioneer of Atheism in Lithuania*, by J. Jurginis (1957). The State Literary Publishing House performs a similar function; more than half the titles in its 1953 catalogue are of propaganda nature.

An interesting innovation that was tried for a short time was the use of various chemical experiments to demonstrate the way miracles are really performed — to prove, in other words, that all miracles are really merely the result of chemical reactions. For example, a colorless liquid is transformed into a red liquid to show how water can be changed into wine, or the same chemicals are used to show how a statue can exude blood. But the Communists themselves began to attack these not-very-imaginative efforts, primarily on the ground that no one accepted the explanation.²⁸

Atheistic propaganda is universal and is injected into every conceivable subject. All university lectures must have an atheistic orientation. The teachers' colleges have courses in the fundamentals of "scientific" atheism. Propagandists are trained in four-day seminars. Collective farm and factory workers are expected to attend atheistic lectures on holidays and rest days. It has recently been suggested that agitators work with each believer individually.

Such is the internal situation. For foreign consumption, there are emphatic assertions of religious freedom. Even "peace congresses" of

clergymen are adduced to prove the existence of complete freedom of religion, and the occasional consecration of a bishop has been used to the same ends. The bishops and clergy are forced to make statements about the situation of the Church and to hold interviews with foreign Communist journalists in order to conceal the true state of affairs.

8. Lithuanian Resistance.

Neither persecution nor propaganda has achieved the intended effect, and many Lithuanians continued to practice their religion in private and in public. A German who left Lithuania in 1951 has asserted that on holy days the churches in Kaunas cannot accommodate all the worshippers, and some of them pray in the street.²⁹ A Lithuanian girl who went to Australia in 1959 has told how on a visit to Vilnius in 1957 she saw people praying in the street at the Gates of Dawn, as well as many people praying in the churches. Several Germans and Lithuanians who left the country in 1959 tell the same story.

Lithuanians have always visited the shrines of the Virgin Mary in large numbers and observed the church festivals called indulgences. The shrine of the Virgin Mary at Šiluva, where on September 8-15 thousands of pilgrims would gather, is especially famous. The Communists have failed to eradicate this custom. The Party press itself has admitted, with great indignation, that in 1954 Šiluva was visited by tens of thousands of pilgrims, many of whom had journeyed hundreds of miles, and according to the Vilnius radio the Šiluva indulgences in 1959 attracted some 150,000 people.

The press frequently complains that the people still hold to their "superstitions," and therefore observe Church festivals even at the height of the working season. The Communists are particularly angered when collective farm chairmen give their workers permission to leave the fields and sometimes even provide trucks to transport them to the festivals; it is even worse when the chairmen themselves participate. The abolition of the Christmas and Easter holidays did not help; on these days many workers leave their jobs after signing in. One priest has written that in 1954 the churches in Vilnius were filled for the Christmas midnight Mass, and a holy day mood was noticeable throughout the country.³⁰ Similar reports have been received from the administrator of the dioceses of Kaunas and Vilka-viškis and from others. The evening May devotions are also attended in great numbers. Believers continue to receive the sacraments of the Church faithfully; many are baptized, marry and receive other sacraments in church. Even though the believers may be poor, they contribute to the support of the churches and to the payment of the exorbitant taxes that are levied on them.³¹

The same is true of many civil officials and

Party and Young Communist League officials. Many of these marry in church and have their children baptized, although they do this secretly, in distant parishes. Even government officials have been known to be practicing believers. For example, Skrebė, chairman of Subačius region, was dismissed for marrying in church, and in 1953 a secretary of the Ministry of Education was fired for having his child baptized.³² In 1959 an employee of the State Bank was married in church with two Communist friends attending, and all three were punished.³³

The faith is also strong among the Lithuanian deportees in the Siberian labor camps. All religious symbols — medals, rosaries, prayer books, pictures — were taken away from these people when they were deported.³⁴ But the deportees continue to practice their religion. Since many priests have been deported, there are enough of them to minister to the deportees' needs. In several areas what amount to parishes have been formed in secret. Lithuanians who have reached the West have described how 130 Lithuanian deportees in a camp in Karaganda observed Christmas in 1955

in the traditional manner, with Mass, a Christmas tree and the ceremonial meal called Kučia, even though this was forbidden and some of them were penalized for it. The same is true of some deportees in the Komi forests; Dr. J. Scholmer, a German who returned from exile in the Soviet Union describes in his book *Die Toten kehren zurück* how the Lithuanian deportees at Vorkuta organized services deep underground in the mines, where their guards did not dare descend. Here at times, even during working hours, while some stand guard others pray, hear Mass, confess and receive Communion. A prayer book written by hand by several girls in Siberia bears the same witness. This book reached the U.S. several years ago and was printed here; later it was translated into English (*Mary Save Us*, New York, 1960).

We may conclude this brief survey of religion in occupied Lithuania by repeating a fact that we have already noted a number of times: Religion still remains a strong force in occupied Lithuania, in spite of persecution and propaganda, and many Lithuanians remain faithful to their Church.

NOTES

¹J. MAUCLERE, *La Situation de L'Eglise Catholique en Lithuanie*, Le Raincy, 1950, documents 21-28.

²*La Chiesa del Silenzio Guarda a Roma*, Rome, 1957, p. 160 ff.

³*Ibid.*, p. 161.

⁴A. Galter, *Libro Rosso della Chiesa Presemitata*, Milan, 1956, p. 65.

⁵A. Brunello, *La Chiesa del Silenzio*, Rome, 1953, p. 31, nos. 4, 5.

⁶"The New York Times," Sept. 12, 1955.

⁷Rev. J. Gasiūnas, "Paskutinės Vyakupo Kazimiero Paltaroko Dienos" ("The Last Days of Bishop Kazimieras Paltarokas"), in "Draugas," March 28, 1959, Chicago, Ill.

⁸Brunello, op. cit., p. 32, nos. 2, 3, 8.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 33, no. 1.

¹⁰"Tiesa" ("Truth"), Jan 1, 1947, and Sept. 25, 1947. "Tiesa" is the official organ of the Communist Party in occupied Lithuania and is published in Vilnius.

¹¹"L'Osservatore Romano," Nov. 24, 1959.

¹²*La Chiesa del Silenzio Guarda a Roma*, p. 188.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 163; Mauclère, op. cit., p. 27, no. 4.

¹⁴*La Chiesa del Silenzio Guarda a Roma*, p. 160.

¹⁵"Tiesa," March 2, 1960.

¹⁶A. Rimvydas, "Sovietinė Indoktrinacija Okupuotoje Lietuvoje" ("Soviet Indoctrination in oc-

cupied Lithuania"), in *Lietuva Okupacijoje* (Lithuania under Occupation), New York, 1958, p. 101.

¹⁷"Tiesa," Sept. 18, 1954.

¹⁸"Tiesa," Dec. 10, 1954.

¹⁹*La Chiesa del Silenzio Guarda a Roma*, p. 183.

²⁰"Tiesa," May 11, 1948.

²¹20

²²"Darbininkas," Feb. 14, 1958, Brooklyn, New York.

²³*La Chiesa del Silenzio Guarda a Roma*, p. 183.

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 189; J. Aistis, "Katalikų Bažnyčia okupuotoje Lietuvoje" ("The Catholic Church in Occupied Lithuania"), in "Tėvynės Sargas" ("Guardian of the Fatherland"), Brooklyn, N. Y., 1955, Vol. V, No. 2, p. 26.

²⁵*Lietuvos TSR Mokslų Akademijos Darbai* (Proceedings of the Lithuanian S.S.R. Academy of Sciences), Series A. Vilnius, 1955, pp. 165, 167.

²⁶"Draugas," April 27, 1959, Chicago, Ill.

²⁷Rimvydas, op. cit., p. 103.

²⁸"Tiesa," June 4, 1959.

²⁹*La Chiesa del Silenzio Guarda a Roma*, p. 183.

³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 183.

³¹*Ibid.*, p. 185.

³²"Tiesa," June 5, 1953.

³³ELTA-PRESS, Servizio d'informazione Litwana, Luglio-Agosto, 1959, No. 18.

³⁴*La Chiesa del Silenzio Guarda a Roma*, pp. 173, 179.

The reaction of youth to the Soviet system falls into three categories, according to T. Remeikis, a young political scientist. Between the two poles of acquiescence and resistance the Ketman balances himself precariously.

ACQUIESCENCE AND RESISTANCE

By THOMAS REMEIKIS

"When the younger generation, free from malevolent influence of the 'old', arises, everything will change. Only whoever has observed the younger generation in the Center is reluctant to cast such a horoscope. Then we must postpone our hopes to the remote future, to a time when the Center and every dependent state will supply its citizens with refrigerators and automobiles, with white bread and a handsome ration of butter. Maybe then at last, they will be satisfied.

Why won't the equation work out as it should, when every step is logical? Do we have to use non-Euclidean geometry on material as classic, as adaptable, and as plastic as a human being? Won't the ordinary variety satisfy him? What the devil does a man need?"

Czeslaw Milosz, *THE CAPTIVE MIND*

A survey of the attitudes and behavior of youth in the totalitarian Soviet society, which goes out of its way to win the younger generation, leads one to repeat Czeslaw Milosz's question: "What the devil does a man need?" An answer to this question can perhaps, be discerned in the political and ideological conditions which must be met before a man can avail himself of the opportunities in life that a Soviet society is capable of offering.

POLITICAL PREREQUISITES FOR SUCCESS

A young rising Party functionary declared: "I saw that all the social, scientific, political, and administrative institutions were open, first to all, to the likes of us, people with proper class origin, devoted to the Party and to the cause of the U.S.S.R."¹ Despite challenges from the efficiency-minded industrial elite, political criteria for status ascription in the Soviet Union are still dominant.² The Communist Party makes this unmistakably clear in word and deed and no thinking youth can fail to consider these standards as conditions for success. It is appropriate, therefore, to inquire what political — ideological demands the Communist Party makes of the growing generation.

A Soviet youth in general and the Lithuanian youth in particular, who is in some respects in a different position than Russian youth as far as the direction of ideological indoctrination is concerned,³ has to make the following ideological commitments in order to achieve social mobility and a desirable position in society and to realize his creative yearnings: he has to accept socialist society and communist ideology, the principles of Soviet patriotism, proletarian internationalism, atheism and collectivism.

A Lithuanian youth has to renounce any nationalistic sentiments and religious beliefs, and has to participate in "socially useful" work before he can be admitted to an institution of higher education. He has to accept the Party's interpretations of his nation's history and must become an avid propagator of proletarian internationalism, which in Lithuania has to manifest itself as a show of affection for the "great Russian nation" and all things Russian. It must renounce many things that are a part of his national heritage. Knowing that such a renunciation is hard to make and sometimes impossible, the Communist Party continuously demands political vigilance in status ascription. As recently as 1959 the First Secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party said before a Congress of the republic's Party organization: "We also cannot neglect political vigilance in the work with cadres. Bourgeois nationalists and other enemy elements try to penetrate into the state apparatus, among the ranks of the Party and the Komsomols. There are still instances, when politically unreliable individuals penetrate even into responsible positions."⁴ Again in 1960 the First Secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party demanded adherence to the "Leninist principle" in selection and assignment of cadres according to their political and occupational characteristics. "The smallest infraction of this principle inevitably leads to violation of the principle of proletarian internationalism."⁵ Elimination of nationalistic sentiments is one of the prime goals of the indoctrination system. One reading of the First Secretary's report to the last Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party (March, 1960) will make this clear.⁶

YOUTH REACTIONS TO THE IDEOLOGICAL ORDER

Acquiescence to ideological demands may be genuine or a hypocritical, outward conformity without inner conviction. Or else, acquiescence may be impossible because it is too repugnant to the youth. If so, he may express his defiance in behavior that is unacceptable to the standards of a "socialist morality."

The individual who tends toward the pole of absolute acceptance may be called a true believer, the one that tends to reject — a rebel, and the individual taking a middle position — which is a compromise between a rejection of the system and the necessity to exist in such a system — a Ketman, as Czeslaw Milosz has called him.⁷ These three categories encompass the **principal reactions** of youth to Soviet environment.⁸

These same categories will be used to organize the available data on the behavior and attitudes of the Lithuanian youth. This data is so scanty and fragmentary that it is impossible to describe statistically the relative strengths of each category. All that can be said, as judged from the usual media of information on life in the Soviet Union — the official press, letters, interviews with escapees, Western press reports, etc. — is that all these categories exist. The true believers constitute politically the most important group and the most reliable to the Kremlin, though numerically the smallest; the Ketmans constitute the vast majority of the younger generation — a potentially politically explosive group and unreliable to the regime; and the rebels at the moment are the least significant from a political point of view.

The Ketman is found not only among the masses of youth, but also within the elite Komsomol and student groups. The true believer, naturally, is mostly found among the Komsomols, while the rebel appears in a most dramatic and significant way among the students.

A somewhat closer scrutiny of the principal reactions to the ideological order and how these reactions manifest themselves among the youth of Lithuania is in order.

THE TRUE BELIEVER

The true believer rejects an ideological compromise and accepts the ideology as it is at any moment defined by the Party (the Party Line). Margaret Mead gives a following definition of the Bolshevik "Line:"

The Anglo-American idea of political compromise is based on the expectation of there being at least two sides to a question, so that a workable compromise represents a position somewhere between or among a series of positions each of which is sincerely believed in and stoutly defended. But the Bolshevik idea of the Line is more accurately represented by the figure of a lens which is correctly

focused; there is only one correct focus for any given situation, and this is not seen as arrived at by finding some midpoint between lens readings which are too open and those which are too closed; rather, all settings except the correct focus are seen as deviations from the single correct position.⁹

The idea of only one correct position and rejection of a compromise or a "middle-way" was well expressed by young Lithuanian writer Justinas Marcinkevicius in a poem *Dvidešimtas Pavasaris* (The Twentieth Spring),¹⁰ which represents the ideological transformation of a maturing young student of twenty named Kairys. He first tries to take a compromise position between Communism and the "old order" represented by his father. In a moment of confusion Kairys asks an old Party man a question:

— "What do you think, uncle, would one go far in the middle of the road? The uncle solemnly replies: — what is the middle? Explain it to me. — the middle — not here, not there. — What nonsense, child. There is none. No middle. No question. Live like a man and don't search foolishness!"

Various experiences in a socialist society convince Kairys that the Communist way is the only "true way". The ideological transformation, described by Marcinkevicius seems to have been experienced by a group of young people in Lithuania and very closely follows the principal phases of ideological transformation of East European intelligentsia described by Czeslaw Milosz in *The Captive Mind*. Recently the First Secretary of the Lithuanian Leninist Communist Youth Association visited the United States and in a meeting with Lithuanian students in the United States described his ideological "conversion" in approximately the following terms:

"My birthplace is Pasvalys. My mother is very religious. When I was young I was an altar boy. However, with the passing time I became convinced that the way of Communism is the way of Lithuania. This conviction was acquired gradually, and only while I was a student at the university. You probably know that during the period of 1945-1950 in Lithuania there was a class struggle, but now such a situation no longer exists and the people, especially the youth is on our side."¹²

The press also claims that this so-called "Class-struggle" had a very decisive influence in the process of "ideological transformation" of the younger generation. This struggle actually was a violent armed resistance of the Lithuanian nation against the Soviet regime (1944-1952). The youth was forced to choose sides, to fight for or against Communism. There apparently was very little room for a "middle-way." The top leadership of the Lithuanian Komsomols, and already the lower rank leadership of the Communist Party of Lithuania, consists of people who fought for the

establishment of the Soviet order, even gambled with their lives.¹³ Needless to say, this period also produced the patriotic rebels, known as partisans, who sacrificed everything to save their country from the Red terror.¹⁴

With the elimination of open resistance and establishment of a relatively peaceful social order, a new situation was created. Already a peace-time generation of true believers has made its appearance and the nature of their ideological commitment is somewhat different and weaker than that of the post war true believers.

The indoctrination system, together with various other factors affecting the younger generation (the social background of their parents, experiences with the Soviet regime, parent — child conflict, etc.) also produces its share of true believers. There is the case of a 22-year old girl, now a member of the Lithuanian Komsomol Central Committee. Eugenija Žemaitytė decided to join the Pioneer organization. This brought her into a sharp conflict with a very religious mother, who, however, acquiesced until Eugenija was old enough to join the Komsomols. At this point the conflict became so acute that Eugenija left home. She was taken in by a government internate and became the example of an ideal communist youth.¹⁵

THE REBEL

The extremely organized and controlled Soviet society theoretically should almost eliminate rebellion. However, rebellion does take place, sometimes openly and violently, more often in the form of nonconformity to the established norms of behavior. The Soviet youth expresses his dissatisfaction with the drab and extremely regimented life in a variety of ways, from idleness, juvenile delinquency, imitation of Western styles and fads, to political apathy, cynicism, "apolitical attitude" in creative works, and a manifestation of nationalism.

There are few "professional" rebels among Lithuanian youth today. Most young people belong to the Ketman category. Nevertheless, the Ketman and even the true believer, on appropriate occasions becomes a rebel and expresses his dissatisfaction. Let's examine a few forms of nonconformity among the Lithuanian youth.

In 1958 the secretary of the All — Union Komsomols stated that:

"Still there are people who are caught by the hook of bourgeois propaganda, who are in the clutches of tastes foreign to us, who become enchanted with silly dances, abstract art and sculpture, who dress like parrots."¹⁶

Such tendencies among Lithuanian youth are especially noticeable, despite the fact that Party and Komsomol organs are waging a fierce campaign against them.¹⁷ Most amazing is the fact that such tastes are prevalent also among the Komsomols themselves.

Juvenile delinquency is found in most societies

and the Soviet Union is not an exception. However, it is possible to say that a good deal of juvenile delinquency in the Soviet Union is attributable to the particular nature of Soviet society. To what extent are drunkenness and hooliganism — probably the most common forms of delinquency — a result of bad supervision of the parents, the school and other social institutions, and to what extent is it a result of disillusionment with a highly regimented society, sometimes asking impossible sacrifices from the individual. For example, a youth desires to enter a University, but the regime wants him on a collective farm. The conflict of desires on the part of the individual and the regime may be resolved by alcohol, hooliganism or a simple refusal to do anything at all. A recent number of a popular bi-weekly magazine *Jaunimo Gretos* (The Ranks of Youth), published by the Komsomols, reprinted a letter from a Komsomol who describes a lazy, arrogant youngster. The Komsomol relates how the errant youth goes from job to job, seeks only such employment as demands almost nothing from him, how he is supported by an old mother and a sister, and rejected by his young wife. In a conversation with a janitor, who tries to make him ashamed for his unemployment, the youth answers: "Others may work, if they so desire. I already have done my share."¹⁸

That juvenile delinquency is a problem in the Soviet Union there can be no question. Suffice it to point out the recent steps by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. to create commissions for juvenile affairs,¹⁹ the reports of the work of "brigades to guard against the infringements of social order"²⁰, and the frequent press reports of not only major juvenile crimes, but of petty thievery, hooliganism, drunkenness, idleness, etc.²¹ It is unfortunate that such reports are superficial enough to mask most of the causes of delinquency. Nevertheless, at least some of the causes lie in the particular nature of Soviet society.

But rebellion is very prominent also on an ideological plane. Youths, especially students, often raise embarrassing questions to their superiors.²² Also, the first secretary of the Lithuanian Komsomols recently admitted that "the influence of the church is still strong"²³. A recent arrival from Lithuania told how some youths go to church just because they are discouraged or forbidden to go.²⁴

The most dramatic form of rebellion concerns nationalistic sentiments and behavior of the younger generation. Open demonstrations during the Hungarian Revolution and on Lithuania's Independence Day (Feb. 16), and, in general, the very patriotic attitude of youth, as exemplified by their unusual interest in and love of national customs, songs, history, and literature, are antitheses to the principles of proletarian internationalism (i.e. love of everything Russian); and friendship of nations (i.e. love of Russia), which the

indoctrination system strives so hard to inculcate in Lithuanian youth.

The official press would lead us to believe that "nationalistic deviations" are a monopoly of the students. Letters and interviews with recent arrivals from Lithuania tend to contradict this. The rulers are concerned with the ideology of the students because they are the leaders of anti-communist behavior, while other forms of non-conformity prevalent among the masses of youth are less significant politically. For this reason in the matter of nationalistic deviations the official press has been concerned mostly with students. Student nationalistic behavior will be given a closer scrutiny below.

Open rebellion, especially nationalistic demonstrations of one kind or another, is rare because the Soviet police state effectively eliminates the influence of individuals manifesting such tendencies, and because sanctions for such behavior are usually severe, from imprisonment, deportation to remote parts of the Soviet Union, to demotions or dismissal from position in society or the school.

THE KETMAN

The existence of a public and a private self is probably as old as society itself, but nowhere it is as difficult to practice or, paradoxically, as widely spread as in the totalitarian Soviet society.

Gobineau in his work *Religions and Philosophies of Central Asia* gives us a description of an ancient Persian Ketman.²⁵ The principal rule of a Ketman is silence about inner convictions.

"Nevertheless," says Gobineau, "there are occasions when silence no longer suffices, when it may pass as an avowal. Then one must not hesitate. Not only must one deny one's true opinion, but one is commanded to resort to all ruses in order to deceive one's adversary. One makes all the protestations of faith that can please him, one performs all the rites one recognizes to be the most vain, one falsifies one's own books, one exhausts all possible means of deceit. Thus one acquires the multiple satisfactions and merits of having placed oneself and one's relatives under cover, of not having exposed a venerable faith to the horrible contact of the infidel, and finally of having, in cheating the latter and confirming him in his error, imposed on him the shame and spiritual misery that he deserves."

The way of a Ketman, or the art of leading a double life, was also expressed in a poem that recently appeared in Lithuania's official literary review *Pergalė* (Victory):²⁶

He is the greatest of the atheists,
But only in the lecture hall!
Next day the emissary of Christ
In person will forgive him all.

Outward conformity to the requirements of the ideological order is a condition for practicing one's profession.

The impossibility of escaping ideological compulsion is the condition of a Ketman. No matter how repulsive it may be to him, the individual, he cannot rebel against the Soviet system because he does not see the possibility of success of his rebellion. The thinking of the Lithuanian younger generation seems to follow this logic:

"The system is here to stay. No matter how repugnant it is to me, I have to exist in it. Since I can't do anything to change it, the best thing to do is to adjust oneself to it and have as good a life as possible."

Such an attitude is manifested in a variety of ways, ranging from a deceptive conformity to the ideological order to almost sheer opportunism. Let's examine more closely the face of a young Lithuanian Ketman, as revealed by a young university graduate in a number of letters to an acquaintance in the United States, excerpts from which follow:

"And, nevertheless, we must try to smile, even if sometimes we do not want to ... I think a lot. I think too much and thoughts torture me. I am already tired and really I have no more spiritual strength to resist the current. ... With fear I observe myself. I am no longer the same, as I was only two years ago. I have become smaller ... I have surrendered to the current and it carries me along, lazily and dirty. I would like to get to the shore, it so attracts me. But to which shore should I swim? And so I paddle in zig-zags and swear on everything, and my strength is decreasing. And the shore attracts me less and less. It is so good to swim down a warm, muddy river, turning my pointless glance toward infinity, thinking about nothing."²⁷

The youth feels powerless to resist the system, and finally pragmatically accepts it.

Another outstanding feature of a Ketman is his flight to a subjective world. This becomes especially evident among creative individuals. Despite the constant demand for adherence to socialist realism in art and cultivation of political and ideological themes ("close ties of art with life"), the recent crop of young Lithuanian writers insistently emphasize the subjective world of the artist, develop themes of "intimate experiences". A yearbook of young Lithuanian writers²⁸ was criticized in the following terms:

"When one reads the poems of certain young authors published in the 11th issue of the Almanac, one misses a deeper view toward life, one encounters such phenomena as epigonism, superficiality, shallow copying of superficial mannerism ... In the poems published in the Almanac the dominant trend is still toward so-called intimate lyricism which treats human feelings and experiences in a subjective simplistic manner."²⁹

While openly giving lip service to socialist realism, young Lithuanian writers admire and imitate Western writers — become "formalists and

aestheticists". While openly accepting tastelessness and ideological commitment they secretly cherish and foster aesthetic values.

Enough has been said of the young Lithuanian Ketman to show that a society which makes ideological loyalty a condition of social mobility and self-realization forces many to conform deceptively to its value systems, creates conditions which give rise to opportunism, hypocrisy, cynicism, and political apathy. The Ketman is not only prominent among the masses of Lithuanian youth and the Komsomols, he is sometimes also a member of the Communist Party. His strength is unknown since he has masked himself with ideological respectability. His significance becomes evident only when the society is in crisis, when the political and social order starts disintegrating.

Finally, we may sum up the conditions giving rise to a Ketman:

1. The frequent impossibility to accept all or most of the ideological positions required by the Party, combined with the necessity to exist within the system.

2. The existence of a discrepancy between the official description of reality and actuality as perceived by the individual.

Having roughly outlined the various modes of reaction to the Soviet system among Lithuanian youth, we may now turn our attention to one of the most important groups — the students — which has caused the Soviet authorities so many worries.

It would also be most enlightening to scrutinize another key group of the Lithuanian youth — the Komsomols, but this will have to be done in a separate article. It should be kept in mind however, that 80% of the Lithuanian students belong to the Komsomol, because this is a condition for acquiring higher education.

THE STUDENTS

As the Hungarian flareup was burning out the students of the University of Vilnius and the Pedagogical Institute, on the eve of All-Souls Day, staged a protest demonstration. Here is how one participant describes the event:

The students of our school began to organize, two days in advance, a joint demonstration at the cemetery of Rasai. They had been speaking almost publically of their intention. The night was cold, but pleasant and fair, so almost all of us arrived on time at the cemetery. There we found, already gathered, crowds of people with lighted candles in their hands. Most amazing was the fact that the entire student bodies of the University and the Institute of Vilnius were present. While standing over the graves of the fallen Lithuanian soldiers, the students started to sing the following songs: "Beautiful is my Fatherland, Country of Suffering," "Holy, Almighty", and others. We approached the tomb of

Dr. Basanavičius, the Lithuanian national patriarch. The tomb was flooded by candlelight ... Whoever approached the tomb lit a candle — they melted later into a mass of wax which covered the tomb... Our national anthem was sung several times. Although previously no one dared even to mention the national anthem, it now sounded over the city and gave the impression that Vilnius was free again. When the University students brought their wreath, tied it with a black ribbon, and deposited it upon the tomb of Basanavičius, the crowds began to sing the national anthem even louder. Thus they sang late into the night, until more people arrived. Then huge crowds started toward the center of the city. But here they were met by police who were sitting in armed cars, waiting for them. The police demanded the streets cleared. Disregarding the orders, the crowds broke through the ranks of police and went shouting along the streets.³¹

Similar demonstrations occurred in two other largest cities of Lithuania — Kaunas and Šiauliai. These events were followed by arrests of student leaders of the demonstrations and by a vigorous press attack on the shortcomings of student indoctrination.

Among the slogans that appeared during the demonstration were "Russians go home", "We salute the Hungarian Revolution", "We want freedom and independence from Moscow", "Down with the Russian language and Leninism in our University".³²

On Jan. 3, 1957, a correspondent of the (London) *Times* reported a student strike in Lithuania:

About 2000 students at Vilnius have refused to attend lectures on such subjects as Marxism, the history of the Communist Party and Soviet Russian literature. They are reported to have demanded the abolition of these lectures and their replacement by national subjects.³³

The official Soviet sources do not indicate whether such a strike took place.

A political prisoner who had the fortune of reaching the West also gives us an interesting account of student unrest in Kaunas, the second largest city of Lithuania, on the eve of the Independence Day of free Lithuania:

"Above my room — students' quarters. Today there goes on an undescrivable brawl and I can't close my eyes. Old Lithuanian songs are being sung continuously. Suddenly I am awakened by a loud noise. It is midnight. In the Avenue of Freedom echoes the anthem of Lithuania ... I see a moving mass in the darkness. God, it is the youth ... Singing the Lithuanian anthem, they are marching to the executive committee ... Armed militia and soldiers are marching behind the masses."³⁴ Most open eruptions of protest, with a highly

nationalistic flavor, occurred during the 1956-57 ferment. Such demonstrations against the regime are not politically decisive; they are, however, indicative of an existence of a very strong ferment among the students.

As a result of the serious student unrest, steps were taken to improve the ideological indoctrination of the students. The 10th Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party (1958) as a focus of its attention had the problem of nationalistic sentiments in the populace and the intelligentsia. The First Secretary of the Party admitted the existence of "serious shortcomings in the ideological education of the students."³⁵ The press attacked the political attitude of many teachers, the ineffective leadership of the Party and of the Komsomols in higher education institutions.

During the period following de-Stalinization and the Hungarian Revolution, students evidently quite freely engaged in a discussion of the Soviet regime and the contradictions of Communism. The secretary of the party committee of the city of Vilnius charged that the instructors of the university did not answer various questions raised by the students; or if they did answer, the answer usually consisted of a reading of a number of statements by ideologues of Communism. The secretary goes on to state that:

"The students, having received no answer from the lecturers, search for it somewhere else. In the dormitories and during recesses between lectures they carry on discussions concerning hazy questions. Here the students, despite much time spent, are not always able by their own efforts to clarify questions of concern. This produces wavering, weakens the fight with the manifestations of bourgeois ideology or its vestiges."³⁶

Despite the various efforts to overcome ideological weaknesses, not only the students but also the faculty of the University of Vilnius continued to adhere to unacceptable positions. The proceedings of the II Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party (March 1960) revealed that the University of Vilnius was actually controlled by individuals with "nationalistic deviations." For such deviations were dismissed from their positions at the University and from the Party the rector of the University of Vilnius, the director of the Department of Lithuanian Language and Literature, and an assistant director of the Pedagogical Institute of Vilnius, the director of the Department of Lithuanian Language and Literature, and an assistant director of the Pedagogical Institute of Vilnius. These key individuals evidently permitted nationalistic interpretations of history and literature and themselves engaged in such activities. Under their direction were educated a number of students who adhered to idealistic, nationalistic ideas.

Nationalistic tendencies are pronounced also in other disciplines. For example, as recently as

March 1960, the students of the Department of History and Philology of the University of Vilnius were charged with nationalistic deviations in the study of folklore and national monuments.

The Party secretary of the department charged that:

"In the work of groups (collecting folklore and folk art) there were serious ideological shortcomings which adversely affect communist education of students. The folklorists collected ancient Lithuanian folklore and analyzed it mostly from aesthetic viewpoint, disregarding class viewpoint. Because of the passivity and objectivist-educationist position of the leadership of the group, bourgeois nationalist tendencies appeared among different students, against which (tendencies) the leaders of the group did not fight."³⁷

An eye-witness account of student life further illuminates their attitudes.

The great majority of students have a good comprehension and can evaluate the events that took place before their eyes. Deportations to Siberia, the most ruthless elimination of partisans and their university and high school sympathizers, collectivization of the Lithuanian village — all this was experienced and felt by the younger generation; therefore, perhaps only 10-15% of the Komsomols are fascinated by socialistic life and its achievements... The events in Hungary played a significant and positive role, for they were widely discussed among the students and to many showed anew the real face of the communist regime... It is an interesting detail that a majority of the student-Komsomols marry in church, even though a fierce fight is waged against it... Students continue to wear narrow pants (to which the regime object) listen with the greatest of interest to jazz music, dance the boogie, rock and roll, and rumba. Youth finds the only satisfaction in the sounds of new music, rhythms of new dances, and by wearing narrow pants they seem to be mocking the Party bureaucrats who are raving in anger.³⁸

The fact that a large part of the Lithuanian students in one way or another reject the Soviet system is of enormous political significance, for the students of today will be the leaders of tomorrow. Their political orientation will be an important factor in the future fortunes of the Lithuanian nation.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

It seems to me that the highly organized Soviet society is somewhat narrowing the field of the Ketman, even though it is a slow and difficult undertaking. Time is advantageous for the development of the true believers. The enormous effort to involve the youth socially and psychologically into the institutional life of a socialist

society, the constantly improving standard of living, the attractive rewards for accepting socialism seem to be working toward acquiescence to the system of more and more young people. The Soviet society has powerful weapons to diminish the number of the rebels and the Ketman and to develop its own new man — the highly specialized, ideologically neutral or a militant supporter of socialism.

Lithuanian youth, in the clutches of Soviet indoctrination, has a weak basis to resist the

communistic world view. They lack sufficient data with which they could compare the present life with that of the independence period. The family and the church can't favorably counterbalance the organized indoctrination of the state. The youth is forced to accept all explanation of the world provided by the official press, the school, the Party, and the youth organizations. Indeed, it is a wonder that so much resistance to the system still exists after fifteen years of indoctrination of Lithuanian youth.

NOTES

1. As quoted by Joseph Novak, *The Future is Ours, Comrade*, New York, Doubleday & Co. Inc. 1960, p. 210.
2. One of the best discussions of the various criteria for status ascription and of the tensions resulting from clashing of their principles of social organization is by Berrington Moore Jr., *Terror and Progress, U.S.S.R.*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1959.
3. For a discussion of different emphases in the indoctrination of Lithuanian and Russian youths, see Thomas Remeikis, "General Education in Soviet Lithuania", *Lituanus*, June 1959, pp. 41-49.
4. Tiesa (the Truth), Feb. 15, 1959, p. 5.
5. Tiesa, March 2, 1960, p. 3.
6. Ibid.
7. These categories were obviously suggested by the following works: Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer*, New York, Harper & Bros., 1951; Albert Camus, *The Rebel*, New York, Vintage Books, 1959; Czeslaw Milosz, *The Captive Mind*, New York, Vintage Books, 1955. The definitions of these categories do not necessarily closely follow those of the authors' cited.
8. The analytical framework of this article by no means is considered empirically verified or unusually accurate. It, doubtless, highly distorts reality, disregards the psychological and sociological motives of the actors, and merely states the types of reactions to official ideology, whatever the motives for such reactions may be. Such an approach may be justified by the fact that we do not know the motivational patterns of the various categories of individuals, we have only fragmentary accounts of the behaviour of soviet youth. Motivation must be deduced from behaviour, which is a very unsatisfactory and invalid method. The analytical categories used in this article are merely a convenient way of organizing the fragmentary data on the behaviour of soviet youth. Needless to say, this approach could be used also in the analysis of the reactions to the systems by the entire population.
9. Margaret Mead, *Soviet Attitudes Toward Authority*, New York, William Morrow & Co., Inc. 1955, p. 15.
10. Justinas Marcinkevicius, *Dviesimtas Pavasaris*, (The Twentieth Spring), Vilnius, Valstybinė Grožinės Literatūros Leidykla, 1957.
11. Ibid. p. 204.
12. As reported by A. Mickevičius and L. Mockunas, who had an interview with the First Secretary of the Lithuanian Komsomols. Record of the interview is in the possession of the author.
13. See, for example, a number of stories of Komsomols who fought for the communist regime against the resisting Lithuanian nation in *Jaunimo Gretos* (The Ranks of Youth), 1958, No. 10, pp. 4-6.
14. The heroic resistance of the Lithuanian nation against Communism is best described by a participant in this resistance J. Daumantas, *Partizanai už Geležinės Uždangos* (Partisans Behind the Iron Curtain), Chicago, Lietuvių Katalikų Spaudos Draugija, 1950.
15. *Jaunimo Gretos*, 1960, No. 5, pp. 12-13.
16. A. Shelepin, "Report on the Work of the Central Committee of the All-Union Lenin Communist Youth Association to the XIII Congress", *Materials of the XIII Congress of the All-Union Lenin Communist Youth Association*, Vilnius, *Laikraščių ir žurnalo Leidykla*, 1958, p. 59 (translated from a publication in the Lithuanian language; hereafter cited as *Materials, XIII Congress*).
17. Reported by a recent arrival from Lithuania in *Eltos Informacijos* (Elta Informations), published by the Information Service of the Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania, Reutlingen, Garten Str. 5, Germany, Feb. 15, 1959, p. 12.
18. *Jaunimo Gretos*, 1960, No. 5, p. 10.
19. Tiesa, Oct. 24, 1959, p. 2.
20. *Jaunimo Gretos*, 1960, No. 6, p. 8.
21. A good survey of delinquency is by Rimvydas Silbajoris "Stepchildren of Communism", *Lituanus*, June, 1957, pp. 3-8.
22. J. Merkys, "Academic Youth of Lithuania Today", *Darbas* (Labor), 1959, No. 3, p. 7; also P. Griškevičius, "To improve the Educative Work among Students—an Important Task", *Komunistas* (Communist), 1957, No. 2, p. 34.
23. *Komjaunimo Tiesa* ("Komsomolskaja Pravda"), Feb. 12, 1960, p. 3.
24. Interview by the author.
25. Cited by Milosz, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-55.
26. Feb. 1960.
27. These letters, covering the last two years, are in the possession of the author.
28. *Jaunieji* (The Young Ones), Eleventh book, Alf. Maldonis, responsible editor, Vilnius, Valstybinė Grožinės Literatūros Leidykla, 1959. "Intimate lyricism" characterizes many of the young poets' works.
29. *Literatūra ir Menas* (Literature and Art), Feb. 27, 1960, cited in English edition of *Elta*, *op. cit.*, April 25, 1960, p. 8.
30. Cited from Tiesa by Elta (English edition), April 25, 1960, p. 9.
31. This letter, written by a secondary school student to his father in the United States, was printed by *The Baltic Review*, 1957, No. 10, pp. 26-27. The events described in this letter are confirmed by other letters, a statement by the First Secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party in Tiesa, Dec. 9, 1956, p. 2, and the account of this event in the novel *Studentai* (The Students) by Rimkevičius.
32. *The Baltic Review*, *op. cit.*
33. Cited by Yaroslav Bilinsky, *Perspectives on Soviet Youth*, New York, East European Student and Youth Service Inc., 1959, p. 3.
34. *J. Laisvė* (Toward Freedom), 1958, No. 15, p. 63.
35. Tiesa, Feb. 13, 1958, p. 5.
36. *Komunistas*, 1957, No. 2, pp. 31-32.
37. *Komjaunimo Tiesa*, March 1, 1960, p. 3.
38. Merkys, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.

A Novel of the "Thaw" Period

Two young scholars in the U.S. review a book on Lithuanian students

Vytautas Rimkevičius, *STUDENTAI* (The Students), published in Vilnius, Lithuania, 1957, 336 p.

1

In 1957, during the so-called "thaw", a novel entitled *Studentai* (The Students), by the young writer Vytautas Rimkevičius, was published in Vilnius. Although it is hardly to be compared on the literary plane with *Doctor Zhivago*, the theme of the work and the daring of the writer remind one somewhat of Boris Pasternak's novel. For this reason *Studentai* was very harshly received by official criticism. The author was accused of having shown the vices of the Young Communists without trying to point out the way for their correction and thus having given the floor to "the refuse of student society". As a result of this criticism it was shortly thereafter claimed that the book had been sold out, and its export abroad was prohibited. However, one or two copies have reached the free West.

The background of the novel is the Vilnius Pedagogical Institute. The book delineates events and the views of students in a dormitory at the Institute around the year 1946. Most of the characters are Young Communist League members at the Institute. In the conversations of the students, which constitute the greater part of the novel, essential questions are raised about the present and the past, about man and his goals. The longing for freedom, the spiritual emptiness, the courage to resist — all are themes developed by the author. There are no abstract stereotype in the work — characters representing a single idea, fanatics to whom the Communist world view is the only possible guide to action. Rimkevičius' people are sharply and yet subtly presented; they are interesting in their human feelings and passions. There is reason to suppose that the views of these students really represent the views of at least some Lithuanian young people.

Studentai is less interesting for its literary merits than for its ideas. The theme of the book is the longing of the enslaved man for freedom and his desire to express his own beliefs and convictions without restraint. The Young Communist League member Vincas is puzzled: "Why is it that at a meeting people often become different from what they are in everyday life, agree to what contradicts their convictions, their thoughts?". It is difficult for him to understand how he can have committed a crime when all he has done is to take ten books from a pile that lay in one room of the library, slated for destruction as "bourgeois literature," for Vincas took the books in order

that he might learn about the past; he did not even realize that he had "sinned" and was subject to judgment by the Young Communists. During the interrogation he openly declares that he wants to understand the past, that he wants to know the writers of the past about whom all he ever hears is stock and almost meaningless phrases. Vincas is very much hurt that his interrogators should accuse him of stealing and call him a thief — the word burns into his soul. It seems to him that it is not he who was the thief but those who took the books from him, who stole ten authors from him.

Several characters in the book experience a terrible spiritual void, feel the dreadful deprecation of human values and the nihilism of the ideas embodied in Communism.

The novel's characters, Young Communist League members, criticize the existing order, complain of difficulties, express dissatisfaction and despair — reality and the ideal forever fail to coincide. Bureaucracy and opportunism, apathy and skepticism — among Young Communists — are sharply depicted. A deep sympathy is evinced in the novel for those who cannot forget their country's past and her interests. It is like a protest against the vain effort to reshape the new generation.

Rimkevičius dares to present his criticism of the Soviet system because in the end it is the "real" Young Communists who "win". But before this solution of the novel's problems the author succeeds in disclosing the dilemma facing the young people. They cannot reject their past and their nationality, yet at the same time they are forced to create a life that is a denial of these things. It is not surprising, then, that we find much skepticism and opportunism and many doubts among the young people. These qualities make it possible for them to tolerate the Communist order, but at the same time they make it impossible for them to become believers in Communism and defamers of their own nation.

Generation follows generation, and what is meaningful and sacred to one may be nothing but parental sentiment to another. The members of the present young generation are still strongly Lithuanian, they can still cry "Let freedom live!" And this in spite of intense indoctrination. The present young people are still children of the war, children of parents who matured in freedom. It is an amazing generation in its experiences, its views, its nationalistic strength. But what will happen to the children of this generation? Will we be able to call them "amazing?" The answer to this question is perhaps the answer to the question of the fate of the Lithuanian nation.

Thomas Remeikis

One does not find in this and other books written during the "thaw" and dealing with the lives of young people, specifically students, a challenge to the whole Soviet system in the name of the very ideals it professes to promote. These books reflect instead an entirely different kind of nonparticipation in the Soviet system, a kind of "internal emigration". In *Studentai* we see the people enclosing themselves in the microcosm of a dormitory room, setting up their own "society", so to speak, and establishing their own laws and their own punishments for such crimes as sleeping too long and falling in love too often. There is actually the kind of camaraderie that has existed from time immemorial in all group situations, except that it lacks clearly definable positive content.

In another book of that period, J. Marcinkevicius' narrated poem *Dvidešimtas Pavasaris* (The Twentieth Spring), we are shown another kind of "internal emigration". Simas Kairys, the protagonist, comes to the university with the idea of escaping any commitment to society. One must be patient and keep out of trouble, and in the end things will turn out all right. This attitude is actually worked up into an ideology of a sort: Lithuania has survived for many centuries under foreign occupiers, with their assorted "isms", and if it bends with the wind it will survive them all.

If we look for indications of open anti-Communist feeling in these works, we will not find them — only indirect references, which nevertheless reveal that there is suffering, opposition, unhappiness. For one thing, both books mention underground activity. Student underground organizations publish pamphlets, sabotage Soviet activities, organize anti-Soviet demonstrations; in *Dvidešimtas Pavasaris* an underground organization even kills a young girl who was beginning to go over to Communism. It is difficult to estimate the extent of these activities, however, since both writers have apparently been compelled by Party censorship to represent the opposition groups as ineffectual, composed of hooligans, confused nihilists and bourgeois-nationalist villains — "all putrid remnants of the past", doomed to perdition. But these hardly seem the kind of elements who would be inspired to dangerous underground activities.

Those students who are not directly engaged in underground work and are even willing to accept the Soviet system also have their moments of sudden awareness that something is radically wrong in Lithuania, that a country which is said to be free is actually suffering from oppression.

In *The Twentieth Spring* a student remembers life in independent Lithuania, thinks it was not too bad at all, and yet, when now someone asks about it he has to think carefully of what is permitted to say, what are the teachings of Marxism, etc. In *The Students* a young man takes from the library few books which were about to be thrown out because he is interested in what the "bourgeois poets" had to say, and then finds out to his unpleasant surprise that he has committed a serious crime against the regime. Curiously enough, after having described this event, the author of *The Students* finds it possible to say that all talk of oppressed Lithuania is nothing but "stupid palaver".

Vytautas Rimkevičius also exposes, perhaps deliberately, the economic ruin of the country and the emptiness of the Soviet claim of "free education for young people". His students live in dingy dormitory rooms with creaky iron beds, and they have enough to eat only when they receive their monthly stipends or when someone's parents send food from the farm. The rest of the time they try either to sleep off their hunger or to scrounge up food somewhere by more or less "black market" methods. These descriptions have a strongly ironical effect against the background of Khrushchev's speeches about catching up with America.

None of these things accomplish more than scratch a little gold paint off the gilded official image of Soviet reality. The reader is left wondering about the beliefs and aims of these young Soviet Lithuanian students. Both authors seem to take a communist position in that they make their "positive heroes" decide for communism after the proper amount of time has been spent in various doubts and ideological mistakes. But there is no enthusiasm for it, nor, on the other hand, is there any real fighting spirit against the foreign occupiers.

Their's is a stammering generation that seems to live under a heavy low roof made partly of their own spiritual shells and partly of the communist oppression. Anti-communists, or at least non-communists, they may be but there is nothing in them that would resemble the proud, free profile of Pasternak or the angry, sincere protest of Dudintsev.

But it may be unfair to judge Lithuanian students by the description of them in the two works we have discussed. The confusion and the stammering may only be the authors'. Having had a delicious whiff of freedom during the "thaw", they probably wished to say something real instead of parroting the Party jargon. On the other hand, the still-fresh smell of the blood of fallen guerrilla fighters and other victims of Communism may have frozen their hearts once more in terror.

Rimvydas Šilbajoris

I ROOM 10

(The scene is a room in a student dormitory at the Vilnius Pedagogical Institute, a room that has its own colorful traditions.)

In Room 10 Dzūkas sat at the table covered with two sheets of green paper. He turned to a blank page in the "History of Room 10", ran his fingers several times through his tousled hair, adjusted his glasses with his forefinger and began to write;

"I. 22. Something odd happened today: Vincas Norvaiša was charged at a Young Communist League meeting with stealing books. A stern reprimand was entered in his Y. C. L. book. Room 10 did not agree and does not agree with a single word in the accusation brought against Vincas.

"Let the future occupants of Room 10 know that Vincas is not guilty."

On an iron bed that creaked in every joint, Antanas Pranaitis turned over. He lifted his head lazily, glanced at Dzūkas, then lay back, muttering sadly:

room's resources were supervised by Dzūkas, a master at cooking mashed potatoes and cabbage. Now, however, there was nothing for him to work with. He stood at the open cupboard for a while; then a thought came to him, and he walked over to Antanas' cupboard—there should be a bit of butter there. Out of the cupboard he pulled one boot, then a second; turning them over in his hand, he muttered:

"They let any jackass play soccer!"

He pulled the blanket off Antanas with a single tug. Antanas, blinking, groped around, grabbed the edge of the blanket and tried to pull it back over him.

"Give it back!"

"Be so kind as to get up, your worship. And put your boots where they belong, lazybones!" Dzūkas blurted out.

Antanas struggled reluctantly out of bed.

"I admit no government!" he murmured, maneuvering to grab the blanket again.

Dzūkas held fast to the blanket. "Let me remind you that by a secret vote you selected me room steward," he said. "So may I request that you—". And he shoved the boots into Antanas' arms.

THE STUDENTS

Excerpts from a novel by VYTAUTAS RIMKEVICIUS

"Oh, if only I had something to eat—"

Sleeping was Antanas' weakness. As soon as he lay his head on a pillow he would fall asleep. It had even happened that he would doze off for a moment or two during lectures. Once he had begun snoring, and had almost fallen from his chair when someone woke him up. Since then he had avoided sleeping during lectures.

Antanas liked to philosophize: "You read books, and you will die; I don't read, and I will die. We will both die anyway, so why should I try? Sleep is the most sacred thing in this vale of tears."

Dzūkas shoved the notebook into a drawer, rose and opened the door of a cupboard on the wall. There was nothing on the shelves except two empty kefir bottles and a few crusts of bread. The term was ending. Stipends would be paid tomorrow; meanwhile it was a time of great poverty, a real famine.

Before the stipend is received a student lies on his bed in reverie, wondering where to borrow a ruble or two for dinner; after the stipend, however, his mood is always good. He treats his friends to cigarettes, he is treated by his friends, and everyone has pleasant words for everyone else.

Room 10 lived on a communal basis: Everything received from home was common property. The

Antanas disappeared with them through the doorway of the Žiurkininkas.

The Žiurkininkas (Rathole) was what they called the small, windowless room where they had set up their kitchen. They also kept their shoes and overcoats here.

"No butter," Dzūkas decided after searching the cupboard.

"When you sleep you aren't hungry. Why don't you take a nap?" Antanas said, recovering his blanket. "You know, I dreamed that I was married to Marciukonytė, the Latin lecturer. And through the whole blessed day and night I had to conjugate amare, to construct its perfect and pluperfect tenses. Did I suffer! Were do you suppose such horrible dreams come from?" A moment later he added, "I've got to press my pants."

For two weeks now Antanas had been ending every conversation with this same "I've got to press my pants," but so far he had not got around to doing it.

Dzūkas once more sat down at the table and pondered where he might borrow a tenner. He had already asked several of his companions, without any luck. And he wanted to eat.

Dzūkas had never found himself faced with a situation from which he could not extricate himself. When he went to take an exam he would tell him-

self that he would wriggle through, even if he was poorly prepared. And wriggle through he always did.

Dzūkas' hair was always tuosled, and he wore glasses that were forever slipping down his nose. Dzūkas had been loaded down with duties in the department—he had been elected to the managing committee of two bodies and to the Young Communist League bureau for his class. Sometimes he was called on to attend three meetings at the same time. Dzūkas would give the matter a great deal of thought, and then he would go to none of the three. If it happened to be spring, he would get his friends together and drive out to Valakumpis for some soccer. The next day Dzūkas would find himself criticized from three sides. In the best tradition of self-criticism, he would admit his guilt and promise to reform immediately. And so he did—until the next time.

Vincas Norvaiša came into the room. His "absurdly blue" eyes, as Dzūkas called them, were startling at first glance. Their blueness was so clear and so remarkable that anyone who saw him for the first time would immediately think, "They're like a sixteen-year old girl's!" His light, wavy hair and pale face lent even more emphasis to the eyes. Vincas was wearing a bluish sweat suit with gleaming zippers.

"Did the district Party committee confirm the reprimand?" Dzūkas asked him.

"They confirmed it," Vincas replied, and walked over to the window.

"Have you eaten?" Dzūkas went on.

"I'm not hungry," Vincas said with a shrug.

"There are two kefir bottles. You can sell them and buy some bread."

Without answering Dzūkas put on his coat and went out.

Vincas pulled a chair over beside his bed, placed an ashtray on it, lay on his back and lit a cigarette.

Antanas, on his bed, was muttering—it would seem that he was dreaming again about his strange marriage and about the perfect tense.

Vincas smoked his cigarette avidly. He didn't want to think about what had happened, but he could not forget, and his thoughts chased one another.

Antanas Dzūkas and a number of others had defended him at the Y. C. L. A reprimand had been entered in his book, but after the meeting the very ones who had voted for the reprimand walked up to him with words of comfort: "It is nothing. You didn't do anything! Cheer up. A meeting is a meeting, you know."

"Why is it," Vincas thought, "that at a meeting people often become different from what they are in everyday life, agree to what contradicts their convictions, their thoughts?"

It had been rumored around the Institute that Norvaiša had stolen ten rare books from the library. During the past week Vincas had avoided the corridors, so that he would not feel the mute glances following him—"There goes our thief!"

All this had depressed him, and had made him cringe at every comforting word as well as at every taunt. It had seemed to Vincas before that he had a great many friends at the Institute; now it became clear that he had only a few true friends. "Why is it? Why am I ready to call a friend anyone who pats me on the shoulder or who mutters a few words about friendship? Why do so many turn away from me, pretend not to see me, try to avoid me? What have I done?"

Yes, he had taken ten books from a pile in one room of the library. "What are these?" he had asked Zenonas, the Institute watchman, one evening. "Bourgeois books," the watchman had answered. "They've been planning to cart them off somewhere, but they never seem to get around to it."

Vincas took several of the books, ones that he thought he should read. He had put them in his cupboard in the dormitory. Several days later he was summoned to the Party committee—"Here, write an explanation, confess what you took from the library." "I took nothing." "Oh, this copy of 'Intymios giesmės'—it's your property?" ("Intymios giesmės" — "Intimate Songs" — is a collection of poems by the Lithuanian poet J. Aistis. —Ed.)

Vincas had to write an explanation. In it he mentioned five books. The Party organizer handed him a fresh sheet of paper. "Write down on it those you didn't mention, those you're trying to keep. No use trying to deceive us, Comrade Norvaiša."

So whoever had told the committee about the books even knew the exact number. There was nothing to do but return them all.

Norvaiša was accused of stealing and lying, although to the question "Why did you take the books?" he had answered, "I wanted to find out myself about the past. Often all we're told about a writer of the past is that he was 'progressive' or 'decadent,' and the name of five poems."

But it appeared that no one was convinced by this answer.

Vincas could not agree that he was a thief. The word burned into his soul. To him it seemed that it was not he who was the thief but those who took the books from him, stole from him ten authors whom he had hoped to know better but now never would. Finally everything weighed so heavily on his spirit that he looked forward to vacation as if to salvation.

II OFFICES AND MEN

(Gerdžiūnas, the secretary of the district Communist Party committee, arrives at a school and asks Stasė, a girl student who is serving as a temporary teacher, to meet him in the school director's office.)

Gerdžiūnas settled down behind the table in the director's office. He moved the inkwell and the cal-

endar to the positions they occupied on the desk in his own office. The chair that Stasė would be sitting on stood on the opposite side of the table, facing it. Gerdžiūnas rose and placed the chair sideways to the table. He did not like people to face him as they talked; it is much more convenient for observing a speaker's every blush and movement if he is sitting in profile.

It seemed that everything was ready but the table still lacked something. Oh, yes — there was no water pitcher and glass. On the wall hung a hunting rifle, completely out of place. What could one do? A strange man, the director.

The door opened and Stasė entered.

"Sit down, please," Girdžiūnas invited her with a wave of the hand.

Stasė's eyes appeared even larger than usual.

"She is beautiful, but—" Gerdžiūnas thought, twirling a pencil in his hand and following the girl with his eyes.

She approached the table slowly and sat down with an air of wariness.

A ray of the sun was playing on the table's glass top. This annoyed Gerdžiūnas, and he covered the spot with a file cover.

"I believe you have no class scheduled for this hour? I'm not inconveniencing you?" he asked.

"No, I'm free," Stasė answered.

Gerdžiūnas asked if the school director and the Young Communist League organization were being helpful and about the progress being made in the course she was teaching. He had sat in on several of Stasė's classes today, and there were two things he had not liked. It was necessary for him to point out the young teacher's mistakes to her.

"Why do you write such things on the board for your pupils?" Gerdžiūnas turned the pages of a notebook and read: "Parugėm gelsvom basa vasara prabėgs, mėnesienojė rasa ašara žibės." (Along the yellowish fields a barefoot summer will run by, in the moonlight the dew will shine like a tear"—from a poem by the Lithuanian poetess Salomėja Neris. —Ed.)

"What do you mean, why? I write it down, we analyze—"

You should penetrate to the essence of the matter," Gerdžiūnas went on. "Even sentences can be used, after all, as educational aids. Instead of such decadent and demoralizing lines, one might dictate the following, for example: 'The Pioneers are collecting scrap metal. We will be active builders of Communism.' Do you understand me? Every one of your words must be given contemporary significance."

Stasė looked Gerdžiūnas straight in the face. She held a braid of her hair in her hand, as if it was so heavy it must be supported.

"Salomėja Neris is not a decadent," she answered.

"One moment. I'm almost through. Then you can answer," Gerdžiūnas interrupted. "Furthermore, in your literature classes you read poems and even stories from magazines and discuss them with your pupils. During recess today, for example, I heard a pupil refer disrespectfully to a poem by one of our

most famous poets. Don't you understand where that kind of education leads? The pupils will begin to express their own opinions, they'll work out convictions of their own, begin criticizing what is printed. I, as an older comrade, must warn you: Don't indulge in such games in the future. Take steps to remedy the situation."

Stasė thought—perhaps she should answer nothing? Literature cannot be taught the way people like Gerdžiūnas would like to see it taught. It was necessary that each pupil receive from the school not Stasė's truths, hammered in by her, but their own convictions, which Stasė could only help to form.

So Stasė was thinking as she sat before Gerdžiūnas, but she couldn't argue with him; she didn't know how.

"I will never give up the magazines. There is more education in them, and in a stanza by Salomėja Neris, than there is in a sentence about scrap metal," was her only reply. "Why did you ask to see me?"

"The teachers have adopted the director's views, Gerdžiūnas decided. Everything in this school is sewed up and hidden. I will have to send a brigade to look into things, to investigate their social backgrounds."

III ALL SOULS' NIGHT

(Young Communist Liucijus is upset after attending the anti Communist demonstration on All Saints Day)

Liucijus returned to an empty room. Outside the windows, too, there was a kind of emptiness: the night mixed with the pale light of electric lamps. He threw off his overcoat and sat down on the bed.

There were moments in Liucijus' life when all his surroundings were clarified by a clear, annoying light. He did not know where the thoughts came from. They became entangled with various images and tortured him, until without realizing it he would pick up a pen and begin to write.

This time Liucijus felt a physical pain from the flood of his thoughts. He pressed his hands against his temples and talked to himself: "Why write? How aimless is man's life, his poems and all his other works! How petty is all that we aim for! Why write about it? Why the devil!" He raged across the room; he laughed at himself.

Calmer now, he sat down at the table. He took the first notebook and pencil he could find, and, as if listening to distant sounds and wanting to understand each one of them, Liucijus began to write:

"Someday there will be no All Souls' nights and no candles. They will not lower the flag at our graves, will not salute them, for we are enemies of the revolution, we are that bog over which a



L. PASKAUSKAS

ON THE BEACH

bridge is being built with our own bodies. But if you should accidentally come upon our graves, stand there in silence and meditation.

"Life has confronted us with a dilemma: On the one hand, 'we live to enact God's will on earth and go to heaven,' on the other hand, 'all roads lead to Communism.' But by the roadside — we are threatened with bayonets. We did not and do not believe the one nor the other. How fortunate to know who your enemy is! We do not even know that. How fortunate to believe strongly in something and fight for it! We have lost all our beliefs. We rage without purpose, we speak only because we have tongues, we laugh because others are also giggling and flashing their eyes.

"I wanted to think, to be silent, to confer, so that I might scatter my doubts. At my first words they condemned me as an enemy and accused me of ingratitude for my fortune. I became an enemy. What an enemy, when I don't know who my enemy is! I am that bog; I should be submerged in it completely, so that over my body a thinking, believing generation might pass. I feel this —but probably I will not have the strength to rise."

IV FOURTH YEAR YOUNG COMMUNISTS

(At a Young Communist League meeting we meet several who participated in the huge anti-communist demonstrations on All-Souls Day in 1956. For a description of these demonstrations see p. 65.)

*

Blidzius sat huddled at the first desk. He had returned recently from Kaunas. At today's meeting they were going to discuss him, Mykolas Bliūdžius. Why, they had not said. Mikas supposed that it would have to do with All Souls' Day. Had anyone seen him breaking the bus windows? He did not know. Laurinaitis had said to him, "Don't admit it — say you were passing by and had merely stopped to look. Admit you were there, and don't be backward about condemning the All Souls' Day hooligans." Bliūdžius had not answered Laurinaitis, but he did not agree with him. Now he pondered, shading his eyes with his hands and preparing in his mind what he would say. Yes, he will tell! About his father, who received 200 grams of rye per workday; about the collective farm chairman, who never calls the members of the

collective farm anything but "Lazy toad!" and who is building two houses in the city, one for himself and the other for his wife's parents. He will tell everything, and not hide behind others' backs, as Laurinaitis wants him to do.

The meeting began.

Laurinaitis settled down comfortably in a desk behind Mikas and began cleaning his fingernails with a knife. No matter what happened at a meeting, whether it developed into a fierce argument or a friendly discussion, you could always read in Laurinaitis' face "It's boring, dreadfully boring." Today Eustchi-jaus' boredom was a mask hiding his anxiety. "Do they know Mikas smashed the windows or don't they? Do they know or don't they?" he kept wondering.

It pleased Laurinaitis to play a two-faced game—to belong to both an underground organization and to the Young Communist League. Never going himself to a dangerous spot but sending others in his stead, he prided himself that "Only I can lead like this, so that they don't discover the organization!" He had been disappointed in the demonstration on All Souls' Day; They had all made some noise, but it wasn't even worth going there. The organization must be protected. There are more effective things than stones or rifles.

To Elena a Young Communist League meeting was like a Latin lecture: uninteresting, unnecessary, but something one must sit through. To Elena it seemed that everyone was lying, two-faced—but no one ever said so out loud.

"Menshevik" Stiklius was reading a book at the next-to-the last desk. Neither he nor his friends could remember how and where he had got his nickname, but something one must sit through. To Elena it seemed that everyone was lying, two-faced—but no one ever said so out loud.

If he went skiing with his classmates on a cold day, Stiklius would not wear a hat. "One must temper himself. You're pampered," he would say.

Afterwards he would walk around for several day with ears swollen by frostbite.

About the Young Communist League Stiklius would say, "Perhaps in my heart I am a Communist, but I disapprove of insignias.

Jonas, sitting next to Stiklius, was preparing for seminar. "Why don't they all go mad!" he was thinking about All Souls' Day and the meeting. "They're interrupting my work.

* * *

Electric lights were blinking palely in the streets. Gusts of cold, penetrating wind whirled the leaves until it carried them from the half-empty streets to between the gates. Bliūdžius hurried along the banks of the Vilnelė. Earlier he had decided that if he were arrested he would tell the investigator what he had told the meeting today. The image of arrest had always been so distant—like a children's game in which he expected to be the suffering hero.

Earlier he had found it possible to recite Laucijus' poems cursing life which was even worse than prison, but now as he stood before the prison door Bliūdžius felt no desire to get there.

Mikas encountered a militiaman and quickened his steps, as if he were really hurrying somewhere. He felt that even the militiaman knew all about him and was following him suspiciously with his eyes. Should he run away from Vilnius? But where? Where could he run to?

The Vilnelė murmured as if in anger, the telephone poles moaned, a torn poster flapped against the wall.

On lighter streets Bliūdžius moved more slowly. He glanced at the windows. The curtains fenced off, as it were, homey rooms from the gloomy autumn evening. Through one window he saw a little girl bent over a desk, preparing her lessons. She was disturbed neither by the steps of passers-by nor by the storm. On the sill of another window a cat was lying, calm and satisfied.

Someone on a second floor was playing the piano. The chords forced themselves out through an open piano lid and disappeared.

At another window a woman was standing, holding a little girl, who, her blonde head resting on her mother's shoulder, was sleeping. Motionless, the mother gazed into the street. Her braid—the little girl had apparently been playing with it, and it was now almost unplaited—flowed across her shoulder. Mikas could not see the mother's eyes, but suddenly the most beautiful, the dearest eyes appeared to him. Everything disappeared: the wind, the leaf-strewn street, his anxiety. His sister had invited him to her house while saying goodbye! He had almost forgotten.

"When you finish the Institute, Brother, we will go somewhere together. Everything has become so boring," his sister had said to him recently.

"We will go away! We really will!" Mikas was now rejoicing like a child. "When I go to her she will stroke my hair with hands warm from sleep. She will weep, and I will comfort her. Let them arrest me—I will come back in a year or two. Then we will go away. In the evenings we will drink fresh, foaming milk. 'Sister!' I will call on entering the room. She will put on a dressing gown, the blue one—She'll treat me to cherry jam; she knows I like it—she made such a lot of it only for me. Here is the door—"

Mikas had a key to his sister's apartment. When she was not at home he would let himself in. Now, not wanting to awaken her, Mikas unlocked the door. Silently he crossed the corridor and the guest room and—let it be a surprise!—lit a lamp in the bedroom.

— — — — —

The next day Bliūdžius was arrested.

The pendulum has swung from extreme restrictions in 1944 to relative freedom in 1956 for historical scholarship in Lithuania. Now it has threatened to swing back again. An incisive study of the course of events in the world of historians in Soviet-occupied Lithuania.

THE WORK OF LITHUANIAN HISTORIANS

By VINCAS TRUMPA

The intellectual life of post-war Lithuania, like that of many other Eastern European countries, was greatly impoverished. Many of the intelligentsia had fled before Soviet occupation and had established themselves in the West. Thus, the history departments in the universities of Kaunas and Vilnius became depopulated of its scholars and those who did remain, such as Profs. Ignas Jonynas and Augustinas Janulaitis were prevented from expressing themselves by the neopolitical and ideological system. Some of them, such as Prof. L. Karsavinas, were deported to Siberia and perished there.

The teaching and research of history had therefore to be reorganized almost completely. At the helm for this task were put men who had not necessarily had much to do with historical studies, but who were found trustworthy politically and were willing to accept the demands the Soviet system places upon the study of history. Thus the former author of Lithuanian grammar books, Juozas Žiugžda, became a professor of history at the University of Vilnius, Director of the Institute of History in the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences and editor of all the more important historical publications. A former newspaperman, J. Jurginis, took charge of all research.

But over 15 post-war years a new generation of historians appeared, which today is beginning to study independently the more important problems of Lithuanian history, as much as such independence is possible in the strictly integrated and centrally controlled Soviet system. However, no matter how strict this control, the thorough study of a country's past is only possible within that country. It is almost impossible for an historian to do such research in emigration. In this article we shall glance briefly at some of the effects of historians in Lithuania today to increase the knowledge of that nation's past.

It is understandable that the conditions for studying Lithuania's past, especially during the first few years after the War, were extremely difficult. This was true not only because the small family of historians had lost some of its most active members, such as Profs. Z. Ivinskis, A. Šapoka, K. Avižonis, J. Jakštas and some others. Probably more important, those who had remained, raised as they were on the spirit of nationalism in independent Lithuania, could not adjust

without great difficulty to the demands of the Soviet system. Most important, however, seems to have been the fact that during the war with fascism, and in the post-war period, a nationalism which was officially called Soviet patriotism but which was actually a Russian nationalism and even chauvinism, had made itself felt in the Soviet Union. Not only the historical studies of occupied countries but also those of Russia itself suffered from this marginal nationalism.

The Soviet Historical Hero

Almost simultaneously with nationalism, a tendency for hero worship appeared in Russian historical studies. The first school of Soviet history had almost totally dehumanized the historical process. Nameless economic and social forces replaced man as the most important historical factor. Under the influence of positivism, Darwinism, and partially Marxism, such a concept of the historical process had been also popular for a time in Western Europe and the U. S. A. In Russia, M. N. Pokrovsky (1868-1932) and his followers had tried energetically to implant this concept. But approximately in the 1930's there came a reaction toward the so-called Pokrovsky school. Life itself called forth this reaction, for it became evident that the historical works written according to the Pokrovsky method did not attract either students or the general public.

Finally, in 1934, a decree was proclaimed in the name of the leaders of Soviet government and Party (signed by Molotov and Stalin), in which, among other things, it was stated that "instead of teaching civic history in a lively manner, narrating in their chronological sequence the most important events and facts accompanied by characterization of historical figures, the students are given abstract definitions of social-economic structure, thus substituting obscure schemes for the coherent narrations of civic history".

What this typically Communistic phraseology really meant, was the return of man into the dehumanized Pokrovskyan pages of history. And not the return of the ordinary, common man, but of the hero. And the hero returned in all his glory. Alexander Nevsky, John the Cruel, Peter the Great, Gen. Suvorov and Gen. Kutuzov lined up next to the great creators of the

Communist idea, Marx, Engels, Lenin, yes and of course next to the very Stalin who soon was to assume the place of paramount importance.

A First Encounter

When Lithuanian historians first came face to face with Soviet historical studies (1940-1941), the latter were completely dominated by two basic principles: Russian nationalism in the guise of Soviet patriotism and the cult of the hero, which later became almost exclusively the cult of Stalin. It became impossible to write any historical article without the mention of Stalin, although the article may have concerned itself with the most distant prehistorical times. It was also necessary to be ever wary of offending Soviet patriotism, i. e. it was necessary to show that the great Russian nation was always right and that the path of every other nation lay with the Russian nation. Every deviation from this maxim meant the festering of bourgeois nationalism, which not only was a grave sin but also a crime.

The far-reaching results of the demand for deference to the "elder brother" may be judged from the fact that, in the early part of 1955, there was being organized in Lithuania a great celebration to honor the 160th anniversary of the annexation of the country to Russia in 1795. In other words, it was demanded that Lithuania celebrate its own death as an independent nation. Lithuanian historians had to "prove" that this annexation had been a great stroke of luck for the Lithuanian nation.

The death of Stalin saved Lithuanian historians and the Lithuanian nation from a celebration of this shameful anniversary. Although the commemoration was not officially cancelled, it was allowed to die its natural death. Soon afterwards, in February, 1956, during the 20th Communist Party Congress, Khrushchev himself criticized Stalin's personality cult as well as other anti-Marxist and anti-Leninist tendencies in Soviet life. The Congress gave new directions to the future development of historical studies. They were described in an editorial of a leading Soviet historical journal, *Voprosy Istorii* (March, 1956) as follows: "The Twentieth Party Congress had clearly defined our task. We must put an end to scholasticism and dogmatism, follow without deviations the theory and method of Lenin and create scholarly works permeated by fresh thoughts, creative fire and the spirit of inquiry, thus contributing to the victory of Communism."

A Destalinized Tome

Lithuanian historians welcomed these new slogans in Soviet historical studies. We must say in their praise that they had avoided as much as possible the distortion of Lithuania's past according to Stalin's demands. The Historical Institute of the Lithuanian Academy of Science, in cooperation with the History Department of the University of Vilnius, had long ago been instructed to publish a detailed and exhaustive text of Lithuanian history in three volumes. The editorial committee, composed of J. Ziugžda, K. Jablons-

kis and J. Jurginis and their co-workers delayed the completion of the first volume, although the prospectus was ready in 1953. This volume finally appeared in 1957, that is, after destalinization and was therefore considerably rid of various nonsensical statements with which, for instance, the earlier published Latvian works veritably glitter.

In the preface to the first volume the editors freely admit that "in the final editing of the first volume, the Twentieth Communist Party Congress had particular significance, for it demanded that Soviet historians renounce all dogmatism, schematism, scholasticism and showed them the strict necessity of reliance on historical documents, enlightening them through the Marxist-Leninist methodology".

Of course, the editors of the first volume of the Lithuanian history exaggerate a little when they claim that this work of theirs is free of dogmatism and schematism and that it relies only on historical documentation. When it appears necessary to grab for authority of Marx and Engels even in the archeologic section (prepared by Prof. Pranas Kulikauskas), when the historical section is decorated with quotes from Marx, Engels and Lenin, it is difficult to believe that the work is built solely out of historical documentation.

As for dogmatism, it must be said that even after the Twentieth Party Congress neither the Russian nor the Lithuanian historians seemed able to renounce the basic dogma that the historical process must lead inevitably toward socialism and communism and that the Soviet system is better and nobler than any other. In this respect, of course, Soviet historical studies are dogmatic and even apologetic. That can be compared somewhat with the early Christian concept of history. For instance, Tertullian maintained in the Third Century A.D. that the soul of man was Christian by nature and sought Christianity. Now the apologists for the Soviet system would like to "prove" that man is by nature inclined toward communism.

Such thinking is basically biased. Soviet theoreticians and metaphysicians want to consider it objective on a higher level. In their opinion, to write truthfully is to present the tendencies of objective reality. And because the road to communism is such a tendency, according to them, the Soviet historical bias is only a higher form of objectivity. (c. f. "The logic and literature of history" by M. Gus in *Znamia*, Nr. 3, 1959). There is some logic in such reasoning, but this logic is based on a dubious premise, namely, that the road to communism is an objective tendency of life. Why?

Bias About Neighbors.

In addition to the bias of historical determinism, the first volume of Lithuanian history displays a tendency which could be called "The bias of the elder brother". No one less than Justas Paleckis, chairman of the Presidium of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet in 1959 wrote a pamphlet entitled "Thoughts about the Elder Brother", in which he explained that the Russian people as an elder brother have a place of leadership



S. KRASAUSKAS

Illustration

in the Soviet Union. Although after the Twentieth Party Congress this particular bias became somewhat less pronounced, it still is far from disappearing, especially in the countries occupied by Russia.

The practical manifestation of this bias in Lithuanian historical works can be seen through several examples from the shorter Lithuanian history textbook published in 1958 and designed for high school student teachers of history and the general public. This work was also prepared by the Historical Institute of the Lithuanian Academy of Science. It is a collective endeavor ranging over Lithuanian history from the most ancient times until 1957, contains maps and chronological tables but no index. This is a new attempt to depict synthetically the road which the Lithuanian nation has travelled. In the introduction, the authors reject both the Pokrovskian and the Stalinist concept of history. They state: "While opposing the idealization of actors on past historical scenes and the cult of the dukes, and while raising the people to a high place as the basic creators of history ... the authors and editors also took care not to dehumanize a single moment of Lithuanian history".

It must be admitted that these principles were

truly put into practice in writing this textbook of Lithuanian history.

Further in the same introduction, the editors and authors promise to present in the light of truth the relations of the Lithuanian nation with its neighbors. This was an especially praiseworthy undertaking, for it deals with the probably most difficult task of every national history. Many historians of independent Lithuania have slipped in it, as have many Lithuanians writing in emigration.

Did the historians in Lithuania in 1958 succeed where others had failed? It must be stated regretfully that they did not. First, they showed themselves lacking in objectivity regarding Germany, Sweden, the Catholic Church and generally regarding the Western world. At the same time, they were overly tolerant of the great neighbor to the East, even sometimes risking the sacrifice of Lithuanian interests in their subservience. And this tolerance did not concern merely events of recent times, but even those of the most ancient times. For instance, speaking of the battle of Grunewald, they state that "the regiments of Smolensk showed especially great bravery and endurance." (p. 48). It is true in certain historical sources

(i. e. Dlugosh) one can find some confirmation of such a statement, but the word "especially" has been clearly added by the author in order to please the older brother. In speaking of the 1557-1586 war with Livonia, it is stated, among other things, that "Latvian and Estonian peasants met the Russian Army everywhere as their savior" (p. 74). This completely unfounded statement, especially since at that time no one knew even the name Russian Army. The section on the war between Lithuania and Moscow in the beginning of the 17th century is called "The aggression of Lithuania's feudal lords toward the Russian state". The chapter about the uprising of the Cossaks and their surrender to Moscow is called "The war of the liberation of the Ukraine, 1648 - 1654." (p. 90). Thus, if Moscow occupies new territories, these territories are liberated, but if someone else is attempting to penetrate into Moscow's lands, he is committing aggression. Such a view of events prevails even now among the Soviets.

Speaking about the partitions of Poland - Lithuania in 1772-1795, the authors of this history give a rather good analysis of events. They admit that the Russian - Czarist government took part in these partitions together with Prussia and Austria, and "had reactionary purposes, directed against the movement of the masses and against the dissemination of the ideas of the French revolution." (p. 125). The authors believe that Lithuania's annexation might have been economically beneficial to the nation, though this is dubious. In any case, the interpretation of events which took place at the end of the 18th century as presented in the Lithuanian history text of 1958 is sharply different from the interpretation of the same events in 1953 - 54 when preparations were made for a festive commemoration of the 160th anniversary of Lithuania's annexation to Russia.

The pressure from the two tendencies of Soviet historical philosophy is especially felt in writing the history of recent times. Beginning with the 1917 revolution and attempts to introduce Soviet government into Lithuania, Lithuania's history becomes more and more similar to the history of the Communist Party. Even though almost half of the space in the book is devoted to the 1917-1957 period (pp. 277-505), the Soviet thesis is applied so thoroughly that it is difficult to disentangle the actual course of events. The purpose of the authors of the last chapters is to "prove" that the masses of the Lithuanian nation always aspired to a Soviet-type of government, and that the period of independence, (1918 - 1940) was a time of "bourgeois dictatorship". An attempt is made to ignore completely the Declaration of Independence of February 16, 1918. It is interesting to note in this case Soviet historians do partly achieve their goal by, for example, misleading some American historians who occasionally tend to follow Soviet sources too uncritically in analyzing the history of Lithuania and the other Baltic states during the Post-World War I period.

New Documentary Material

However, generally speaking, the first volume of Lithuanian history published in 1957 as well as its

abridged version which appeared in 1958 are not an insignificant contribution to the study of Lithuanian history. While the interpretation of events in these volumes is biased, we find a not inconsiderable amount of new documentary material regarding economic and social relations in the past.

It is good that Lithuanian historians are trying to explore new sources and publish new works. Prof. Konstantinas Jablonskis, who already during the period of Independence was known as a very thorough and conscientious researcher, merits special praise in this respect. Through his efforts primarily, the first volume of the *Lithuanian SSSR Historical Sources* was published in 1955, encompassing the country's history until 1861. Among other things, this source book was used by the authors and editors of both the above-mentioned historical works. In 1958 the third volume of *Historical Sources* was published, dealing with the period of 1917-1919. Both of these volumes have names and subject indices, a rare feature in Eastern European publications. The second publication in this series, dealing with the controversial period of independence, has not yet appeared. Through the efforts of the same K. Jablonskis, the first volume of another series of historical documentary sources appeared in 1959, containing material on the disputes of Lithuanian peasants and townsmen with the large estate owners.

Journals and Monographs

Until 1959, Lithuanian historians had no periodical in which they could publish minor studies, articles and other historical materials and in which they could discuss theoretical and professional questions. They had to be content with the general publications of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences and of the University of Vilnius. In 1958 the Lithuanian Historical Institute started publishing *From Lithuanian Cultural History* and two rather large volumes of this journal have so far appeared. Since it is primarily intended for archeology, ethnography and material culture, it still does not fill the need for a historical journal.

Not too many monographs have been published, unless some of the pamphlets are to be counted as such: that of J. Jurginis, dealing with the 17th century atheist K. Laisčinskis, that of J. Žiugžda's, concerning the leader of the 1863 rebellion, A. Mackevičius, that of B. Sarmaitis, about the interventions of the United States and England in 1918-20, that of I. Jonynas dealing with the union of the Ukraine with Russia, or a few larger studies by Povilas Pakarklis (1902-1955) of the German Teutonic Order State and the Roman Catholic Church in Lithuania.

A study by L. Bičkauskas - Gentvilas, "The 1863 Rebellion in Lithuania" (Vilnius, 1958), merits special mention. It is a rather large work (350 p.), heavily documental by archive sources, and presents the 1863 rebellion, an important problem for Lithuania's historians, in a new light. It is a pity, however, that the author followed the directives of the Marxist and materialist method too closely — in some respects one is even reminded of the old Pokrovsky school. Because he did so, it is doubtful that his work will be read

widely by the general public. A great effort is needed to plow through it.

In summing up it must be admitted that the efforts toward research in Lithuanian history during the past several years have not been totally fruitless. The relaxation of the demands of dogmatism, scholasticism and the cult of the hero freed independent thinking, scholarly curiosity and the search of truth to some extent. At the same time, there arose the new problem of the so-called cultural heritage — the need for a new evaluation and recognition of the achievements or the pre-Soviet Past. This is worthy of exploration in a separate article for it touches not only history but also literature, art, music and civilization in general.

However, as a small crack in the dam at the time of the spring floods can destroy the whole protective system of the coast, so the emergence of freedom within a dictatorial system threatens to destroy its whole system. The leaders of the Kremlin could not but have felt this danger, especially as they observed the course of events in the so-called satellite countries, which was being followed with great attention in the countries occupied by the Soviet Union. In Lithuania, the spirit of Gomulka's Poland had great influence. Rather close ties developed between the historians of Lithuania and Poland, growing naturally out of a variety of common problems of the past. After 1956 historical study in Poland continued almost completely along independent lines. At the Eighth Congress of Polish Historians in 1958, Prof. T. Manteuffel, the director of the History Institute at the Polish Science Academy, admitted openly that the work of Polish historians prior to 1956 had to be counted off on the debit side. Lithuanian historians could have said the same, only with even greater cause, of their own work during the first decade after the Second World War.

Historian Again Meets the People

As is known, the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress criticized Stalin's methods in the political and ideologic sphere rather sharply. However, this was done not in the name of freedom, but in the name of truth, learning, and most important, in the name of practical effectiveness. As far as history went, the leadership of the Party understood that too great a dogmatism and scholasticism do not attain their goal, for none will read the books written with their methods. The link between the general public and the historian had been completely broken. That meant that history had lost its role as a significant factor in the political development of the general public. The same was true in literature, in art and in other intellectual areas. It was necessary to restore the lost link somehow. The same motive, we have seen earlier, directed the discarding of the Pakrovskian method, although it had probably been more suitable to Marxist - Leninist theory than the methods dictated by Stalin. Nevertheless, one of the basic attributes of the Soviet dialectic is its eternal willingness to sacrifice principle in the name of effectiveness.

After the Twentieth Party Congress there again emerged an interest not only in historical works, but also in the romanticized reality of the past as it

was pictured in literature, in art and music. Therefore for example, the historical drama of J. Grušas, *Herkus Mantas*, depicting the 13th century battles between Lithuanians and the Knights of the Teutonic Order, had such success, as did the novel by Putinas, *The Rebels*, describing the 1863-64 uprising in Lithuania. The comparatively difficult circumstances of current life sharpened the hunger for the past.

However, this hunger hides within itself certain dangers, especially for such a regime as wants to hold today's life more perfect than that of the past, and also wants to see the beautiful mirage of the future prevent men from noting the various defects of today. Also, too great an interest in the history of one's nation can always reawaken nationalistic sentiment which can eventually begin to explode the Soviet system from within. The manifestations of National Communism in China, in Yugoslavia and in part in Poland increase this danger, for the road between national Communism and "bourgeois nationalism" is a short one.

Again a Reaction

Approximately in 1959 a reaction began which can be described as the shift of attention from the past to the present and future. First, writers, artists and musicians were invited to change historic themes for reality of the present and the vision of the future. The historians themselves were warned of the danger of "bourgeois nationalism". In August, 1959, the Lithuanian Communist Party organ *Komunistas* editorialized; "Nationalistic narrowness still shows itself occasionally in literature, art, history. It shows itself through idealization of the feudal and bourgeois past, the cherishing of the heritage of nationalistic culture and the antimarxist "continuous flow" positions. What was called "continuous flow" was in fact the effort of some historians to view the Lithuanian historical process as a constant movement in which the introduction of the Soviet system in essence changed nothing.

On Oct. 8, 1959, the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and the Council of Ministers passed a resolution regarding the teaching of history in schools. The basic idea of this resolution was that the history of separate Soviet republics be included in the general course of Soviet history, or in other words, that the teaching of the history of separate nations be eliminated. The motive of such a drastic reform was said to be "the creation of appropriate circumstances to develop the proletarian nationalism of the students." (*Tarybinė mokykla*, Nr. 11, 1959).

The carrying out of this resolution will be a great blow to Lithuanian historians and the study of Lithuanian history. Of course, if it is actually carried out, an effort will be made to strengthen the ideology of the elder brother in the name of "proletarian internationalism", as was done during Stalin's time. The nations of the Soviet Union will be forced to line up more closely and more obediently around "the great Russian nation". In practice, this will mean the adjustment of the past to the demands of the present, or the crude falsification of history.

THE OFFICIAL LINE AND CREATIVE IDEAS

By ALINA STAKNYS

A search for artistic freedom is evident in the literature of occupied Lithuania. Some recent efforts are analyzed by the author.

1. The "Frozen" View of Reality

Prof. E. Simmons, in one of his books on Soviet literature, has said "Perhaps for the first time in the history of literature, art has utterly repudiated the subjective and the sensual and minimized the element of enjoyment, and the artist has been forced to kill within himself the desire to convey a personal vision of humanity in his work."¹ The words accurately define what Communism is trying to destroy in art: precisely those aspects of the creative process that Western aesthetics deems most important — a subjective approach to reality, the sensuous contemplation of it, and the formation of a personal world view.

As is well known, in Soviet art "subjectivity" is a sin. The artist must adhere to Party-dictated rules of "the true understanding and portrayal of reality." These rules define and delimit the very notion of reality. Therefore Soviet literature is not based on the writer's effort to extend the bounds of experienced reality and to conquer new and deeper areas of human experience, nor is it based, as is truly creative art, on the artist's effort to implant his own order and meaning on the chaos of the objective world.

The Soviet artist has no right to a multiform experience of reality. A narrow, rationalistic and utilitarian view must dominate, and this is called "an active attitude toward life." The sensuous and the affective, as well as deeper intellectual strains, are either stifled or subordinated to the theme of "the building of Communism." James Joyce and Marcel Proust, among Western writers, have been particularly ridiculed and scorned for their "entanglements in petty sensuous perceptions and vibrations of the subconscious."

In Soviet aesthetics only objective "social reality," as "correctly interpreted" by Marxist science, has the right to be represented in art. Neither the world of nature, forms and colors nor the individual person and his inner life is, in the official view, a worthy object of art. They must both be subordinated to "social consciousness." Poets are often attacked for emphasizing their inner world of thoughts and feelings at the expense of political themes; this is called "depar-

ture from the aims and dreams of the people", "thematic anemia" or "petty—bourgeois deviationism."

As has been officially declared again and again, the probing of human existence and the posing of "eternal" human themes are out of place in Soviet literature. An insight into the tragedy of man is quite foreign to it. Therefore such poetry as that of Dylan Thomas, vibrating with vital joy and deep human suffering, is inconceivable in a Soviet context. The same can be said of Nyka-Nyliūnas, a Lithuanian refugee poet in whose deeply philosophical poetry there also exists a tension between rapture at the beauty of life and a tragic apprehension of its inevitable loss. Official Soviet art has excluded a profound joy in life as well as a feeling for its tragedy. A shallow and deceitful optimism and a mandatory belief in the bright future of Communist society stifle a deeper experience of life.

"There can be no other attitude but indignation toward the conditions of vulgarity and of falsehood under which the Soviet writers create—indignation and at the same time solidarity with all the writers who succeed even under such circumstances in writing anything of literary value, anything human and honest": These are the words of Francois Bondy in his introduction to *Bitter Harvest*, an anthology of some daring writers behind the Iron Curtain that was published in New York last year.²

2. The Fight for Cultural Freedom

How are these narrow bounds, within which true art is almost impossible, accepted by the writers and artists of occupied Lithuania? It is difficult to reconstruct the whole situation from available sources; the thick cloak of lies and moral constraint prevents a full insight into the tragedy of the enslaved writers. But in their work, and in some statements by them and also by their critics, we can detect a sharp conflict between the narrow official view and the writers' desperate and frequently daring creative searchings.

Until 1954 Party control was absolute. The political atmosphere was too harsh for any

kind of creative writing, as well as for criticism. Therefore we cannot speak of a Soviet Lithuanian literature during the first postwar decade of Communist rule. The only right an author had was to glorify pompously the rule of Stalin and to vilify completely the life and culture of the period of independence. Since 1954, however, things have changed somewhat.

When at the 20th Party Congress Khrushchev admitted the mistakes of the Stalinist era, the narrow cultural framework began to collapse throughout the Soviet empire and new shoots of freedom sprouted on its foundations. They were soon to be crushed, but during the period of the "thaw," and especially during the years of "revisionism" (1956-1958), a struggle for greater cultural freedom was launched in Lithuania by the writers and critics alike. The absolute dictatorship of the Party in the field of culture was boldly challenged. Interesting discussions developed in the literary periodicals, sometimes reaching the point of complete denial of the "methodology" of Marxism-Leninism, the "principle" of Party supremacy, and even socialist realism itself. The poverty of Soviet literature was daringly criticized, and ways were sought to raise its low level.

Revisionist ideas spread in several directions. They were most apparent in the demand for an open treatment of Soviet reality; in a reappraisal of the cultural past and open nationalist feelings; and in a revival of aesthetic values in art and literature.

Since the "gilding of reality" and the "no conflict" theory of the Stalinist era had been publicly condemned, writers began to portray Soviet reality as they saw it. The picture was not too favorable. Several books appeared that criticized certain aspects of Soviet life rather sharply. Notable among them were the novel *Studentai* (The Students), by V. Rimkevičius; the poem *Twentieth Spring* by J. Marcinkevičius; the comedies of K. Saja; and the short story "Padaigos Mirtis" (The Death of Padaiga), by A. Markevičius. Needless to say, this open treatment of Soviet life did not meet with the Party's approval, and the authors were reprimanded.³

Revisionist ideas were also responsible for some fairly daring efforts to rehabilitate the cultural achievements of the period of independence. The so-called "literary heritage" was publicly reappraised, and while the "bourgeois ideology" of pre-Soviet writing was rejected, its literary worth was evaluated positively. This opened the hitherto-closed doors to the nation's cultural past, and with this "bourgeois nationalism" boldly raised its head.

New works on Lithuanian literature appeared that were hardly touched by Marxism. Some Lithuanian classics were "uncritically published," and they were immediately bought up by the public. For instance, two volumes of the works of Maironis, the poet of the Lithuanian national renaissance, were published in an edition of 25,000

copies, which was sold out in a few months. The same thing happened with works by other "bourgeois" writers. An "uncritical idealization" of the past flourished, as well as the dangerous "single current" theory, which neglected the official splitting of the national culture into Soviet and pre-Soviet, or "reactionary" ("bourgeois") and "progressive," and stressed the artists' desire to work for the further development of a culture inherited from the independent past.

Some young critics "idealized" such writers of the independent past as B. Sruoga and V. Krevė, contrasting their work with contemporary Soviet writing to the detriment of the latter. Therefore all efforts to present "bourgeois" writers as "the embodiment of the highest artistry" and to "evaluate the literary heritage from bourgeois ideological positions" were harshly censured.

But the most fruitful result of revisionist ideas in the field of literature was a sudden flourishing of aesthetic values. During the barren Stalinist period the development of a Communist theme alone had been considered important in a literary work; artistic form was a more or less unimportant "accessory."

Revisionist writers and critics made a bold step in stressing artistic form over Communist content, and the benefit to literature was apparent. Some genuine poetry and some genuine prose was written, and the readers liked it because it was "contaminated" hardly at all by Communism. But the Party did not like it, and it insisted that more weight should be placed on "contemporary themes." Mr. Khrushchev himself restored the total importance of those contemporary themes at the Third Congress of the Writers' Union in Moscow in 1959.

Now writers are once more forced to follow an official line almost as narrow as the previous one, while the critics must again analyze and evaluate literary works from strict "Party positions." Revisionist ideas are now condemned, and the Party is doing everything in its power to repress them. But even today there are strong deviations and continued efforts on the part of writers toward creative freedom.

3. The Relics of Revisionism

It is formally admitted that the most important vestiges of revisionism are "lack of principles" or "lack of political orientation" — a great shortcoming from the Soviet viewpoint — and, especially among the younger writers, a "formalism" or "aestheticism" that strongly emphasizes the aesthetic values in art. The blame for these deviations is placed on foreign influence and on local brands of "bourgeois ideology."

In an account of the Third Congress of the Lithuanian Writers' Union we read: "Some young writers, through a lack of experience, readily surrender to the influence of a foreign ideology, be-



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come contaminated by decadent, petty-bourgeois leanings. A number of participants in the discussion spoke of this with deep concern.⁷⁴ It was complained that "a lack of political orientation, a bent toward aestheticism" was strongly evident in the almanac "Jaunieji" ("The Young Ones"), and that the compilation of the Vilnius University students' anthology *Kūryba* (Creation) had been marked by great ideological shortcomings. Some speakers said that in the poetry of certain younger writers there was an "unhealthy tendency" to experiment and search. This theme was also frequently developed in the press.

The question is complicated by the fact that many of the literary critics have themselves been "contaminated." At times they have been attacked for this even more strongly than the writers, whom they are supposed to lead along the true path. In spite of these attacks, however, it is admitted even today that many critics have surrendered to revisionist tendencies.

There were complaints at the Writers' Congress that literary scholarship and everyday criticism "had not been marked by enthusiasm for the Party, had not taken up the offensive against bourgeois ideology and nationalism, were not always firm in principle and demanding in terms of ideas." The critics, it was said, neglected the idea content in favor of form; they would denigrate a work that developed a good theme because of shortcomings in its form. Criticism, while worrying about many questions, failed to concentrate its attention upon the principal question — that of "contemporary themes" and the writers "ties with the life of the people". There were also com-

plaints that "the preparation of new cadres of workers on the literary front, especially at the universities, is especially oriented toward the study of the literature of the past. The most talented young university graduates often cannot work in the field of Soviet literary criticism, for they come out of the institution of learning with neither a deep knowledge of nor a love for this literature." A. Sprindis, docent of Lithuanian literature at the State University of Vilnius, admitted that some lecturers, while "making mistakes" themselves educated the young literati without principles (i.e., Communist principles), and also admitted that the blame for the shortcomings of the anthology *Kūryba* rested on him and other lecturers in the department.

The literary periodicals "Literatūra ir Menas" ("Literature and Art") and "Pergalė" ("Victory") were also assailed because their articles on art, literary theory and aesthetics were on a "low theoretical plane" and failed to satisfy readers, especially young, searching authors, and thus opened the door to "mildewed aesthetic theories and the concept of 'art for art's sake'."⁷⁵

It can be seen from the above quotations that some of the ideas that flourished during the "thaw" have taken root, and that it is difficult now to return to the Zhdanov concept of artistic creation, which has been reinstated in Soviet literature. These daring ideas greatly raised the level of art and introduced many innovations into literature and criticism. The writers have occupied fairly bold positions from which they do not wish to retreat. In the words of one young critic, "Let us not retreat from those broad positions that we have occupied, let us deepen them."⁷⁶

4. "Craftsmanship"

If the open treatment of Soviet reality and manifestations of "bourgeois nationalism" or "bourgeois positions" in evaluating the past are today fairly dangerous, the stressing of artistic form over ideological content is still a deviation that is more or less openly professed. For some time now the word "craftsmanship" has been widely employed to justify interest in sheer artistic form. Questions of style, of the writer's individuality, originality and innovations, and various other problems of aesthetics are constantly being raised in the press and in meetings of one kind or another, and fairly lively discussions develop.

For the study of "craftsmanship" critics, heedless of possible contamination by bourgeois poisons, refer authors not only to the writers of independent Lithuania but to contemporary foreign authors as well — for example Faulkner, Hemingway, Maugham, Caldwell, Steinbeck, Saryan, Mansfield and others — who skillfully depict "the bitter reality of bourgeois life." Strange to say, this "bitter reality" seems to have a great attraction both for the Lithuanian writer and

for the country's reading public, and interest in Western literature is soaring.

"Literatūra ir Menas" recently carried an animated controversy among several critics on the topic of Western writers. For example, V. Žilionis maintained that it is scandalous that books by such authors should reach the readers, since these books contain "examples of the decay of the capitalist world." R. Lankauskas, another critic, answered him: "True, this is a fact known to all; but would V. Žilionis perhaps suggest that Hemingway, for example, depict the capitalist world in light, gay colors, ignore all the evidences of decay, idealize and falsify reality? Obviously, no conscientious, virtuous and talented artist will do this."⁷ The last sentence reads like sharp sarcasm directed at Soviet literature. Soviet readers themselves must have sensed the sarcasm, since it is precisely such idealization and falsification that Soviet writers are under orders to practice. R. Lankauskas writes further that if such novels were banned, then "all the world's literature, from antiquity to the present day, should be examined, and all books containing instances of the decaying capitalist world should be removed from libraries, leaving only books about birds and animals and, for good measure, Hauff's tales." All the readers of this passage undoubtedly knew that the library shelves in the Soviet Union actually have been greatly thinned out.

The poet A. Baltakis once wrote in "Pergalė" that "it is possible to learn a thing or two even from the impressionists and modernists," even from the futurists.⁸ Here, of course, he was departing substantially from the official line, for if romanticism (active romanticism, that is, following Gorky's division of romanticism into active and passive) and so-called critical realism are to some extent tolerated, all the currents in Western literature since symbolism are considered to be completely rotten.

The writers and critics, trying to justify their interest in form, argue that the people are now able to appreciate works that are on a higher artistic level, that readers now demand more in the way of form, and that works that have better form present ideas more effectively, are more "operative." Declarativeness is often condemned and more expressive artistic forms are favored. In spite of the sharp war against so-called "formalism" and "aestheticism" and insistent demands that works be evaluated as "unities of form and content," criticism itself frequently "slides into one-sided questions of form."

This process is taking place not only in occupied Lithuania but in Soviet Russia itself. The Soviet periodical "Voprosy literatury" ("Problems of Literature") is publishing a growing number of articles on questions of style, the use of words and images, etc., and these questions are subjected to spirited discussion.

It is interesting to remember in this connection the fierce "aesthetic battles" and the vivid criticism and daring experimentation in art that existed in the Soviet Union before Zhdanov elevated socialist realism to the status of a monopoly — precisely in that era of "formalism" that is being so strongly attacked today. Formalism, which had its roots in the now-scorned symbolist school, flourished in the Soviet Union clear up to 1934 and was the chief competitor of socialist realism.⁹ While the realists held to didactic and utilitarian norms, the formalists adhered to aesthetic norms. (This is why the present efforts to escape writing for didactic or propaganda purposes are labeled "formalism.") Under the influence of formalism, bold experimentation took place in postrevolutionary Russian literature. But after 1934, when all writers were forced into a single Writers' Union under strict Party control and socialist realism was introduced as a mandatory doctrine, experiments with form ended. From avant-garde positions Soviet literature took a giant backward step to academism. Instead of lively criticism, a boring conformity and official jargon and formulae were introduced. Daring experiments with form in every sphere of art were condemned as bourgeois decadence.

It is noteworthy that at that time the battle for new artistic forms was being waged on the ground that "new forms are needed to express the content of the new reality." The same argument is being raised today. The battle was lost then, in spite of its worthy aims; the new, "progressive" Soviet reality had to be expressed in old, fossilized forms. The direct utilitarian aims of Soviet propaganda won out — art was not considered important. It is not yet clear who will win the present controversy, but it is continuing.

5. "Innovationism"

The term "innovationism" (the word "modernism" is, of course, taboo) has been coined to justify creative experiments and has become very popular. Present-day writers and critics in occupied Lithuania constantly speak of the "organic necessity" of searching for new paths, new materials from life, a new artistic solution. "And nothing inspires a writer more than the feeling that he is forcing his way into an area of life that has never before been touched, that he is expressing such thoughts as will enrich other people, will advance the development of literature."¹⁰ These words ring with a passionate longing for creative freedom.

A battle for the acceptance of free verse has been waged during the past several years, and it seems that modern verse has now become respectable. At a meeting of the poets' section of the Writers' Union on January 5, 1960, problems of innovation, artistic experiment, originality and the poet's individuality were intensively discussed.

Experiments in versification were evaluated favorably; not long ago they had been condemned as a decadence of poetic form. Some writers strongly defended free verse on the ground that it "gives great freedom to thought, feeling, imagery."¹¹

At a meeting of the prose writers' section that was also held in January, voices were raised against ancient schemes and frozen forms. Some participants praised innovations "quite lavishly" and, according to press reports, "gave the impression that one should abandon all traditions, take up something entirely new." A lively discussion on the novel developed in "Literatūra ir Menas," and O. Būtėnas, among others, even called for a completely new form for the novel.¹²

Official circles are observing these developments with a wary eye and are trying to divert them into safe channels. "We favor experiments, we favor innovations, the improvement of verse, we are against primitivism and didacticism. But we understand innovations to mean in the first place innovations of content, innovations in the sphere of ideas, feelings, thoughts, and not as the empty rattling of beautiful words, metaphors."¹³

In the press, critics representing the official line claim that true innovation lies in revealing as deeply as possible "the content of the new life". Thus they are forever stressing the supremacy of ideological content and condemning "drawing room aestheticism" and "empty experiments." "The question of enriching our literature with artistic individuality," said one such Party — line critic, "though it need not be referred to the problem of themes in a vulgar way, is nevertheless connected with the broadening and deepening of the complex of ideas."¹⁴ But where in the sphere of ideas are "innovations" and originality permitted?

It should be noted here that present — day artists in occupied Lithuania are not seeking innovations of form exclusively; they actually seek new paths wherever possible. But the Party — line critics, in their deliberately confusing jargon, summarize all tendencies to experiment and to search as a "form versus content" conflict.

6. Lack of "Contemporary Themes"

By "content" they mean, of course, Communist ideological content, and most writers, although they are unable to escape this completely, are looking for ways and means to avoid it as much as possible. A determined "absence of contemporary themes" manifests itself in their work. "Writers are taking up contemporary themes very unwillingly" in spite of intense Party pressure for them to "strengthen their ties with the life of the people." Neither "the growth and development of the working class" nor collective farm life attracts much attention from the writers.

Poetry, as we have seen, is quite devoid of "social themes." In prose, only a few young au-

thors write about collective farm life. Apparently it is easier to conform to the Party line in writing about the past. There are very few plays with contemporary themes, and those that have dealt with Soviet reality have not expressed the pathos of that reality but have concentrated on its negative aspects.

"In the latest works of original Lithuanian drama pride of place is awarded to ... thieves, embezzlers of public property. Around us — Communist labor brigades, Heroes of Socialist Labor, today's new hero. And it is as if we purposely did not see them. Is this not paradoxical?"¹⁵

And here is another paradox: At the aforementioned Writers' Congress, the former chairman of the Writers' Union stated that "if today we sincerely rejoice in the triumphs of our literature, then we must be grateful to the Communist Party, which not only guided the creation of the new socialist life but also with maternal sensitivity raised and encouraged our literature."¹⁶

Of course, it is quite clear to everyone that progress was achieved not thanks to the Party's leadership but precisely because of bold escapes from its iron clutch. It only remains to be wished for the literature of occupied Lithuania that the Party's maternal care not smother it again.

NOTES

¹E. Simmons, *Russian Fiction and Soviet Ideology*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1958.

²*Bitter Harvest: The Intellectual Revolt Behind the Iron Curtain*, edited by Edmund Stillman, New York, 1959.

³For a stimulating view of this period, see two articles by V. Trumpa in "Lituanus": "Dawn of Free Criticism in Soviet Lithuanian Literature" (Vol. 4, No. 4, December, 1958) and "Literature and Art in the Snares of Socialist Realism" (Vol. 5, No. 3, September, 1959).

⁴"Pergalė" ("Victory"), No. 2, 1959

⁵Ibid.

⁶T. Rostovaitė, in "Pergalė," No. 7, 1958.

⁷R. Lankauskas, in "Literatūra ir Menas" ("Literature and Art"), March 19, 1960.

⁸"Pergalė," No. 10, 1958.

⁹See Marc Slonim, *Modern Russian Literature*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1953.

¹⁰A. Baltakis, in "Pergalė," No. 10, 1958.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²J. Butėnas, in "Literatūra ir Menas," April 2, 1960.

¹³From a report by E. Miežėlaitis and M. Sluckis, Secretaries of the Executive Committee of the Lithuanian Writers' Union, in "Pergalė," No. 2, 1959.

¹⁴L. Šepkus, in "Pergalė," No. 4, 1958.

¹⁵J. Chlivickas, in "Literatūra ir Menas," April 30, 1960.

¹⁶"Pergalė," No. 2, 1959.



A. GRICONAS

WAITING FOR A BUS

During the Soviet occupation there have been hardly any new developments in art as evidenced in this review by a prominent Lithuanian artist in the U.S.A.

ART IN OCCUPIED LITHUANIA

By Vytautas K. Jonynas

It is almost impossible to give a thorough and comprehensive account of the artist and his art in today's occupied Lithuania. Political circumstances do not allow us to visit the country and to observe the artist's efforts, his yearnings and problems. We can only speculate, basing ourselves on Soviet press and reproductions of officially accepted works of art.

It is hard to tell whether the reproduced works of art fully represent the complete efforts of the artists, their different movements and styles. Most likely they do not. But we are forced to discuss only the "official" art which was allowed to pass through the Soviet press.

The artist in occupied Lithuania is automatically involved in politics. His creative possibilities and limits are under the Party control since he is told how and what to create. Political themes are his subject matter, the realistic style is his means of expression. There is, however, once in a while, a variation in the themes: it corresponds to the change of political leadership, to the building of new electric power plants, to the Five

and Seven year plans and to the mechanized farming methods. Even if his subject matter may change a little, the position of the artist in occupied Lithuania remains the same — he is considered still the illustrator of political themes or a "political artist". The Party continues to choose and suggest his themes and to request that they be executed in the accepted style of "social realism".

At the beginning of Soviet occupation, not even the political leaders knew exactly what the Lithuanian artists should be allowed to create. To be on the safe side, the artists resorted to repeating the subjects, style and even composition of the approved works of art of Communist Russia. The early art under Soviet occupation consisted of monuments in honor of the Red Army and paintings which closely followed official Soviet "samples". Some of these works were admitted to the "national" museum. Later, collective farming supplied an inexhaustible source of subject matter: "Woman milking cow", "Girl feeding pigs", "Woman feeding chickens", "Man herding horses", "Man driving tractor" — these became the constant themes of the



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REST

artist. That which was written by the political writer, was illustrated by the political artist and was presented to the public by the political leader. This is the vicious circle in which all creative work, up to the present, must invariably be caught.

The restrictions in subject matter were minor in comparison with the restrictions of style and form. The best Russian realists were an example of what art should be. No wonder that when one picked up a book illustrated by a Lithuanian artist, there were no characteristic traits that would distinguish it from the work of accepted Russian artists. Such control of art by a political party from Moscow inevitably unifies and strips of personality all creative work. It would seem that precisely here is a refuta-

tion in fact of the theory expounded by the Communists that they respect the national characteristics of the occupied countries.

It is interesting to note what happened to the work of mature Lithuanian artists who remained in Lithuania and had to adjust in one way or another to official demands. Let us consider the fields of sculpture, painting and graphics.

SCULPTURE

Good Lithuanian artists, such as J. Mikėnas, P. Aleksandravičius, Kėdainis, Petrušis, and even B. Pundžius, so capably imitated the Russians that some were awarded highest Soviet medals for their services.

B. Pundžius in his work never showed any traces of deep individuality. Schooled in

the French tradition with a feeling for shape and realistic form, he had no difficulty interpreting political topics and bestowing upon them the theatrical pose so well liked in the Soviet Union.

Younger sculptors, such as Kėdainis, Petrulis and others, were more flexible in their use of form. Their works are therefore much more convincing.

Kėdainis' sculpture of simplified form, as in "Poilsis" ("Rest"), has succeeded in giving a great deal of life, not only to the movement, but also to surface treatment, while still remaining in the framework of the realistic style.

While looking at the sculpture of J. Mikėnas, one is faced with the real tragedy of a Lithuanian sculptor. His style before the occupation was characterized by broad decorative forms, by monumentality and simple movement. The texture was subtle and balanced. The theatrical pose was foreign to him. In other words, all of his characteristics and his original style were directly opposed to the requirements of a political sculptor. But unfortunately, he too had to bend his head to the "foreign gods", gods against whose superficiality, theatrical pose and artificiality he himself had once fought.

The sculptors of the older generation, such as P. Rimša and J. Zikaras, even though they remained in Lithuania, were not directly involved in politics. P. Rimša, one of the most forceful creative personalities of the older generation, could not fit into the role of political sculptor, precisely because his originality and stylistic world had nothing in common with "social realism". Even his bust of Noru-Naruševičius, which seems to be the closest to the Party line in style, remains nevertheless within the limits of the impressionistic school. P. Zikaras could have been welcomed by the Party with open arms because of his stylistic elements, but death released him from active participation.

TEODORAS VALAITIS

PAINTING

The painters of the older generation were not very numerous in occupied Lithuania. After the death of P. Kalpokas, whose realistic interpretations could have been easily adapted to the requirements of political art, the number dwindled down even more. J. Vienožinskis was apparently too old to change his style of the Cezanne school of painting to that of political realism and thus his portraits still remain a faithful expression of his individuality.

A. Zmuidzinavičius, who during the days of Independence produced sweet, sentimental landscapes for the public, had no difficulty at all in becoming precisely the type of painter that the Party prized. The truly talented and endowed artists of the middle generation of the Independence period, however had to live through a more difficult transformation.

One outstanding example among them is Antanas Gudaitis. Some of his works, impregnated with color, lyricism and impressionistic interpretation, were excellent paintings. His "Dievdirbis" ("Folkartist"), 1939 "Moteris" ("Woman") and other works were highly personal expressions of strong harmonies of color. Unfortunately his works are now very rarely represented or seen in the press of occupied Lithuania.



L. Kazokas, J. Vaitys and others had to go through minor sufferings in order to be readily accepted as political artists. S. Užinskis, from the Eastern school in Paris, with his stylized, mechanical world, was however not able to fully adapt himself and remained isolated. A decorator of extraordinary talent, L. Truikys, completely disappeared from the artistic scene.

The younger generation, for the most part, adapted itself to the new requirements and in turn was adopted by the Party. V. Dilka, with his sculptured stroke from the Italian school of realism, A. Savickas, V. Gečas, J. Svažas, S. Džiaukštas, A. Stasiulevičius, V. Gražėnas, S. Veiverytė, A. Greičiūnaitė, are some of the more prominent names.

GRAPHIC ART

In the field of graphic art, Lithuanian artists had achieved great results during the period of Independence. Today, Lithuania's most gifted graphic artists are in the West. Among the first-rate artists remaining in occupied Lithuania are V. Jurkūnas, M. Bulaka, A. Kučas, J. Kuzminskis, T. Kulakauskas and P. Rauduvė.

It is amazing to discover that within the past fifteen years there have been no innovations in Lithuanian art in general, whether it be in painting, sculpture or graphic art. The two Russian graphic artists Kravchenko, and Favorski with linear wood-engravings, are still set up as the examples to be followed by Lithuanian artists. There are no new problems to be solved, no new outlooks or viewpoints towards subject matter and composition. J. Kuzminskis in his Vilnius woodcuts remains the same promising young man that he was twenty years ago while still a student in the art school. In his BRIČKA illustrations, A. Kučas also failed to catch up with himself. It is sad to see how quickly talent freezes and is forced to stand still in the chilly climate of Soviet art.

Perhaps the most depressing case of all is that of V. Jurkūnas. His illustrations of METAI are lagging behind even his own former work done during the days of Independence. Only in a few illustrations does he remind one of the old Jurkūnas, with his crude monumentality and the natural archaic force so characteristic of a Lithuanian graphic art-

ist. Yet this creative force had to die, in order to make way for a senseless imitation of Russian graphic art.

Among the young artists there is a whole crop of new talent. The younger generation, that grew and matured in the reflective influence of Lithuanian art during the independence period, at first accepted social realism, but seems now to be growing weary of the yoke imposed upon them. We find for the first time an attempt to solve the rhythm problem in "Festivalyje" (At the festival) of V. Karatajus and in the "Turguje" (At the market) of V. Gečas. Much has been gained from the point of view of form. Large scale sculptures and figure composition clearly show and prove the ability of the creative artist to control format.

State support could do much to help the creativity if only it would not bind the artist with political straps and place him in the position of an amateur having to create what is pleasing and vital to the "public". The political leaders pretend to think for the people and for the artist, believing that the art education of the people is still that of babes in swaddling clothes.

Gomulka's Poland, though it be communist, nevertheless allows more freedom for its artists. The latter have spiritual ties with the abstract art of the West, which is still frowned upon by Russia. It seems, however, that Moscow's approval or praise is neither coveted nor wanted.

In Russia itself some Western schools of art are becoming more acceptable. In one instance, the Moscow art critic Sarabjanov corrected the Lithuanian Party-line critic V. Drėma who had previously stated that the works of Monet were living examples of decadent "bourgeois" culture. Sarabjanov snapped that "it is somewhat too late to doubt Monet and the merits of classical impressionism. They were acclaimed by history". ("Pravda" Moscow, June 5, 1960)

If some future day the impressionistic school becomes accepted and even popularized in the Soviet Union, then there is no doubt that even the Lithuanian artist will have his horizons broadened and brightened by this new freedom. Freedom to create and independence from imposed restrictions will eventually be the goal of every true artist who has remained faithful to his calling.



VILNIUS. Railroad Workers' Palace of Culture. Built in 1957

Developments in Architecture

By JURGIS GIMBUTAS

During World War II, the old section of the city of Vilnius was greatly damaged. Fortunately, the great monuments of the Lithuanian capital's architecture — churches and buildings dating from the Gothic through the Classical periods, remained unharmed and intact. The 15 post-war years witnessed the construction of a few residential, cultural, and government office buildings in Vilnius. In the background of a city grown marvelously rich in its architecture through the centuries, it is difficult for contemporary architects to create new structures which would not only meet the functional needs of the day, but would also complement and blend harmoniously with the historic masterpieces. The obvious solution would be

to restore and preserve the old architectural masterpieces in the congruous setting of the city's older section and to group the new buildings into modern sectors. But this would not be in accord with the official Soviet party line which advocates a stale, uncreative eclecticism — the imitation of various historical styles or their elements.

The Soviet Lithuanian press reports that a Railroad Workers Palace of Culture, an airport terminal and a few movie and drama theatres have been erected in Vilnius after the war. Currently, plans for a new State Library, a new Academy of Music, and for new Government Administrative Offices have been published. Also the railroad stations of Vilnius and Kaunas have been remodeled.

Because these plans are drawn-up by government agencies, the names of the architects have not been made public. They are neither published in the popular press nor printed on the postcard reproductions. However, the name of the author of the project for the State Library is known. The name, V.I. Anikin, is typically Russian, revealing the Russian monopoly of Lithuanian architecture, in spite of the fact that a new generation of Lithuanian architects has come to the fore and that a few architects, prominent in the years of Lithuanian Independence still are active in their profession.

These new structures are complete or partial imitations of Neo-classicism. This style was popular in Lithuania around

the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th — the era of the architects Knafus and Stoka-Gucevičius. Today, when the function and the building material of office and business erections can not be compared to that of 150 years ago, the out-dated facades and characteristic features of Classicism together with semi-modern plans is an anachronism, unjustifiable from either the practical or the artistic viewpoints. However, this is the architecture dictated by social realism which is promoted by the Soviet Union, so it must also persist in Lithuania.

Last year, one of the official mouth-pieces of the Lithuanian Communist government, the historian J. Jurginis tried to justify this imitative architecture. He is known as the author of history text-books and the falsificator of the past in line with party propaganda politics. According to J. Jurginis, Neo-Classicism is best suited to this epoch of Socialism, closest to the reality of life, and easily understood by the working class. ("Mokslas ir Gyvenimas," "Science and Life" Vilnius, 1959 nr. 5.) Being neither an architect, nor an artist, Mr. Jurginis evidently does not understand that a conglomeration of historical and modern architectural styles is not creativity. Eclecticism contradicts the main principle of creative art: "Thou shalt not repeat and imitate what has been created previously by others." This is especially abhorrent in the second half of the 20th century, when new technological inventions such as: reinforced concrete thin shells, prestressed concrete, high-strength steel, light construction metals, plastic, and other innovations opened wide fields and new possibilities for completely new forms in space.

There has been a dynamic renaissance in the architecture of the West during the past 10 years. It is likely that the Soviet Union is sufficiently advanced technologically so as not to lag behind the Western

world with regard to construction. But the architects are hampered by the Bolshevik bureaucracy and do not have the freedom for original self-expression and creativity. They are being forced into conformity. Other hindrances towards the development of modern architecture in Lithuania are the ban of Western press and the inability to travel freely.

This banality and mediocrity of post-war architecture in Soviet Lithuania was noticed by certain Western journalists on their visits to Vilnius. A correspondent from the Italian "Il Tempo" wrote: "In regard to construction, the style of most buildings, erected recently, is haphazard and lamentable; the buildings resemble square blocks of rough cement, stacked on top of each other and carelessly placed on the ground. They are a tremendous contrast to the magnificent Renaissance and Baroque edifices. (Darbininkas, Brooklyn, 1960, I. 22) In the Soviet Union itself mild protests are heard and the necessity for new paths in architecture is being stressed. The Party now seem to approve this new trend. And even from Lithuania comes the hint of fresh winds rising on the architectural horizon.

The Lithuanian architect J. Minkevičius wrote a few feature articles for the government issued newspaper organizations (and except for these, there are no others), stating that the aping of past styles mars the once-beautiful face of Vilnius. "Each new building" says Mr. Minkevičius, "should be new both in its form and in its construction." He clearly enumerates the architectural faux pas of the recent structures and criticizes the views of J. Jurginis. In his battle against triteness and eclecticism in architecture, J. Minkevičius demands more individualism, more originality. Though with some reservation and caution, Minkevičius even approves of functionalism in architecture. While this contemporary trend is complete-

ly accepted in the West, until now it has been denounced as a "bourgeois degeneration" in the Soviet Union.

Says architect Minkevičius: "Not the transformation of past forms and styles but a critical, creative use of their progressive principles, which would enable us to raise the quality of current architecture, should be the bridge spanning the old and the new eras of Lithuanian architecture." He also commented upon the artistic value of the primitive architecture in Lithuanian villages from whose example even contemporary architects can benefit.

In another article: "The aesthetic appearance of structure should be created by fusing architectural form and function or the basis of good proportion, correct material and construction, attention to detail, and high standards." (Literatūra ir Menas, 1959.) Here the author reiterated the credo of the progressive Western architects of the past decades: Walter Gropius, Le Corbusier, Frank Lloyd Wright, Oskar Niemeyer and some of the Lithuanian architects in the United States. J. Minkevičius did not feel free to mention the names of these Western architects. However in the spring of 1960, this same architect wrote a feature on the latest achievements in construction, ("Mokslas ir Gyvenimas," Nr. 4), illustrating his article with the work of P.L. Nervi, O. Niemeyer, F.L. Wright (i.e. the Guggenheim museum in New York City). He compared designs with some of the latest Soviet architectural projects and he pointed out the excellent qualities of the Western designs. Previously, the architects of the Western World were mentioned only with ridicule.

It will be most interesting to see whether these new winds over Vilnius will bring creative vitality and freshness into the stagnant architecture of that city, or will they become officially condemned and forgotten words in the hostile, empty air.

The Baltic Question in International Law

By MARTYNAS BRAKAS

Krystyna Marek, *Identity and Continuity of States in Public International Law*, Geneva, 1954, 613 p.

Boris Meissner, *Die Sowjetunion, die Baltischen Staaten und das Voelkerrecht*, Koeln, 1956, 377 p.

An extensive bibliography has built up during the last decade and a half on the Soviet annexation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Nevertheless, there have been only three detailed monographs dealing with the process of Soviet occupation and analyzing its consequences in international law — three doctoral dissertations, by the Lithuanian Juozas Repečka, the Pole Krystyna Marek, and the German Boris Meissner.

Unfortunately, J. Repečka's dissertation, *Der gegenwaertige voelkerrechtliche Status der baltischen Staaten* (Goettingen, 1950), has only been mimeographed, and is not available to the general public; for this reason, it cannot be dealt with in this review.

Krystyna Marek, the daughter of a well-known Polish socialist, wrote her work under the mentorship of the famous Swiss professor Guggenheim. Boris Meissner, long known for his articles and studies on Eastern European question and now a professor at Kiel University, received his doctorate at Hamburg University. Both dissertations are monumental works. They are on such an intellectual and scholarly plane and they contain so much factual and legal material that they must be considered standard works on the questions they consider. These works are not only significant additions to the treasury of legal science but also valuable weapons in the Balts' battle against the wily Soviet intention to legalize the occupational regimes in the Baltic states.

Although both authors ana-

lyze the same object — Soviet aggression — and although they both base their analysis on the same international law as accepted throughout the West, their somewhat different ways of thinking and methods of research lead them to different conclusions regarding the legal details of various questions. Meissner describes more than he analyzes; his work is noteworthy rather for the wealth of material he has collected than for the strength of his analysis.

One sometimes gets the impression that the indisputability of his legal conclusions is impaired by the wealth of the material. One also notices a tendency to introduce concepts of German private law (such as "Rechtsfaehigkeit," "Handlungsfahigkeit," "Anfechtbarkeit") into international law and to use them to qualify the status and actions of states. The quality of the work is also reduced by a sometimes superficial analysis that does not convince the legal expert and merely confuses the layman. A regrettable bias appears in certain arguments that concern acts of Nazi Germany or German political interests — for example, the Klaipėda (Memel) question. Nevertheless, none of this lessens the work's value. An experienced jurist or an expert on Baltic questions can easily separate the wheat from the chaff.

Merek's work clearly reflects an unusual intellect, sharp analytical powers and a sovereign control of her material. With these weapons the author lucidly and systematically develops

and defends her theses. The reader will find in her work not so much a mass of facts as inspiration and spiritual food. He will follow with pleasure the interesting and strongly argued development of the theses.

The result of any occupation is a dual legal order within the occupied country. The order of the occupier appears alongside the original legal order of the occupied country. If the occupation is legal, the duality raises no essential legal problems. Only when the occupation order is illegally introduced does there arise, because of the accompanying political shock and the temporary nature of the situation, a series of legal problems the basis and source of which is that dualism of systems, their coexistence and contradiction. The order of force and exception tends to supercede and liquidate the order of law and normalcy. Effectiveness contests with law, fact with norm.

The titles of the works under review in themselves indicate that Meissner considers primarily the legal aspects of the occupational regime forced upon the Baltic states by the Soviet Union, while Marek is concerned more with problems of the identity and continuity of the independent Baltic states. But the dual nature of the problems forces each author to touch upon questions concerning both: the occupational regime and the continuity of the Baltic States. The two authors cannot avoid statements touching both of the opposing systems, even though one concentrates the weight of his analysis on one system and the other on the other system.

Comparison of their conclusions is made especially interesting by the circumstance that the

two authors were unaware of each other's work.

Both authors, after a profound theoretical analysis, evaluate the Soviet occupation regime in the same way. There can be no talk about the Baltic states' having joined the Soviet Union of their own free will. The "people's governments" on their territories have been created by falsifying the nations' wills. The treaties of federation between these "governments" and the Soviet Union are null and void. The imposed "governments" have been and remain agencies of the Soviet Union. In making agreements with those agencies, the Soviet Union was merely agreeing with itself. From the viewpoint of international law, the Soviet republics created on the territories of the Baltic states are neither sovereign nor states. This, according to Marek, is one of the reasons why they cannot be identical with the independent Baltic states: "for a State cannot be identical with a non-State". Nevertheless, this does not mean that the legal effects of the acts of the Soviet regime are null without exception. Any attempt to treat an illegal act *per non est* can only lead to the most absurd fictions," Marek correctly remarks. The nullity or validity of each separate act — in the sphere of legislation, for example — depends from the viewpoint of international law upon the decisions of foreign states, that is, upon whether they recognize the Soviet republics *de jure*, or only *de facto*, or not at all.

Both authors describe and analyze in detail the reactions of foreign states to the Soviet Union's aggression and arrive at the same conclusion — even though it is differently formulated — that the international community denies the legality of the Soviet Union's aggressions. In general, the position of the international community of states is equivalent to a protest against the Soviet Union's aggression, and this

prevents the fact of the occupation from becoming legal.

However, the authors hold different views as to the legal nature of the act of recognition or nonrecognition. There is a controversy in the science of international law as to whether recognition is a law-creating (constitutive) act changing the international status of the government or state recognized or whether recognition is only a declaratory statement, based upon opportunistic motives of day-to-day politics, without a reference to and frequently in conflict with the demands of international law. Meissner holds the first view, Marek the second.

In view of Lithuania's recent and fairly painful experience in connection with the Vatican's unmotivated decision to discontinue recognition of the credentials of the Minister of independent Lithuania, we can only assent to Marek's thesis that recognition or refusal of recognition cannot be a sufficient criterion for determining the continuity of a state. Recognition or nonrecognition is adjusted to the ever-changing interests of politics. It is therefore a very relative political act, frequently dictated to by legally irrelevant interests. Recognition or the refusal of recognition do not create norms. They are acts which must themselves conform to international law, and they may constitute illegal intervention if they contradict legality.

Marek, in seeking existing rules of international law by which the identity and continuity — or, conversely, the extinction — of states is determined finds that there are only three rules in international law that have a bearing upon the legal existence of states. These concern territorial changes, international revolution, and belligerent occupation. Neither of the rules changes a state's identity and continuity or destroys its existence.

If the Baltic states had become Soviet republics in the

course and as a consequence of real revolution reflecting the national will (as Czarist Russia became Soviet during the 1917 revolution), then from the viewpoint of international law the Soviet republics occupying the territory of the Baltic states would have replaced the independent Baltic states, would have continued their identity and have been the successors of their international rights and obligations. But such revolutions did not take place. Marek points out an essential difference between the representative of Czarist Russia in Washington appointed by the Kerensky government who was "recognized" by the United States for 16 years as a representative of Russia — and present representatives of the Baltic states. The former based himself on the credentials of a government that had been removed by revolution and had ceased to exist according to international law; since Soviet Russia was the legal successor of Czarist Russia only the Soviet government could give proper credentials. But the representatives of the Baltic states base themselves on the credentials of governments that were removed not by internal revolution but by foreign aggression in violation of international law since the states represented by them have not legally vanished, only the credentials of the governments of those states and not those of the Soviet republics are legally proper.

The rules governing military occupation of foreign territories were codified at international conventions in the Hague in 1899 and 1907. The clearly defined rules of these conventions tell us if, and under what conditions, a state occupied in wartime ceases to exist. Occupation alone, no matter how effective, is not able to annihilate the continuity of an occupied state. Only the final subjugation (*debellatio*) of the occupied country and the disappearance of even the slightest possibility of the restora-

tion of its sovereignty can make a state nonexistent. The Hague Convention also determined the provisional competency of the occupier. He not only has no right to change or abolish the legal order of the occupied country, it is his obligation and responsibility to preserve and guard that order.

Both Marek and Meissner raise the question of whether these conventions, applicable to war in the technical sense, are applicable to the aggressive acts of the Soviet Union in the Baltic. Both find that although there was no formal war, the Soviet Union is obliged to observe those conventions. Marek basing herself on analogy while Meissner argued a *fortiori*. If the occupier is bound by those conventions to preserve the continuity of the occupied country in the case of a formally declared war, then a military attack based on a claimed legal screen ("war in disguise," Marek calls it) cannot make a difference and free the disguised belligerent from the obligations of an avowed belligerent. Marek, after analyzing Soviet actions in the Baltic, rightly asserts that "there is at every step a complete analogy with belligerent occupation in its classical form." But Marek, who devotes a large part of her work to comparing aggression and war, goes further and raises the question of whether the aggressive practices of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Bolshevik Russia in Ethiopia, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Austria, the Baltic states and Poland may not have created precedent that have circumscribed or abolished the value of the Hague Conventions. She concludes that the answer is no; the "practice" of these aggressive states not only has left the validity of the conventions unimpaired but has called forth a reaction on the part of the international community that has even strengthened their legal value. Hence the Baltic states, whose territory is under temporary occupation, continue

to exist. If they did not exist there could be no diplomats representing them ("they do not exist as such, they represent a State whose organs they are"), no citizens belonging to them, no passports and other documents issued according to the original order of the Baltic states; their representatives could not have *locus standi* in foreign courts based on a still-existing legal order. Returning to her main thesis, Marek concludes that in spite of the effectiveness of the occupation, a relation of continuity and identity is still possible between the Baltic states of 1940 and those states that will be restored after the occupation. She correctly denies the finality of the Soviet annexation.

No general peace-making in Europe has taken place and no foundations of any new international delimitation have been laid to exclude the legal existence of the Baltic States and destroy any reasonable chance of their restoration.

In spite of the general sympathy toward the cause of the Baltic liberation expressed in Meissner's work and the overall value of his theses, some of his views are unacceptable to a Balt, and especially to a Lithuanian. Apparently the author's sympathy has its own somewhat strange limits.

In their political activities the Balts attach decisive political and juridical importance to the secret protocols of 1939 between Ribbentrop and Molotov, under the terms of which the Nazis and the Bolsheviks agreed on "spheres of influence" in Eastern Europe. All the Balts' troubles began with this "shameful collusion" (as Churchill called it) between Hitler and Stalin. To Stalin these protocols opened the door to the Baltic coast (Meissner describes Stalin's masterly maneuverings in all their dramatic details) and the enslavement of the Baltic nations by the Soviet Union. But Meissner holds, on the contrary, that it was not the protocols but the mutual

aid treaties forced upon the Baltic governments by the Soviet Union that are the starting point of a legal analysis." He holds that the Nazi-Bolshevik protocols were only *res inter alios acta*, which to the Balts were *nec nocent nec prosunt*. Agreement on spheres of influence is an old practice among states, Meissner maintains and to claim, as did the International Military Tribunal in Nuernberg that these protocols constituted a Nazi-Bolshevik conspiracy, then the British and French were also guilty, since before the protocols they had also agreed with the Soviet Union on spheres of influence. Of course, Meissner is here using an argument that is somewhat less than "gluecklich," but at the same time he is disclosing a fact that will be new to many. He brings to light documented French sources that show in the British-French negotiations in the summer of 1939 aimed at forming an alliance against Hitler's Germany, the Baltic states were already sold to the Soviet Union as "spheres of influence" in exchange for a promise of Soviet aid in the event of a war with Hitler. The negotiations collapsed not because the British and French refused to pay the Russians the agreed-on price, at the expense of the innocent Baltic nations, but because the Russians demanded the right to march through Poland in the event of war and the Poles refused to grant them that right. "If we go with the Germans we may lose our freedom, but if we go with the Russians we will lose our souls," Marshal Smigly-Ridz said in explaining the reason for his refusal to grant this right of passage. Meissner's argument is understandable only if one believes that the Nazis in further spinning out the British and French thread of "Spheres of interest" in the Baltic, could do nothing else but pat Stalin the same price he had been promised by his previous negotiating partners.

But it is not always that Meissner can find such arguments to defend the Nazi actions. For example, he applies one standard in analyzing the action by which the Nazis forced Lithuania to cede the Klaipėda (Memel) territory and another standard to his treatment of the Bolshevik actions in getting the Baltic states to sign the mutual aid pacts. The Nazis, in compelling Lithuania to sign the treaty ceding Klaipėda, are said merely to have used "strong diplomatic pressure" ("starken diplomatischen Druck"), and Ribbentrop only "advised" (have "nahegelegt") Lithuania's foreign minister Urbšys to return Klaipėda for the sake of peace. Therefore Meissner concludes that Klaipėda was turned to Germany by "legal cession". On the other hand we are told that Molotov and Stalin in imposing the mutual aid pacts upon the Baltic states used not only "strong diplomatic pressure" but impermissible force ("Zwang"). Their actions violated international law, and the pacts they forced upon the Balts were juridically vicious ("fehlerhaft"), disputable ("anfechtbar") and infected with juridical shortcomings ("mit rechtserheblichen Fehlern belastet"). One may doubt whether there exists a conscientious jurist who would agree with this logic. The Lithuanian is convinced that both the Nazis and the Bolsheviks violated law, and with their treaties created only legally null shields. Meissner uses different standards, too, in analyzing the circumstances of the Austrian "Anschluss." We are to believe that Austria joined the Reich in 1938 on the basis of a legal plebiscite, whereas the Bolsheviks falsified the will of the Baltic nations when they manipulated the elections of the "people's diets". Again, the jurist will not believe the author's argument whereby he tries to convince his readers that it is "difficult" to apply to the Bolsheviks' aggressive actions the same provisions of international

al penal law that were applied by the International Military Tribunal in Nuernberg when the rulers of Nazi Germany were tried and convicted for similar crimes.

This is as much as need be said, in general, in a review about the conclusions of the two authors as these concern the present situation of the Baltic states and the occupation regimes forced upon them. But what is there beyond this? Does international law have the means to remove the duality of legal systems that have arisen on the territories of the Baltic states as a result of Soviet aggressions? Is there any legal possibility that the fact of occupation may become a legal norm, and that the effectiveness of the occupation may grow into legal Soviet sovereignty?

According to the existing rules of international law, the Soviet Union could receive title of sovereignty only from the Baltic nations themselves, expressing their will through free and legal plebiscites or through a competent government in exile. But the Soviet Union can have no hopes of legalizing its position this way — and there are no other legal means "There is no legal remedy," Marek correctly concludes.

For this reason Soviet Russia, "the occupier will remain only an occupier for all time," Meissner says.

Such is law, always concerned only with the past and dealing only with facts. The authors' analyses and conclusions can only portray the legal situation as it is. Juridically the enslaver — Soviet Union, with its pretensions — and her victims — the Baltic states, with their aspirations — are in a blind alley. Law, as it is organized and as it is in effect today, has no way of finding a solution of the contradiction between physical force and the aspiration for freedom. It is the function of politics to find such a solution.

Both authors, realizing this inadequacy of the results of their investigations, end their works with a leap into the field of politics, trying there to find means of solving the problem, which cannot be satisfactorily solved through law. Here there is a parting of their ways.

According to Meissner, if the various foreign states rightly refuse to recognize the annexation of the Baltic states, they thereby perform quasi-judicial functions which oblige them to restore the original order through means permitted by international law; what these means are he does not say. He appeals to the wisdom, initiative and good will of the Soviet Union; it is primarily through that country that a permanent peace, based on the free self-determination of nations, can be brought about and a third world war averted. He suggests as a practical solution to the Baltic problem, which is not local but European, that the example of postwar Russo-Finnish relations be followed, leaving in force the mutual aid treaties between the Baltic states and the Soviet Union, which though legally defective, are according to Meissner, sufficient to guarantee the Soviet Union's security.

Marek searches for an entirely different solution. She leaves aside legal positivism and penetrates to the very fundamentals of international law. Two antinomic maxims — on the one hand *ex iniuria ius non oritur*, and on the other *ex factis ius oritur* — are the root and foundation of the rules of positive law concerning the contradiction between fact and law. The existence of states and the preservation of the existing legal order are based on the first maxim; the danger of extinction of states arises from the second. The author asks how long international law, basing itself on the first maxim, can resist the normative pressure of facts.

International law, torn between validity and effective-

ness, will finally have to choose effectiveness in order not to become an unreal vanity. The choice is unavoidable; it can only postpone the antinomy in time, it does not solve it. In an international community where pathological effectiveness is preponderant and where there is no enforceable limit upon the manifestation and even increase of voluntarism — i.e., the exaggerated will of sovereign states and their unrelenting aiming at selfish interests, — the antinomy between fact and law endangers the very existence of international law *qua* law. Marek, however, does not find a mathematically precise time limit within which the choice has to be made. She merely notes the importance of the time factor in law and points out that a state possesses not only a material, personal and territorial but also a temporal sphere of validity. There is a beginning and an end to the state as to everything else.

In the case of the Baltic states, Marek rightly asserts, the finality of Soviet annexation cannot be admitted at the present time. Nothing has occurred that resembles even a shadow of this finality; on the contrary, the Soviet Union's domination over the territories of the Baltic states continues only as a temporary situation "against a background of the gravest international instability", "The Soviet claim to the domination of the Baltic states continues to be reflected by the international community."

Nevertheless, Marek does not surrender to illusions, and she cautions against the danger that lies in time. This danger threatens law not only in the Baltic but in the whole world in general. The root of many healthy norms, *ex iniuria ius non oritur*, is in danger. In the course of time it may become only an empty formula. The devaluation of this maxim to a meaningless formula by those who surrender to the perversion

of law, to the glorification of physical force and *faits accomplis*, can only open the way to the complete disruption of law and order. This is the central problem of all international law today.

The solution does not lie, Marek asserts, in the intellectual and speculative, but on the organizational plane. Not an intellectual construction but an organizational effort can con-

tribute to a growing reality of international law. The protection not only of states but of law itself, and in general of every human value, depends upon the success of sincere efforts to this end. Here lies the way to the *Civitas Maxima* uniting humanity, while the other way based upon the contrary maxim *ex factis ius oritur*, can lead only to disaster. "It is for man to make the choice."

SOVIET VIEWPOINT

G. Metelsky, *Lithuania — Land of the Niemen*, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959 274 pp.

* * *

When the Third Reich informed the Kremlin of the establishment of the German "Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia" with the "assent" of the Czech people, the then Soviet foreign minister M. M. Litvinov replied: "It is difficult to assume that any nation would voluntarily assent to the destruction of her independence and her incorporation within another state." (Note to the German Ambassador in Moscow, 18 March, 1939).

The main thesis of *Lithuania — Land of the Niemen* is that the Lithuanian people have joyfully assented to the destruction of their freedom and the incorporation of their state into the U. S. S. R. The publication of the book evidently coincides with the 20th anniversary of Soviet aggression against the Baltic States and is part of the Soviet campaign to convince world opinion about the legality of their absorption of Lithuania.

The book uses the landscape — into history — into contemporary reality pattern which has been successfully employed in Dr. Victor Jungfer's *Litauen — Antlitz Eines Volkes* (*Lithuania — the Face of a Nation*) (Kaunas, 1938). On the credit side it has to show a number of photographs of Lithua-

nian landscapes, some valuable quotations on Lithuania, a few excerpts from Lithuanian literature. The abundance of inaccuracies and distortions, however, deprives the book of any intrinsic value and makes it unsuitable for library use.

The scientific level of the book can be gleaned from the following examples. In attempting to prove that since prehistoric times Lithuanians were only a chip from the Slavic block, the book summons as its main argument the opinion of ... Karl Marx, who "placed the Lithuanians among the Slavs". Then, in trying to contradict established linguistic facts about the unique character of the Lithuanian language and to make it appear but a part of the Russian language, the author quotes none other but A. Hilferding, a notorious Russian chauvinist and political reactionary of the 19th century.

For students of the evolution of Soviet propaganda techniques will be of interest that the element of Russian chauvinism in the book outweighs Communist ideological contents. The author sets out to prove that only as part of the Russian Empire can Lithuania live and flourish. This contention is flatly denied by historic facts, some of them summarized in this issue, but then — facts are the least concern of Mr. Metelsky, author of *Lithuania — Land of the Niemen*. N. B.

NATIONALIST MOODS IN LITHUANIA

"We cannot forget that the remnants of capitalist ideology will not disappear by themselves. Therefore, we must determinedly fight against any manifestation of bourgeois ideology, against various idealist conceptions and theories which are still nurtured by bourgeois — nationalist splinter groups ...

"We must remember that there still exist among us splinter elements of the demolished exploiting classes and of various former bourgeois elements who, influenced by the imperialist ideological diversions, are trying to disseminate nationalist moods, to promote nationalist limitedness, to stir up nationalist discords. Therefore, under our conditions, one of the most vital remnants of the capitalist system in the consciousness of the people is the remnant of nationalist ideology. In fighting against the remnants of capitalism, primary attention should be concentrated on this particular relic of capitalism."

"Komunistas". (The Communist), No. 4, 1959.

READERS SHUN COMMUNIST "CLASSICS"

Party activists in Soviet — occupied Lithuania have made a research tour around the distribution and the sales of communist political books. Their impressions were published in "Komunistas" (The Communist), October, 1959.

The picture of the political literature is, in their eyes, very sad. Although almost all Communist classics have been published in Lithuania — including Marx's Capital, and 37 volumes of Lenin's collected writings — the demand for such books is at a minimum. Even Party activists shun buying political literature. In some places, according to the researchers, Communist party secretaries had subscribed to these classics,

Excerpts from the Communist press

NON-CONFORMIST WRITERS:

...store their creations for posterity,

"Can a young writer, who does not notice the noble struggle for peace by the masses, who is unimpressed by the world-astounding achievements of Soviet scientists, who does not understand the pathos of the creative work of the people, who turns away from the dictates of life and indulges instead in formalistic nonsense on art as expression of beauty alone—can such a writer be an active helper of the Party? Such "literati" cannot satisfy the needs of our society. They are fully aware of this and, therefore, are storing their 'creations', full of petty bourgeois sighs and 'trinkets of pure art', in their desk drawers."

"Literatūra ir Menas" (Literature and Art)
November 14, 1959

...refuse to use ideological themes,

"Why do our best books of the last few years depict nothing but the past? Shouldn't we be concerned about the fact that our poets refuse to use social ideas or themes; that our writers have deserted the battlefield of the struggle against religious superstition?"

T. Tilvytis, "Literatūra ir Menas", No. 19, 1959.

...follow Western examples,

"Some people nowadays elevate Hemingway and Remarque as examples, offering them as a patented American medicine for the 'asthma' of our novels. From these writers, it is said, one must learn how to write a novel, develop the plot, create characters and dialogues with a rich texture of meaning..."

V. Žilionis, "Literatūra ir Menas", March 5, 1960.

ARTISTS AVOID POLITICAL THEMES

"In landscapes, intimate, closed depiction of nature is predominant. Painters very seldom introduce into their landscapes themes which would reflect our time. Of course, nobody denies the need for landscape painting, but our painters restrict themselves too much to this genre; our painting lacks works depicting contemporary events and people"...

"Literatūra ir Menas", March 5, 1960.

but failed to buy them when they arrived at the bookstores.

The party researchers further criticize the sales clerks who are not energetic enough in convincing the public to purchase political literature. The fact is emphasized that very few Communist party and Komsomol members are active in book trade or related occupations.

A shocking example is mentioned — a new edition of the Communist Manifesto in Lithuanian was published recently, but one could not find it in the bookstores. The reason? The bookstores simply neglected ordering them. As a rule, in filling out order slips for books, the bookstores try to order as little political literature as possible.



LITERATURE RECOMMENDED

THE FORMATION OF THE BALTIC STATES
By S. W. Page, Cambridge, Mass., 1959; p. 196.
\$4.50

THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN LITHUANIA. By A. E. Senn, New York, 1959; p. 272.
\$6.00

SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS THE BALTIC STATES, 1918-1940. By A. N. Tarulis, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1959. \$5.50

SELECTED LITHUANIAN SHORT STORIES
Edited by Stepas Zobarskas, New York, 1959;
p. 264. \$5.00

LITHUANIAN FOLK TALES
Second Enlarged Edition. Compiled and edited
by Stepas Zobarskas, illustrated by Ada Korsakaitė. Brooklyn, 1958; p. 202. \$4.50

LITHUANIA
Illustrations by V. Augustinas. Pictorial presentation of the country. 2nd edition. Brooklyn, 1955; p. 120. \$6.00

LITHUANIAN SELF-TAUGHT
Released by Marlborough, London, p. 146. \$1.25

THE BALTIC REVIEW
A periodical on matters pertaining to the Baltic states. Published by the Committees for free Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

THE REFUGEE
By K. C. Cirtautas. A psychological study. Boston, 1957. \$3.00

HISTORY OF THE LITHUANIAN NATION
By K. R. Jurgėla. A comprehensive history of Lithuania in English. 1948; p. 544. \$5.00

OUTLINE HISTORY OF LITHUANIAN LITERATURE. By A. Vaičiulaitis, Chicago, 1942; p. 54. \$0.50

CROSSES
By V. Ramonas. A novel depicting the life during the Soviet occupation of the country. Los Angeles, 1954; p. 330 \$4.00

MARY SAVE US
Prayers written by Lithuanian Prisoners in northern Siberia. New York, 1960; p. 72. \$0.50

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